Abstract
It is in the Fifth Book of his treatise that Gianfrancesco Pico examines carefully the Aristotelian theory of “scientific demonstration.” We have spoken of this briefly already.1 It now remains for us to analyze his argument systematically. We might say at the outset that the loss of Pico’s Institutiones Logicae to some extent impairs our present study. This work, which seems to have been one of Pico’s more important philosophical writings, apparently was never printed and no manuscript of it is known to exist.2 Almost certainly it treated many of the key problems which are also discussed in the Examen Vanitatis. However, the major lines of Pico’s position are evident from the latter work; and, although some fine points of his logic may escape us, we can still learn much about his attitude regarding demonstrative science from a study of the Examen Vanitatis.
Quanto usui autem esse possit Sexti Empirici commentarius ad tuenda Christianae religionis dogmata adversus externos philosophos, pulchre do-cet Franciscus Picus Mirandulanus in eo libro quo Christianam tuetur philo-sophiam adversus dogmata externorum philosophorum.
Gentian Hervet, Preface to his translation of Sextus (1569).
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References
See particularly the discussion in the preceding chapter, pp. 75–82.
This work is mentioned in the often reprinted letter from Gianfrancesco Pico to Lilio Gregorio Giraldi (ed. cit., pp. 877–80) which lists the writings of the two Pico. It is one of the works most often cited by Gianfrancesco. See for example Ex. Van., I, 13, p. 510; II, 32, p. 576; III, 10, p. 636; IV, prooem., p. 658; V, 1, p. 694; V, 7, p. 724; V, 8, p. 728; V, 12, P. 749.
“Nec locis communibus et translatitiis utendum, nec principibus aliarum sectarum, qui Aristotelem confutavere omnino insistendum. Non Garneadis tormenta, non Ephecticorum philosophorum copiae, non Sexti Empirici machinae confidant praelium. Non Galeni, non Avicennae particulares in ilium excursiones bellum indicant, sed ipsi nostro aere licet minus canoro bellum canamus, nostra promamus arma, licet acuminata minus. Demus quae etiam operam ut ipsemet Aristoteles se magna ex parte armet in semet, ac eius in ilium familia validis arietet lacertis, deque ipsorum armamentario eliciantur instrumenta, quibus oppug-netur ad hanc agnoscendae veritatis expeditionem.” Ex. Van., V, 1; p. 693. For Pico’s rejection of Aristotle see Ernst Gassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (Berlin, 1922), I, pp. 145–49.
Ibid., V, 1; p. 693.
Ibid., V, 1; p. 694.
See for example I, 5, p. 492; V, 2, p. 695; V, 10, p. 735; V, 10, p. 737; V, 13, p. 759. Also see De Elementis 3, p. 118.
432a7–8. Cf. Post. An. I, 18 (81a37–b10).
“... reliquas omnes quae a sensu oriuntur et de quibus proprie conficit artem Aristoteles, quo pacto defendes? Quomodo certam dices artem quae incertis principiis utatur? In-certis nitatur fundamentis? Gontendes fortasse non semper decipi sensum, quid tum? Nam etsi quandoque non decipitur, tarnen et quandoque etiam decipitur, sive in indicando sive in iudicando, sive in utroque. Ideoque incertus. Dices corrigi errorem aliis postea sensionibus sensationibusve, ut dici plerisque solet. Dicam ego te semper incertum, an in hac an in ilia videlicet sensione fueris deceptus, nam sensus ipse ut diximus, ut mox etiam latius dicemus, in se ipso, quanquam verus esse potest, varius tarnen et ambiguus dubiusque et est et habetur saepenumero ipsa experientia, cum suo officio defungitur.” Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 696.
See Charles B. Schmitt, “Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Gianfrancesco Pico on Illumination,” Mediaeval Studies, XXV (1963), pp. 231–58.
“Indicium appello haustum receptionemque sensilis formae qua res ipsa indicatur altiori potestati.” Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 695.
τῷ τε ϰριτιϰῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἒργον ἐστι ϰαὶ αἰσθήσεως 432a16. Although Aristotle usually speaks of sense as being passive, in certain contexts a more active nature is attributed to it. For example, it is spoken of as judging (ϰρὶνειν) several times in the De Anima. See 418a 14, 422a21, and also De motu an. 700b 19–21. In fact, this ability to judge might be considered the common element that connects the powers of sense and intellect. See De Anima 4273a20–21. Also interesting is the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodisias cited by Hicks (op. cit., p. 361) in his note to 418a 14. According to this, the nature of the judgement seems to rest on the ability to distinguish the various range of qualities possible within the object sensed: that is, whether it is sweet, sour, or bitter, for example. Cf. De Anima 42608–12.
“Indicat enim sensus superiori altiorique vi quod sentit, quod forinsecus hausit per illa quinque ceu canalicula sensilium specierum, idque ipsum etiam sua ipse vi et potestate diiudicat.” Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 695.
“Nam sensus quidem verum esse aliquando et indicium et iudicium non ambigo, nul-lumque homini, qua carneus est, omnino verius, turn, scilicet, cum non fallitur, cum non in ambiguo versatur, cum in sua duntaxat sensione persistit, nec ad aliorum sensa et iudicia refertur, quanquam fere semper adsunt conditiones ipsius sensorii varii quae res ipsas ob diversum temperamentum secus ac se habeat apud alios, saepe etiam aliter ас se habeat Veritas, prae se ferunt; ob diversam etiam rei ipsius sensilis fluxamque naturam ea ipsa, quae obiiciuntur sensorio, diversae sese habent temporis diversitate.” Ex. Van., V, 3; p. 704.
See De Anima 428b18–22. Also see our discussion of this in the previous chapter, p. 80. Cf. De Anima II, 6.
See our discussion in the previous chapter, note 89. The same question arises again in connection with Pico’s disagreement with Duns Scotus on the reliability of sense knowledge. See Schmitt, “Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Gianfrancesco Pico on Illumination,” Mediaeval Studies, XXV (1963), pp. 244–55.
Ex. Van., IV, 12; pp. 688–89. See our discussion of this in the previous chapter, pp. 79–82.
Pico says very much the same thing in the De Imaginatione. See Caplan’s edition, pp. 34–37, where the editor also gives references to the sources in Aristotle, Galen, and Averroes and adds several useful notes. Also cf. Ex. Van., I, 14; p. 515. On the history of this question see Arthur Schneider, Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, IV, 5 (1903), pp. 173–84.
On Leoniceno and Manardo, see chapter I. Ludovico Carro is mentioned several times by Pico in the Examen Vanitatis (V, 4; p. 714, for example). For further information, see Giulio Bertoni, La Biblioteca Estense e la cultura ferrarese ai tempi del duca Ercole I (1471–1505) (Turin, 1903), pp. 97, 190–91. See also notes 19, 22, and 31 below.
The earliest detailed discussion of the theory of humors and temperaments is in the work De natura hominis (ca. 420 B.C.), attributed to Hippocrates. A convenient edition is W. H. S. Jones (ed.), Hippocrates (London, 1923–31), IV, pp. 1–41.
See also George Sarton, “Remarks on the Theory of Temperaments,” Isis, XXXIV (1943), pp. 205–208.
For a detailed study of melancholia, as one of the humors, and its influence see Klibansky, Saxl, and Panofsky, Saturn and Melancholy (Edinburgh, 1964).
“Proportio autem ipsa multis variari modis potest, per aetatem, per casum, item eadem in aetate, nutritione, auctione, detractione, vel omnium, vel aliquorum, quorum videlicet in loco caeteri succedant humores, unde et varia quoque proportio dissultet, quae etsi eadem esset, ab alio tarnen individuo diversa fuerit, ut propterea certa ulla, et universalis regula sensilis, super qua fundetur demonstratio, trahi non queat.” Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 702.
The root of such an argument can be found in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, but is not there spelled out in great detail. See I, 14, 51–52 (Loeb Ed., pp. 30–33) where it is argued that, for example, when we have a cold and phlegm is excessive, our sense impressions are different than they are under normal conditions. Sextus does not develop this argument in as much detail as Pico later does.
Pico cites several texts on this point, which state that the eye is affected by external objects, which of course is how the eye perceives. The one decisive argument is based on a text from the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, 887а24–27, which says that the eye is the most movable (εύϰινητότατον) part of the body. See also the important discussion of eye diseases in Galen’s De symptomatum causis, book I, chapter 2, in Claudii Galeni, Opera omnia, ed. G. G. Kuehn (Leipzig, 1821–33), VII, pp. 86–101.
“Quod si corporis totius, certe et oculi ipsiusque pupillae, eoque magis quod non ita solida est natura atque compacta, sed tenui fluxilique; quando ex aquea plurimum substantia constat ...” Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 699.
From the way the word situs is used in this context it seems to mean the way in which the eye is situated in the head. That is, whether it is sunken, protruding, etc.
“Ad haec et pupillae purum humorem in percipiendis exquisite colorum differentiis et oculorum situm, non prominulum, sed concavum et reductum, ad procul videndum asciscit. Illa vero humoris et colorum varietas et cutis multiplex qualitas et diversus oculorum situs in diversis hominibus, a diversa humani corporis temperatione dimanant. Нас igitur sensus mutatione, hoc est, varietate sensilis potestatis atque sensorii, et de re sensili, cum indicium, tum iudicium permutatur. Id est, non solum quatenus sensus diverse atque aliter quam se habet res, de ea indicat, sed etiam quatenus sensus tali est natura, hoc est, mutabili et in sese frequentissime varia, atque ideo sese offeret altiori potestati non uno semper modo, sed vario atque diverso, pro varia videlicet dispositione, proque ea etiam rem obiectam speciemque illius varie perspicit.” Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 700.
De sensu 438b6–8.
Ibid., 438b 12–16.
Outlines of Pyrrhonism I, 14, 44 (Loeb ed., pp. 28–29). Humor theory, as a basis of difference, was used as late as La Mettrie: “Il est vrai que la Mélancolie, la Bile, le Phlegme, le Sang, &c. suivant la nature, l’abondance & la diverse combinasion de ces humeurs, de chaque Homme font un Homme différent”. La Mettrie’s L’Homme Machine: A Study in the Origins of an Idea, ed. A. Vartanian (Princeton, 1960), p. 152.
See for example Ex. Van., II, 33; p. 585; IV, 12; p. 688.
The line of argument here is involved and difficult to follow. We need not present it in detail, for it is not essential to our purpose to give a detailed analysis of the physiology of the sceptical position. The most detailed exposition of it is to be found in Ex. Van., V, 3; pp. 702–703.
“... qui enim sunt icterici, pallore circumfusa putant, quae nobis alba videntur ...” Ex. Van., II, 22; p. 561. This, as is much of chapter 22 of Book II, is a direct translation from the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Cf. I, 14, 44 (Loeb ed., pp. 28–29). In the same chapter other details are repeated from Sextus. For example: for similar reasons it can be supposed that those who have hemophthamia see red; if one gazes for an extended period at the sun he will see yellow; if the eyeball is deformed by pressing it out of shape, the visual image will also come to us in a deformed way. See the Galen text cited above in note 22, esp. p. 99, where Galen speaks of jaundice and hemophthalmia affecting the eye in terms very similar to those used by Pico. There are numerous passaged in Galen from which Pico may have drawn some of his material. See also De temperamentis (ed. cit., I, pp. 509–694, esp. pp. 588–94) and Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur (ed. cit., IV, pp. 767–822). In his work, De locis affectis, Galen says, “And it is confessed by the most eminent physicians as well as philosophers that the humors as well as the temperament of the body completely alter the actions of the soul; by which it has been shown that the faculties of the soul follow the temperament of the body.” op. cit., VIII, p. 191. For an Aristotelian attempt to cope with this argument see below, pp. 162–68 and my paper cited in note 10, p. 163. I plan to study the physiological basis of Early Modern scepticism in greater detail in a subsequent study. Cf. La Mettrie, ed. cit., p. 185.
For general discussion of this complicated, but important, aspect of medieval thought see Pierre Duhem, Études sur Léonard de Vinci (Paris, 1906–13), III, pp. 314–46;
Anneliese Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie, 2nd ed., (Rome, 1951), pp. 1–109;
and E.J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, trans. G. Dikshoorn (Oxford, 1961), pp. 186–88.
See Ex. Van., V, 3; p. 704.
Ibid., V. 2; pp. 701, 703; see also De Elementis 6; pp. 121–23.
The work was probably composed during Pico’s stay at Rome in 1512, the same period during which the famous letters on imitation were written. It is dated January 1, 1513 m the printed editions. This would perhaps put it in his “pre-sceptical” period, i.e. before he became acquainted with the writings of Sextus Empiricus. The first edition of the De Elementis of which I know is Basel, 1518. It is printed in the 1601 edition of the Opera, pp. 115–23.
“Nam proportio diversa mixtionis diversas temperaturas parit; et cum hae mixtiones non quatuor duntaxat habeantur, sed multo plures multo etiam plures habebuntur tempera-turae humani aut etiam brutorum corporis. Ipsa etiam mixtionis diversa ratio diversave proportio vicem habet propriae et speciem afferentis differentiae (nam proportiones nume-rorum instar habentur) quare ubi diversa merit proportio, diversa prodibit species temperamenti.” De Elem. 6; p. 122. Pico also ties the diversity of literary style to diversity of temperament in his De imitatione. See Le epistole ‘De imitatione’, ed. G. Santangelo (Florence), 1954), pp. 35–36. My attention was called to this passage by Donald R. Kelley, “Legal Humanism and the Sense of History”, Studies in the Renaissance XIII (1966), pp. 184–99, at p. 191.
See our discussion of this in the previous chapter pp.80–82.
499a20f.
792а33.
“Sed et ipsa imaginatio sive phantasia variantior sensu, ас desultoria magis, ubi decepta fuerit, imponet intellectui et ex ea vacillabit et aberrabit eius iudicium, ipso Aristotele non repugnante, cum in eo de Sensibus libro quicquam eorum quae sunt extra sanxerit non posse nisi ipso cum sensu intelligi. Qui et secundo de Anima libro decrevit hoc esse inter sensum intellectumque discriminis, quod ille propriorum semper verus sit, contingat autem et falso intelligere.” Ex. Van., V, 5; p. 722.
427b27–429a9, esp. 428a12.
This is discussed in chapter 8 of the work, “Unde imaginationum varietas.” Caplan ed., pp. 48–57. The translations which I cite here will generally be taken from this edition.
“Diximus ante opinionum varietatem eiusque culpas atque rationalis animae defectus omnis ab ipsa ratione et intellectu (qua scilicet intellectus et ratio est) provenire non posse, sed ab imaginationis vitio derivari.” De. Imag., 8; pp. 50–51.
“Ab rebus item extrinsecus occursantibus quibus afficimur, varias oriri easdemque fal-sas imaginationes in nobis hinc liquido constat, quod objecta sensus identidem mutant varieque afficiunt. Cum enim imaginatio sequatur sensum ducaturque ab eo, consentaneum est ut et variato sensu varietur imaginatio, eoque labente, et ipsa labatur.” Ibid., 8, pp. 54–55.
The basic Aristotelian position is stated thus: “Sensus autem propriorum sensilium, quamquam aut semper verus aut rarissime falsus, in iis tarnen quae subjecta sunt ipsis sensilibus, hoc est, quibus accidunt ipsa sensibilia, fallitur saepenumero.” Ibid., 8, pp. 54–55. For Aristotle’s arguments from the De Anima see our discussion in the previous chapter (pp. 79–81) and the corresponding notes. For a good statement of Pico’s view on this see particularly note 65.
“Quem ad modum sanguine, pituita, bile rubra, aut atra abundat quispiam, sic et eius imaginatio philosophorum medicorumque testimonio huius modi naturam sectatur, ut pro eorum diversitate ad diversas imagines — hilares, torpidas, truculentas, maestas — exstimu-letur, a quibus non secus intellectus, spiritualis animae oculus, in cognoscendo variat atque decipitur ac corporeus depictis variegatisque specillis hallucinatur . . . Ita et intellectui evenit quod, ei Veritas ipsa quamquam suapte natura una est pura atque impermixta, ob diversa tarnen contrariaque phantasmata multiplex, infecta, permixtaque praesentetur. Qui autem vel temperatura corporis, vel arte et exercitio, vel speciali divinae largitatis privilegio, puriora simplicioraque phantasmata adepti sunt, ii ad percipiendam rerum veritatem aptiores procul dubio sunt.” De Imag., 8; pp. 50–53.
“Quo modo imaginationis morbus falsitasque de corporis temperatura deque objectis sensuum proveniens corrigi curarique possit.” Ibid., 9; pp. 56–57.
“Qui de corporis temperatura manant morbi corporeis rebus curandi.” Ibid., 9; pp.
58–59.
The attempt of the De Imaginatione is given bare mention, but nothing further is said of it. See Ex. Van., IV, 12; p. 689.
Post. An. 90b24–25. Also see 90b28–33. Note especially 1. 30. The reasons for Aristotle’s holding these positions are explained at 72b18–25 and 84a29–b2 and are ultimately based on the impossibility of demonstrating everything. As the opening sentence of the Posterior Analytics so aptly says, “All teaching and all intellectual knowledge arises from pre-existent knowledge” (71a 1–2). Also see De An. 402b25–26.
Because induction merely shows that and not why. Cf. Post. An. 92а37-b2.
Post. An. 90b30–31.
Topics 141D26–27. Cf. Topics 103b15. On definition in Aristotle see Zeller, op. cit., I, pp. 265–73 and G. Vailati, “La teoria aristotelica della definizione”, in his Scritti (Florence-Leipzig, 1911), pp. 485–96. On definition as it refers to the classification of animals see D. M. Balme, “Aristotle’s Use of Differentiae in Zoology,” Aristote et les problèmes de méthode: Symposium Aristotelicum (Louvain, 1961), pp. 195–212/
This process is described in several places in Aristotle’s writings. For example see Metaph.Z, 12 (1037b8–1038а35); Роst. An. II, 13–14 (96а20–98а2з); Topics VI–VII (139a24–155a39). The latter considers specific problems that are encountered in formulating a definition.
Post. An. 97a23–b8.
Topics 140a27–28. The translation is from the Loeb edition of this work, p. 569.
“.. . nam si non est reperire veram definitionem, fieri neutiquam poterit, ut quicquam vere demonstretur, quomodo in posterioribus Analyticis demonstrandum Aristoteles docuit”. Ex. Van., V, 7; p. 723. For Aristotle’s statement see our note 50 above.
“Primo sumptum probemus, ostendendo nullam dari vere definiendi certam facul-tatem, non iam scepticis excursionibus usi adversus ipsam definitionem, quarum tertio huius operis libro mentionem fecimus, sed in Lyceo vel stantes vel passu nil concitato deambulantes. Dixi vere definiendi, quoniam et describendi et quoquo pacto non tarnen vere et exacte definiendi, multos et ipse modos tradidi in secundo libro Logicarum Institutionum. Sane apud Aristotelem vere definiendi facultas minime tradita est, quanquam ipse multis locis definitionis meminit ...” Ibid., V, 7; pp. 723–24. For Pico’s discussion of the sceptic notions on the subject of definition see Ex. Van., III, 10; pp. 638–39. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism II, 205–12; vol. I, pp. 284–89. The Logicae Institutiones is lost as we mentioned before.
“In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipsae differentiae essentiales nobis ignotae sunt; unde significantur per differentias accidentales quae ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa significatur per suum effectum, sicut bipes ponitur differentia hominis. Accidentia autem propria substantiarum immaterialium nobis ignota sunt; unde differentiae earum nec per se nec per accidentales nobis significant possunt.”De ente et essentia, 6, in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis . . . Opera Omnia (Parma, 1865) XVI, p. 336a.
“Sed tarnen quandoque aliquis dividens differentias “faciet hoc” ut scilicet dividat per ea quae sunt secundum accidens, propter hoc quod non potest invenire proprias et per se differentias. Aliquando enim necessitas cogit, ut utamur, loco per se differentiarum, differen-tiis per accidens, inquantum sunt signa quaedam differentiarum essentialium nobis igno-tarum.” Comm. in libros metaph. VII, 12; ed. cit. XX, p. 495a. The Metaphysics text commented on is 1038а8–24. Pico’s comments appear in Ex. Van., V, 7; pp. 724–25.
Aristotle states clearly that neither genus nor differentia are accidental qualities. See Topics 144a22–27 and Post. An. 93a21–29. It is also quite apparent from the Metaphysics argument (VII, 12) that this is the case. It is worth noting that Averroes specifically rejects division per accidens in his commentary on the Metaphysics passage in question. See Aristotelis Stagiritae Omnia quae extant Opera (Averrois Cordubensis in ea opera omnes qui ad nos pervenere Com-mentarii) (Venice, 1573–75) vol. VIII, fol. 196.
See our discussion below, pp. no—17.
“Nec me latet quibusdam placuisse fieri posse, ut cognoscantur, sed quaenam sint illae differentiae ultimae, neutiquam verbum factum est ab eis, quod sciam; solas etiam acciden-tium differentias ultimas cognosci quidam asseveravenant, a quibus libenter peterem, quo pacto cognoverunt, quod ultimae videlicet sint difFerentiae, quas afferunt tanquam ultimas”? Ex. Van. V, 7; p. 725.
“Nam si sensu id se dicant discriminis depraehendisse, tarn erit incertum illas esse ultimas, quam incerta erit sensus ipsa sententia, quam supra docuimus incertain, ambiguam et nutabundam. Si vero intellectu dicant se potius id assequi de modo, quo intellectus accidentia cognoscit, primo quaeram et an sensu duce? ut tandem a coeno nequeant avellere plantam. Nec item me praeterit ultimas specierum ultimarum differentias ignotas dici a mul-tis, non tarnen nesciri eas, quae sunt generum specierumque subalternarum differentiae. At cur nam hoc? cum quasfatentur nesciri proximiores sunt sensui, quibus primas deferunt in cognos-cendo parteis? Sed et eadem quoque eos circumstat difficultas, sensu ne videlicet, an intellectu eas ipsas depraehenderint? Si sensu, cum differentiae generum et specierum substantiae sint, quomodo, cum et ipsa quoque genera et species substantiae habeantur, sensus eas non agnoscet? quern tamen constat solis accidentibus immorari. Si intellectu? sensu fuit opus in primis, qui quam fallax est, tarn erit et fallax indagatio et incerta depraehensio.” Ibid., V, 7; P. 725.
Metaph. 1038a 19.
Post. An. 96b33–35.
Ibid., 97028–29.
Paraphrasis in Post. An. II, 13 (Teubner ed. I, p. 93, lines 29–30).
Post. An. 97a6–22. See Harold Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore, 1944) I, pp. 59–64.
“Cui quidem Speusippo, quanquam aliud agens Nicolaus Cusa, in tertio Idiotae libro, ubi agitur de mente, videtur aperte suffragari, cum scribit, quod si de una re precisa scientia habereur, omnium rerum scientia necessario haberetur.” Ex. Van., V, 7; p. 726. Cf. Idiotae III, 3 in Nicolai De Cusa, Opera Omnia (Lipsiae, 1932f.), vol. V, pp. 51–54.
“Mihi certe videtur, si inveniri possent ab homine rerum differentiae, debuisset utique ea, quae sua est ipsius differentia, qua proprie homo constituitur, qua dispescitur a caeteris animalibus, iam diu esse inventa, super qua tamen a prima est antiquitate certatum, uti paulo post monstrabimus . . . Ex hac re quis est qui sequi non videat, artem demonstra-tricem Aristotelis incertain esse, quoniam definitione utitur ipse tamquam medio . . . Atque identidem monet observandum in omni particulari demonstratione. Quare ignorata definitione demonstrationem sublatam iri necesse est.” Ex Van, V, 7; p. 725.
De Hist. An. 491 a19–23.
Ibid., 494b21–22.
I have not been able to find a passage that spells this out in precisely the same terms indicated by Pico. Chapters 3 and 4 of Book VI of the Exameron (CSEL, XXXII, pp. 209–23)
“Aristoteles in septimo Primae Philosophiae de hominis locutus definitione, bipedis ex-emplo est usus: putamus ne illam quae est vera et propria differentia, si non ignorasset, ab eo fuisse sub silentio praetermissam? At dicet quispiam, num tu es animal rationale? Quid turn ergo homo subinferet. Negabit consecutionem quispiam paulo peritior.” Ex. Van., V, 8; p. 727.
“Gum multae sint species irrationalium animantium, quod nemo negat, multas etiam rationalium esse debere, quid prohibet”? Ibid., V, 8; pp. 727–28.
Porphyrii Isagoge, ed. Adolphus Busse in CAG (Berlin, 1887), vol. IV, pars I, p. 10, lines 10–12.
In Book III, 1; Porphyrii ... Opuscula Selecta ed. A. Nauck, (Leipzig, 1886), p. 187, lines 14–17. Here Porphyry attributes the view that all souls which partake in memory and sense are rational to the Pythagoreans. He himself endorses it also, however.
This is true of a later Christian Platonist such as Ficino, who still devoted a good deal of attention to speculating about demones. See e.g. the commentary on the Symposium in Marsile Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, ed. Raymond Marcel (Paris, 1956), esp. pp. 201–205 and D. P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella (London, 1958), pp. 42–53.
Metaph. 1017b10–13.
Ross argues that Aristotle here refers to the “heavenly bodies” when he uses the term δαιμονία and gives parallel texts to support this view. See W. D. Ross (ed.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford, 1924) I, p. 310. It is evident that the word is used in an off-hand way and certainly not with the fixed terminological significance that it found in Plato and the Pythagoreans. This is also apparent from Bonitz’ Index Aristotelicus.
