Abstract
The conception of induction we shall articulate and defend is based on a concern for truth and the constraint of social consensus. Inductive inference, if totally successful, would yield maxiverific results. The result of accepting statements in a language is maxiverific if and only if the set of statements accepted contains all true statements of the language and only true statements of the language. In a language adequate for all scientific purposes, there is no realistic method for finding the maxiverific set. We require some local method of induction consistent with the general objective. We shall propose such a method based on consensual probability assignments which determine the cost and benefits of accepting statements in the quest for the maxiverific.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Alchian, A., ‘Cost’, in D. L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York, 1968, pp. 404–414.
Anderson, A. R. and Belnap, N. D., Tautological Entailments’, Philosophical Studies 2 (1974), 79–92.
Carnap, R., Logical Foundations of Probability, seconded., Chicago, 1962.
Carnap, R., Chaps. I and II, in R. Carnap and R. Jeffrey (eds.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Vol. I, Los Angeles, 1971.
Hempel, C. G., ‘Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation’, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III, Minneapolis, 1962, pp. 98–169.
Hilpinen, R., ‘Rules of Acceptance and Inductive Logic’, in Acta Philosophica Fennica XXII (1968)
Hintikka, J., ‘A Two-Dimensional Continuum of Inductive Methods’, in J. Hintikka and P. Suppes (eds.), Aspects of Inductive Logic, Amsterdam, 1966.
Hintikka, J., ‘On Semantic Information’, in J. Hintikka and P. Suppes (eds.), Information and Inference, Dordrecht, 1970, pp. 3–27.
Jeffrey, R., The Logic of Decision, New York, 1965.
Kuhn, T. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1962.
Lehrer, K., Induction and Conceptual Change’, Synthese 23 (1971), 206–225.
Lehrer, K., ‘Evidence, Meaning and Conceptual Change: A Subjective Approach’, in G. Pearce and P. Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change, Dordrecht, 1973, pp. 94–122.
Lehrer, K., ‘Relevant Deduction and Minimally Inconsistent Sets’, Philosophia 1 (1973).
Lehrer, K., ‘Truth, Evidence, and Inference’, American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1974), 79–92.
Levi, I., Gambling with Truth, New York, 1967.
Levi, I., ‘Truth, Content, and Ties’, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 865–876.
Marschak, J., ‘Information, Decision and the Scientist’, in C. Cherry (ed.), Pragmatic Aspects of Human Communication, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974.
Mates, B., Elementary Logic, Oxford University Press, New York, 1965.
Savage, L. J., The Foundations of Statistics, New York, 1954.
Zeeman, E. G, ‘Geometry of Catastrophe’, Times Literary Supplement 10 (1971), 1556–7.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Lehrer, K. (1976). Induction, Consensus and Catastrophe. In: Bogdan, R.J. (eds) Local Induction. Synthese Library, vol 93. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9799-1_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9799-1_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-9801-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9799-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive