Intention

Abstract

According to commonsense psychology, mature humans have intentions, desires and beliefs. Very young children and some animals have desires and beliefs and act intentionally, but lack intentions. So what is distinctive of intending? What is added when we form intentions as well as possessing desires and beliefs?

This paper is the result of two sets of joint seminars on these topics in which I have learned greatly from my co-lecturers: Stephen Williams and Michael Bratman. My debt to Bratman’s pioneering work will be evident throughout the paper. An earlier version of this paper was read at a conference on ‘Functionalism and Content’ at the Inter-university Centre at Dubrovnik in September 1988, and the Oriel Wednesday discussion group in January 1989. I am indebted to Misha Arsenijevic, Bill Brewer, Justin Broackes, john Campbell, Quassim Cassam, Bill Child, Adrian Cussins, Kathleen Lennon, Michael Martin, Al Mele, Neven Sesardic, Holly Smith, Paul Snowdon, Fred Stoutland and Tim Williamson for their comments and criticisms. It is a pleasure to be able to contribute this paper to a Festschrift for Charlie Martin with whom I have enjoyed a variety of illuminating and vigorous discussions on these and other topics over several years.