Abstract
We have seen that the postwar dialectic of the communist camp has increasingly turned on the problem of unity. Even as an ideological tenet, it has become a source of “contradiction” — of centrifugal as well as of centripetal impact. Nor has the tension been mitigated by the presence of institutional forms providing (in Marxian terms) some “substructural” stability, transcending ideological dissension.1 The alternative of using naked force as a meaningful substitute for peaceful integration has apparently either not been considered or, if considered, not been thought advisable, either because it will create new problems of a magnitude greater than the ones already in existence, or because of the realization of the dysfunctional nature of force in disputes of a mainly organisational nature.
... a philosophy, developed in a politically and economically advanced country, which is, in its birthplace, little more than a clarification and systematization of prevalent opinion, may become elsewhere a source of revolutionary ardour and, ultimately, of actual revolution. It is mainly through theorists that the maxims regulating the policy of advanced countries become known to less advanced countries. In the advanced countries, practice inspires theory; in the others theory inspires practice.
Bertram Russell, ‘History of Western Philosophy’
For us, the Sino-Soviet dispute is one of the saddest events. We do not participate in this dispute. We are trying to mediate. But as is it a fact, we inform the people about it and it is discussed by the party. Our party’s attitude is not to analyze who is in the right and who is not. We have our own position, and as they say in the American movies, any resemblance is purely coincidental.
Che Guevara, in ‘Revolución,’ August 2, 1963
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References
Some excellent works are now becoming available on this topic. See especially, other than those cited in previous chapters, Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow. N.Y., Putnam’s (1963); and
Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Pekin: Baltimore, Penguin Books (1963).
William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press (1964); and
Richard Loewenthal, World Communism. London and New York: Oxford University Press (1964); see below (this chapter) for discussion.
The works basic to an understanding of the dispute are: Crankshaw, Moscow v. Pekin, op. cit.; David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev: N.Y., Praeger (1963); Griffith, Albania, op. cit.
Harry Hamm, Albania: China’s Beachhead in Europe: N.Y., Praeger (1963); Kurt London (ed.), Unity and Contradiction, op. cit.; North, Moscow, op. cit. and Zagoria, Conflict, op. cit. The most important journal articles will be cited in the appropriate place. Two documentary collections are invaluable: Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, The Sino-Soviet Dispute: N.Y., Praeger (1961); and Alexander Dallin (ed.), Diversity in International Communism. A Documentary Record, 1961-1963: N.Y. and London, G.U.P. (1963).
See the very perceptive discussion by R. A. Scalapino, “Tradition and Transition in the Asian Policy of Communist China,” reprint from Hong Kong University Press. Institute of International Studies, Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1961.
See Ho Lung, “For a Continued Leap Forward in Military Work Under the Beacon Light of the General Line,” in Ten Glorious Tears: Peking, F.L.P. (1960), pp. 153–154.
Henry Pachter, “The Meaning of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’,” P.O.C., vol. x, no. 1, January-February 1961, p. 5.
The term is taken from Professor Towster, “The Khrushchev Polity,” Current History, vol. xxxix, no. 231, November 1960, p. 261. See also Burn, loc. cit., who agrees with Towster that the exigencies of the present forced the Soviets to abandon the old hostilities expressed in the “inevitability of war” concept.
Harry Gelman, “Russia, China, and the Underdeveloped Areas,” A.A.A.P.S.S., vol. 349, September 1963, pp. 130–42; see also Zagoria, Conflict, op. cit., pp. 249-50.
See George Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos, “Tibet in Captivity,” P.O.C., vol. ix, no. 5, September-October 1960, pp. 25–31
A. M. Halpern, “The Emergence of an Asian Communist Bloc,” A.A.A.P.S.S., vol. 349, September 1963, pp. 117–129; and Kurt London, “The Role of China,” P.O.C., vol. xi, no. 4, July–August 1962, who argues that both the Soviet Union and mainland China realize that the African states are not going to come into the communist orbit on their own volition. If that analysis is correct (and I would tend to agree) the policies of the C.P.C. are not too conducive toward furthering the expressed aims of Peking (pp. 26-7). The events in Indonesia, Vietnam and Ghana serve to further substantiate this interpretation.
See H. E. Salisbury, American in Russia: N.Y., Harper (1955), p. 306–7; Mehnert, Peking, op. cit., p. 282.
See Brzezinski, “Deviation Control: A Study in the Dynamics of Doctrinal Conflict,” A.P.S.R., vol. lvi, no. 1, March 1962, pp. 5–22.
See William N. Loucks, “Workers Self-Government in Yugoslav Industry,” World Politics, vol. xi, no. 1, October 1959, especially pp. 78–9, 82; and Jovan Djordjevic, “Yugoslav’s New System of Government,” The Fortnightly, no. 1036, April 1953, pp. 229-37.
These concepts are discussed by Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev. The History of World Communism: N.Y., Praeger (1960), pp. 24–5, 81-4, 233-34.
Even a favorable critic of the Yugoslav regime, the closest to the concepts here discussed, freely admits that the country is no “democracy”; see F. W. Neal, “Yugoslav Communist Theory,” The American Slavic and East European Review, vol. xix, no. 1, February 1960, p. 61; also Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism: N.Y., Twentieth Century Fund (1960), especially pp. 3-6
C. P. McVicker, Titoism: Pattern for International Communism: N.Y., St. Martin’s Press (1957), pp. 138–39, 166-67
Joseph Frankel, “Federalism in Yugoslavia,” A.P.S.R., vol. xlix, no. 2, June 1955, p. 426; the same author’s “Communism and the National Question in Yugoslavia,” Journal of Central European Affairs, vol. xv, no. 1, April 1955, p. 53; and
Paul Shoup, “Yugoslavia’s National Minorities under Communism,” Slavic Review, vol. xxii, no. 1, March 1963, pp. 64–81.
On the question of experts in China see Mayer, op. cit., pp. 82-95, and chapters V and VI; and H. F. Schurmann, “Peking’s Recognition of Crisis,” P.o.C, vol. x, no. 5, September–October 1961, p. 11. For more recent assessments, after the departure of Soviet experts, see A. M. Halpern, “Communist China’s Foreign Policy: The Recent Phase,” The China Quarterly, no. 11, July–September 1962, p. 103, and A. Boone, “The Foreign Trade of China,” who, on p. 169 of the same issue, agrees with Halpern regarding the Chinese economy’s dependency on the Soviet Union; Dwight H. Perkins, “Centralization in Mainland China and the Soviet Union,” A.A.A.P.S.S., vol. 349, September 1963, pp. 70–80, and in the same issue, Schurmann, “Economic Policy and Political Power in Communist China,” pp. 49-69, describing recent economic decentralization on the mainland, the abandonment of the “great forward leap,” and the attempt to revive the economy by local measures.
The question of recognition for communist China is exhaustively examined in Robert P. Newman, Recognition of Communist China? A Study in Argument: N.Y., Macmillan (1961).
See B. I. Schwartz, “Sino-Soviet Relations — the Question of Authority,” A.A.A.P.S.S., v. 349, September 1963, for an excellent discussion of the institutional factors facing the communist camp. He is of the opinion that the “myth” of unity will need to be shattered if a world communist parliament is ever to be erected (p. 46). For the first tentative, but abortive, steps in that direction, see P. H. Juviler, “Interparliamentary Contacts in Soviet-Foreign Policy,” The American Slavic and East European Review, vol. xx, no. 1, February 1961, p. 25, and n. 2.
Yet the discussion, both communist and non-communist, is precisely in these terms. The scholars who tend to depart from that approach, and use “sociological models” are inclined to commit the errors discussed in n. 1, pp. 108-9. See Mehnert, “The Chinese and the Russians,” A.A.A.P.S.S., vol. 349, September 1963, pp. 1–13; and
Mark Mancali, “Russia and China: Perennial Conflict,” P.O.C., vol. xii, no. 2, March–April 1963, pp. 60–68, who advances the thesis of a perennial misunderstanding of China in the West, in which he includes Russia, both Soviet and Tsarist. Reversely, China’s “eternal” reliance on indigenous ideology is stated to have “swallowed” Marxism-Leninism.
William L. Davidson, Political Thought in England: the Utilitarians, From Bentham to Mill: London, Williams and Norgate (n.d.), p. 13; and Ivor Brown, English Political Theory: London, Methuen (1920), pp. 97 ff.
See the discussion in Brzezinski, Bloc, op. cit., pp. 173-77, 184-90, and 308-15; Slobodan M. Draskovich, Tito, Moscow’’s Trojan Horse’. Chicago, Regnery (1957), especially chapter xiv
Eric L. Pridonoff, Tito’s Yugoslavia’. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press (1955)
F. W. Neal, Titoism in Action: Berkeley and L.A., U.G.P. (1958), pp. 255–6; and Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., pp. 424-6, 430-47.
That fact seems to rankle with the Peking leaders. Yugoslav dependence on U.S. “imperialistic” weapons, and thus control, is viciously attacked in “Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?”, by the editorial departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, September 26, 1963, reprinted Peking, F.L.P. (1963), pp. 25-26. Especially galling to the Chinese must be that they are not receiving soviet military aid since about 1960. Thus the modern technological corps of the People’s Army are in dire need of tanks, planes, and heavy to medium-heavy equipment in general. See Raymond L. Garthoff, “Sino-Soviet Military Relations,” A.A.A.P.S.S., vol. 349, September 1963, pp. 84–5, 90-91.
Also Bernard B. Fall, “North Vietnam: A Profile,” Problems of Communism, xiv, 4, July–August 1965, especially pp. 22 ff., where the relationship to the two giants is discussed; the problem of military aid and supplies, and in what quantity and from where these reach Hanoi, remains at the moment ineluctable.
See A. N. Dragnich, “Recent Political Developments in Yugoslavia,” Journal of Politics, vol. xx, no. 1, February 1958, pp. 114–26.
There is not even agreement between the G.P.S.U. and the C.P.C. regarding the beginning of the actual dispute. The Kremlin version is that it was begun by the Chinese publication of the “Long Live Leninism” pamphlet in April of 1960. The Chinese claimed, earlier, that it began with an attack on them in Pravda, September 10, 1959; see the editorial, “East Wind, West Wind,” Survey, no. 49, October 1963, p. 3. Now Peking has pushed the date backwards, charges they began with the attack on Stalin at the XX C.P.S.U. Congress. It would depend on what actually began the differences escalating into dispute. The answers to that question can only be indicated at the moment, and most tentatively at that. The view of Alexander Dallin, to cite but one case, that the differences arose out of concrete policies, namely how to cope with the U.S. While this no doubt has a bearing on the differences, it is not in itself sufficient to account for the dispute — that question could have been settled to the satisfaction of both parties, at least in the long run, without causing the danger of a rupture in the movement. See Dallin, “Russia and China View the United States,” A.A.A.P.S.S., vol. 349, September 1963, p. 161.
See C. A. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 29, 177-79; Werner Levi, “China and the Two Great Powers,” Current History, vol. xxix, no. 232, December 1960, p. 321. To show that even eminent scholars are not immune to errors of interpretation, G. F. Hudson, “The Stability of Mao’s Regime,” Current History, vol. xxix, no. 232, p. 328, claims that the Chinese are “nationalists,” the Soviets “internationalists.” The experience of the European communist parties, since the days of Stalin, should have been sufficient to absolutely controvert such an interpretation. (See chapter II, and especially the discussion based on Borkenau.)
The phrase is borrowed from Thomas P. Whitney, The Communist Blueprint for the Future. The complete texts of all four Communist manifestoes, 1848-1961: N.Y., Dutton (1962). Neither Declaration nor Statement are included as texts, but accorded 1-1/2 pp. in the rather lengthy introduction.
Several excellent studies, which exceed the purely militaristic aspects, are now available on the Soviet armed forces. See B. H. Liddell Hart (ed.), The Soviet Army: London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson (1956)
H. S. Dinerstein, War and The Soviet Union. Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking: N.Y., Praeger (1962, rev. ed.), and The Soviet Image of Future Wars: Washington, D.G., Public Affair Press (1959).
See Hunt, op. cit., pp. 82-3; Lewis S. Feuer (ed.), Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: N.Y., Anchor (1959), “Introduction,” p. xiv.
It is, of course, possible to now detect, with the inestimable advantage born of hindsight, that the Bolsheviks were, in questions that concerned the all-important matter of organization, already outside the Second International. Not because they indeed represented a national party — membership in that body was dependent thereon — but rather for the reason that the Lenin faction had submerged its internationalism to national revolutionary goals. Lenin’s main interest in international revolution was that in the earlier period he did not believe it possible for a Russian socialist state to survive in a “hostile” environment. But the “appeals” of Leninism, as well as its organizational precepts, were based on nationalistic Russian (i.e., “populist”), and not on international Marxist doctrinal considerations, aims, and goals. See J. L. H. Keep, The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia: London, Oxford (1963).
See Stalin, A Letter to Ivanov: N.Y., International Publishers (1938), and Marxism and Linguistics: N.Y., International Publishers (1951); and the excellent discussion in Mehnert, Stalin versus Marx: London, Allen and Unwin (1952), pp. 52-64.
Ibid., pp. 36-7. But of course there is such an example. Stalin cautioned Mao, according to Dedijer, against armed insurrection, and for cooperation with the K.M.T., in 1948; see Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks: London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson (1953), p. 33.
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© 1968 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Mayer, P. (1968). The Sino-Soviet Dispute, and Some Implications for the Future of the World Communist Movement. In: Cohesion and Conflict in International Communism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0495-9_4
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