Abstract
Charles Chastain has developed a general notion of singular reference based on the reference relation a singular term bears to its referent.1 He holds that perception is, in this broad sense, a kind of reference. Subtleties aside, he holds that one perceives something if and only if one has a sense experience that refers to it.2 This account of perception plays a central role in his framework for a theory of reference: Perceptual reference is, he holds, the primary way that referential chains are initiated.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1989 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
McLaughlin, B.P. (1989). Why Perception is not Singular Reference. In: Heil, J. (eds) Cause, Mind, and Reality. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 47. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-9736-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9734-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive