Abstract
The war had come, in spite of a powerful Dutch attachment—for obvious reasons—to peace, and in spite also of a peace party in England which included the greatest figure of all. Cromwell, in whose mind a great plan for a Protestant federation was always turning, disliked the idea of strife between the enemies of Popery. But temporarily the opposing forces were too strong. A powerful element in the new government was materialist and anti-Dutch, and the parliamentary party could not ignore the demands of its supporters amongst the London merchants. It well knew, from the experience of the Civil War, the value of sea-power, and its enthusiasm for a great Navy sprang partly from its desire to use it as an instrument of a new imperialist policy and partly from its distrust of the motives and ideals of the Army. Its enthusiasm for a war at sea was quickened by the belief that in any conflict England would be placed at great advantage by her position and her resources. A later writer quotes a conversation between a Plymouth sea captain and the skipper of a Dutch ship which he had captured off the Dogger Bank en route from Amsterdam to Stockholm.
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References
Gardiner and Atkinson, op. cit., Vol. 1, Part I, No. 2 (‘Reminiscences of Richard Gibson’).
This speed is based on the analysis of a number of samples taken from logbooks, both Dutch and English, printed in Gardiner and Atkinson, op. cit.
M. Oppenheim: Administration of the Royal Navy, 1509–1660 (1920), p. 306 et passim.
The introductory ‘Notes’ in Gardiner and Atkinson form an invaluable commentary on the strategy and tactics of the war. There are few more illuminating studies of sea warfare than those from Mr. Atkinson’s pen in Vols. III-VI of the Documents.
It was not the last occasion on which professional sailors were to show their dislike of the convoy system. In 1917, Jellicoe and the Board of Admiralty, facing a task not unlike that which faced Tromp in 1652, declared their unanimous opposition to the introduction of convoys.
Gardiner and Atkinson, Vol. I, No. 156.
Gardiner and Atkinson, Vol. I, No. 224.
Gardiner and Atkinson, Vol. II, Nos. 256, 257.
Gardiner and Atkinson, Vol. II, Nos. 435, 488.
Ibid., Vol. III, No. 570.
Ibid., Vol. IV, No. 885.
Ibid., Vol. IV, No. 1013.
Gardiner and Atkinson Vol. IV, No. 980.
Letter from de Witt to Beverning quoted by Geddes, op. cit., p. 328.
Dumont: Corps Universal Diplomatique (1726–31), Vol. VI, ii, 74.
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© 1978 Curtis Brown Academic Ltd.
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Wilson, C. (1978). The First Dutch War. In: Profit and Power. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9762-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9762-5_5
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