Abstract
Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations is emphatic in declaring that the obligations under the Charter shall take precedence over all other obligations which member nations have undertaken, or will have undertaken, and that all obligations contrary to the Charter principles shall not be entertained. Hence the superiority of the Charter as a law-making treaty accepted by virtually all states in the international community seems undeniable.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
For an authoritative elaboration of both general and specific obligations of membership in the United Nations, see Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations; A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1966). pp. 87–110.
However, some writers would hold that the above-cited items in the Charter do not forbid the “threat or use of force” altogether nor unconditionally; rather that the prohibition is conditional upon (1) such usage being made “against the territorial integrity or political independence” of any state, and (2) otherwise making such usage inconsistent with the “Purposes of the United Nations.” As for the purposes of the United Nations, it is noted that the stipulations of the purposes oulined in Article 1 do not import legal obligations to member states but are a declaratory statement of purpose. For this and related points, see Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), especially pp. 94–98.
For further discussion on the principle of “self-defense” and related points, see F. S. Lin, “Self-Defense—A Permissible Use of Force Under the U.N. Charter,” De Paul Law Review, vol. 13 (1963), pp. 43–72.
R. Higgins, “Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States—United Nations Practice,” British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 37 (1961), pp. 269–319; Kelsen, op cit., pp. 791-805.
Acknowledgedly, there is no universally agreed definition of the term “self-determination.” The doctrine is allegedly associated with “the right of a group of people who consider themselves separate and distinct from others to determine for themselves the state in which they will live and the form of government it will have.” However, such definition as this too must be regarded as a guide not as a definition. Assuredly, the concept is more a political than legal norm. While the concept has become a principal instrument through which many of the new states acquired their independence, especially since World War II, the concept was implicitly acknowledged in the (United States) Declaration of Independence, and saw its first international recognition in the form of President Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points (1918). For further discussion, see S. K. Panter-Brick, “The Right to Self-Determination: Its Application to Nigeria” International Affairs (London), vol. 44, no. 2 (1968), pp. 254–266.
Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics, (New York: Mc Graw-Hill Book Co., 1969), pp. 314–316.
Jack C. Piano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 121–122.
Donald C. Blaisdell, International Organization, (New York: The Ronald Press, 1966), pp. 197–198.
For a complete discussion on this point, see W. M. Reisman, “The Enforcement of International Judgments,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 63, (1969), pp. 1–27. See also Blaine Sloan, “Implementation and Enforcement of Decisions of International Organizations,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1968, p. 3.
Evan Luard, Conflict and Peace, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 333–334.
For additional comments and elaborations, see Quincy Wright, International Law and the United Nations, (New York: Asia House, 1960), p. 43.
For the specifics on the interpretation and analysis of Article 2 (6) of the Charter, see Richard A. Falk, “The Authority of the United Nations to Control Non-Members,” Rutgers Law Review, vol. 19, no. 4 (1965), pp. 591–645.
also Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and Maintenance of International Peace and Security, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1955), pp. 128–143.
Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, 1940–1945, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958).
A. Glenn Mower, Jr., “Observer Countries: Quasi Members of the United Nations,” International Organization, vol. 20 (1966), pp. 266–283.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1972 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kim, JG., Howell, J.M. (1972). Obligation of Compliance for Member and Nonmember States under the United Nations. In: Conflict of International Obligations and State Interests. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0505-5_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0505-5_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-015-0035-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-0505-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive