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Is Choice Determined by the Strongest Motive?

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Abstract

A determinist is one who maintains that every event has a cause.1 The meaning of this formula can be expanded in various ways, but most determinists have understood it to mean that for every event which occurs, there is some other condition or set of conditions which are sufficient for its occurrence and in the presence of which it and it alone must occur. Upon this metaphysical doctrine determinists have also based a corresponding epistemological thesis that every future occurrence is predictable in perfect detail, at least in principle, to one who knows these causal conditions and the relevant causal laws which are present in any given state of the universe. As a consequence of these causal doctrines, the determinist also finds himself committed to the views that nothing in the past or present could have been otherwise and that everything in the future is in principle predictable in absolute detail. For the determinist, there can be nothing really new under the sun!

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References

  1. The vacuity of this causal formula has been ably explored by G. J. Warnock in his article “Every Event has a Cause,” which appears in: Antony Flew, Ed., Logic and Language (First and Second Series), Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 312–323.

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  2. For example see: R. H. M. Elwes, Ed., The Chief Works of Spinoza, vol. II (New York, Publications, 1955), pp. 134, 194-195

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  3. Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957), p. 141

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  4. Arthur Schopenhauer, Essay on the Freedom of the Will (New York, The liberal Arts Press, 1960), p. 37

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  5. Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, vol. II (London, Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 306

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  6. W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 229, 230

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  7. Norman L. Munn, Psychology (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946), p. 225.

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  8. This argument or one very similar to it appears in: A. I. Melden, Free Action (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), pp. 88–89, 114-116.

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  9. It is also used by Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood-Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 220–223, 254-255.

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  10. For an excellent survey of and refutation of this and additional arguments see: W. D. Gean, “Reasons and Causes,” The Review of Metaphysics, XIX, No. 4, (1966), pp. 667–688. For bibliographical references on recent pro and con discussions, see his footnote number 6 on pages 667-668.

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  11. C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), p. 24.

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© 1969 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Edwards, R.B. (1969). Is Choice Determined by the Strongest Motive?. In: Freedom, Responsibility and Obligation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0643-4_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0643-4_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-015-0154-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-0643-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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