St. Thomas (Comm. in libros Metaph. V, lectio 10; ed. cit., XX, p. 403a) is cited also as commenting on this text. Thomas, also seemed to recognize it as more Platonic than Aristotelian.
For example Metaph. 1072b28–29, De An. 402b7. See Hicks’ (op. cit., p. 188) note on the latter.
“Si daemones itaque, Aristotele authore, partes habent, si Deum esse dixit animal et animalis speciem, si et in Metaphysicorum etiam postremo, ἐστι, δὲ τῶν φαινομένων θειόταον; est autem divinissimum eorum, quae apparent; sequitur eos esse secundum ip-sum rationalia animalia. Num et hinc deducitur Aristotelis de daemonibus et diis opinionem non differre a Platonicis? Qui et corporeos dixerunt et rationales. Hac in re certe nullus fuisset labor Ioanni Pico patruo meo in conciliando Piatone et Aristotele.” Ex. Van., V, 8; p. 729. The quotation is from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1074b16.
In addition to the text cited above (note 82), Pico mentions Sum. Theol. I, I, q. 70, a.3 (ed. cit., I, pp. 273–74) and De Spirit. Great, a.1 (ed. cit. VIII, pp. 425–30). It should be noted that our author conveniently neglects to mention a most interesting and pertinent text in the work De Substantiis Separatis. Here Thomas devotes an entire chapter to the differences between the opinion of Plato and that of Aristotle on the matter. Particularly incisive for the present discussion is the following: “... quia Aristoteles non posuit aliquas animas medias inter caelorum animas et animas hominum, sicut posuit Plato: unde de daemonibus nullam invenitur nec ipse nec ejus sequaces fecisse mentionem.” ed. cit., XVI, p. 187a.
“Quare videtur Aristoteles ipsam connexionem, animal rationale, ergo homo, per ea, quae dicta sunt, aperte reprobare.” Ex. Van., V, 8; p. 729.
Many examples of this are to be found throughout the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, nor are they absent from many other ancient works such as Aristotle’s naturalistic writings, Aelian, or Pliny. Pico’s argument is often repeated by later sceptics, e.g. Montaigne in his Apologie de Raimond Sebond offers many examples of animal intelligence in his effort to minimize man’s preeminent place in the universe. See note 127 below.
Numerous examples of this sort are given in Ex. Van., V, 8; pp. 731–32.
Ibid., V, 8; p. 733. This seems to be taken from Outlines of Pyrrhonism II, 26 (Loeb ed., pp. 168–69) which argues that some hold that “man is a rational mortal animal, receptive of intelligence and science.” Such a definition is rejected by Sextus who says that “all animals are receptive of intelligence and science.”
De. An. 402022–25. The translation is taken from Hicks, op. cit., p. 7. This difficulty of knowing the essences of things agrees with many other statements of Aristotle. For example, see the passages cited in the previous chapter, notes 103–108.
Some of the problems are discussed by Hicks, op. cit., pp. 191–93 in his notes to 402b18–25.
In addition to our notes 59 and 60 above, see also Thomas’ comments on the text in question in Comm. in libros de Anima I, 1 (ed. cit., III, p. 46). The key passage here says, “Sed quia principia essentialia rerum sunt nobis ignota, ideo oportet quod utamur differentiis accidentalibus in designatione essentialum ... Et per eas, scilicet per differentias accidentales, devenimus in cognitionem essentialium.”
Ex. Van., V, 11; pp. 743–46.
Post. An. I, 13, 78a22f. Also II, 1 89b23–31.
For example we read the following very clear statement in Thomas Aquinas: “... duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid, et haec est per priora simpliciter; alia est per effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae sunt priora quoad nos. Cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad Cognitionem causae. Es quolibet autem effectu potest demonstran propriani causam ejus esse, si tarnen ejus effectus sint magis noti quoad nos; quia cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu, necesse est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos.” Sum. Theol. I, I, q.2, a.2 (ed. cit., I, p. 8b)This is not to say that the distinction did not play an important role in the methodology of the “naturalistic” followers of Aristotle. Perhaps more than in the “theological” tradition it became significant through Galen, Averroes, and the Italian Aristotelians from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries. This aspect is traced in John Herman Randall, Jr., “The Development of the Scientific Method in the School of Padua,” in his The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science (Padua, 1961), pp. 13–68. Here I mean to emphasize the unknowable aspect that essences had for the theologians and the impact of this on Pico. Of the treatment of these concepts by the “scientific “tradition of Aristotelianism we will say more below.
The distinction is perhaps nowhere so clearly drawn as in Albert of Saxony, who says, “Demonstratio quaedam est procedens ex causis ad effectum et vocatur demonstratio a priori et demonstratio propter quid et potissima; ... alia est demonstratio procedens ab effectibus ad causas et talis vocatur demonstratio a posteriori et demonstratio quia et demonstratio non potissima.” As cited in Rudolf Eisler, Woerterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe, 4th ed., (Berlin, 1927) I, p. 86.
“Itaque a priori simpliciter et absolute cum procedit Aristoteles, quaeri ab eius nimiis amatoribus posset, quomodo effectum depraehendit? Quo pacto ipsius effectum causae, quisquís ille fuerit effectus decernit? Nam si primo a causa procedit ad effectum ni suas dese-rat regulas, sensibiliter procedere ilium omnino necesse est; neque enim principia illa intel-lectilia, nisi a sensu collegit, cognitis rebus singularibus, quoniam supra satis explicuimus. Si sensibiliter, quaero primum quo modo prius causam agnovit? Nam si intellectilis est causa, sensili opus fuit in primis, cum voluerit nos egere sensu, tamquam paedagogo. Quo pacto enim per intellectum causa priusquam effectus cognoscetur? Si nihil in intellectu esse voluit, quod prius non fuit in sensu, et ab effectu sensus cognitionem trahit. Si sensilis vero causa fuerit, nihilominus earn nisi coniectura non potuit apprehendere, intermediis videlicet acci-dentibus, cum sensus ipse ad rei essentiam non pervadat.” Ex. Van., V, II; p. 743.
“Si alterum altero dicas agnovisse, idque diverse, confuse primum, mox et distincte, circulo revolveris. Nam si sensu primum mox intellectu dicas illum fuisse usum, quo pacto illud verum fuerit, quod ab eo prolatum est, quod certior est, quae per causam quam quae per effectum ducitur demonstratio, cum ad id monstrandum alio non nitatur fundamento quam sensu? Dices sensus quidem viam priorem esse, intellectus vero certiorem et digniorem. At negare non potes quin sensui feratur accepta omnis, igitur certitudo pendebit a sensu qui effectum percipit ex quo causa cognoscitur.’, Ibid., V, 11; p. 743.
This is discussed in detail in Charles B. Schmitt, “Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Gianfrancesco Pico on Illumination”, Mediaeval Studies; XXV (1963), pp. 231–58.
This work, compiled in 1506, treats in abundant detail the important first chapter of the Physics. We use the following edition: Augustini Niphi ... Super octo Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros de Physico Auditu ... (Venice, 1559). Although our choice here is somewhat arbitrary, Nifo’s commentary gives a “typical” Aristotelian view and also the range of the questions being debated in the early years of the sixteenth century. For example, Nifo specifically rejects Pico’s charge that the use of the “double procedure” is circular reasoning (see note 99). See Niphus, ed. cit., lib.1, text 4, pp. 12a-b. For other examples see Randall, op. cit. Nifo’s significance as more than a “timeserver” is clearly brought out by Edward P. Mahoney, “The Early Psychology of Agostino Nifo” (Ph. D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1966), 2 vols. The loss of Pico’s Logic is felt here, since his discussion of these important problems is very sketchy in the Examen Vanitatis.
“... Primum quod non de omnibus demonstrationibus quia et propter quid nostra in Aristotelem argumenta probent, quod probare tentavimus, sed de iis tantummodo quae aliter nobis aliter naturae sunt nota. Sunt autem quaedam quae simul nobis simul naturae cognita, in quibus videlicet ex effectu non procedimus as causam, nee a causa remeamus ad effectum, sed altero cognito cognoscitur et alterum.” Ex. Van. V, 11; p. 744.
Niphus, op. cit., lib. i, text. 2, pp. 8a-b. Note especially, “... Dicerem igitur media mathematica esse naturae nota per se, per accidens vero, non quatenus media, sed quatenus possunt scribi in pulvere, sunt nota nobis. Averroes vero opinatus est enuntiatum Aristotelis esse legendum indefinite, et sic hae duae subcontrariae sunt simul verae. Eadem non sunt nobis nota et naturae, ut in naturalibus: secunda, eadem sunt nobis nota [et naturae], ut in mathematicis: ubi medium quatenus causa est, naturae notum dicitur, quatenus vero accidens per se sensile, nobis notum dicitur, qua ratione evenit, ut in illis non fiant duo processus, sed unus tantum e causa ad effectum.” Cf. Averroes’ commentary on this same text (ed. cit., IV, fol. 6vb).
“Nam nihil tale est in rebus quae sub obtutum cadunt, quod et nobis simul et naturae sit notum, si ab Aristotele nolunt recedere, apud quern in principiis physicis illud potissimum ponitur innatam esse nobis viam a notioribus nobis ad ea quae sunt ipsi notiora naturae. Nec mathematica nobis ingeras, cum quod naturalia ita non sunt, ut etiam diversa putentur, diversaeque de utrisque scientiae constituantur, turn quod super rebus etiam naturalibus, si quicquam habent pensi omnino fundantur, quomodo enim circulum aut triangulum (verbi causa) cognoveris, ni prius ea delineata fuerint in sensili materia. Et numerum pariter quo pacto animo capíes, nisi res numeratas apprehenderis. Quapropter dicuntur abstrahi a naturalibus rebus ea quibus mathematicarum nomen obtigit.” Ex. Van., V, 11; p. 744.
Aristotle discusses the question of the status of mathematical concepts most fully in the last two books of the Metaphysics. His position is not completely clear, for he rejects both the view that mathematical objects exist apart from sensible things (Platonist-Pythagorean view) and that they are in sensible things.
“Secundum quia ex regressu illo et ut ipsi loquuntur negociatione acquiritur causae notitia quaepiam clarior et dilucidior, quae quidem duo si reprobaverimus vel nihil vel certe parum habituri sunt quo nitantur.” Ex. Van., V, 11; p. 744.. Again Pico is indebted to Sextus. Cf. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 164–72; ed. cit., I, pp. 94–97 on “regress.” See also William F. Edwards, op. cit., pp. 256–86 where Zabarella’s De regressu is discussed.
Nifo’s discussion of the salient points is treated in Randall, op. cit., pp. 42–47. We here touch on Nifo’s discussion only in so far as it relates to what Pico has to say.
“... est eiusdem causae per intellectus negociationem, ex qua dum prima crescit notitia causae in tantum, ut digna sit effici medium demonstrations simpliciter.” Niphus, op. cit., lib. I, text 4, p. 12b.
Ibid., pp. 12b-13a. Cf. Randall, op. cit., pp. 42–47.
Ibid., p. 12. Cf. Randall, op. cit., pp. 42–47. Also see the opinions of other Aristotelians on the matter in Randall, pp. 38–41. That “regress” involves circular reasoning had already been argued by the ancient sceptics. See the passage from Sextus cited in note 106.
See above p. 114 and note 99.
“... effectus illi ... et quod attinet ad illiam suam negociationem nihil certe (ut mihi, ut aliis etiam videtur) lucrantur ... Nunquam etiam causa sese illis patefaciet magis quam effectus, ipsius videlicet index assiduus et si Aristoteles vere hac in re decrevit, necessarius; quod si cognita re, quae est causa, et cognita re quae est effectus, posse a te effectum in causam referri dixeris, eaedem te difficultates circumstabunt, quas initio capitis huius tetigi-mus; nam tu ipsas res sensu prius cognoveris et coniectura deprehenderis, intermediis acci-dentibus; unde si quicquam demonstrare volueris, ad effectum et sensus notitiam pro certi-tudine habenda, nisi ab Aristotele desciscas, illico tibi recurrendum fuerit.” Ex. Van., V, 11; p. 744.
“Restat enim ut progressum etiam Universum et finem monstremus incertum, hoc est, incertain esse affectionem illam subiecti propriani, quae dicitur demonstrari, et universales propositiones quae maxime per demonstrationem exiguntur, idque in ipsa specie et univer-sim, adeo ut Aristoteles, propterea censuerit propositiones, quibus demonstratio conficitur, de omni dici oportere, quoniam omni etiam subiecto talem affectionem speciatim inesse ipsa in conclusione, hoc est, demonstrationis fine terminove colligitur. Colligi autem nequit, nisi ex propositionibus, quae ipsam praecedunt conclusionem. Quapropter et illas ipsas, quae negocium conficiunt propositiones assumptionesque et de omni et universales esse convenit. Has ergo propositiones quas et certas et universales esse oportere censuit Aristoteles, minime certas convincemus; et maxime quae dicuritur affirmatrices, cum tarnen sine duabus, vel ad minus sine altera, nequeat ulla, authore Aristotele, confici demonstratio ...” Ex. Van., V, 12; p. 746.
Post. An. 100b3–4.
“At quo pacto certam universalem probationemhabebimus, cum incerta sit ars inductions, sine qua incerta est universalis propositio? Si dixeris universalem propositionem te a priori (ut aiunt) probaturum te ipsum Aristoteiis authoritate repellam, non qua nuper sumus multipliciter usi, sed qua priores eas et nullo intermedio probandas voluit, neque admisit, ut communes illae animi conceptiones omnibus notae demonstrationem ipsam proprie ingre-derentur, quas quidem initio operis satis innuimus non Aristoteiis doctrina, sed naturalis luminis beneficio cognosci.” Ex. Van., V, 12; pp. 746–47.
Pico cites quite a number, including Themistius, Philoponus, Boethius and Thomas.
“Dices si duorum vel trium individuorum proprietatem affectionemve cognovero, cur et illa alus etiam individuis inesse non collegero? Illo, inquam, pacto non collegeris, quo si tres vel quatuor, addo et centum et mille etiam Myriadas hominum, albo colore, succulenta et vivida carne, promissoque capillo spectaveris, omnes propterea collegisse ita esse homines affectos non potuisti.” Ex. Van., V, 12; p. 748. Cf. also p. 750. The notion that the universal is derived from merely two or three cases quite possibly derives from Pico’s reading of the Peripatetics, who, usually when discussing induction, mention only two or three particulars in the examples they give. For example, they say that we learn the universal “man” from knowledge of Socrates, Callias, etc. Such an example is to be found in Themistius’ Paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics II, cap. 35 (in Themistii philosophi acutissimi Commentaria (Venice, 1520), fol. 11vb; this is Ermolao Barbaro’s translation often cited by Gianfrancesco) or Nifo’s commentary on the same text (in Augustinus Suessanus Super Posteriora Aristotelis (Venice, 1572), lib. II, com. 144, fol. 83va).
See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism II, 195–204 (Loeb ed., I, pp. 276–83). Especially note section 204 where the two basic reasons for rejecting induction are given. These are (1.) if only a part of the individuals are used in formulating the universal, one of those omitted may contradict it; and (2.) if it is attempted to use all of the individuals, there are an infinity of them and hence it is impossible.
Ex. Van., V, 12; p. 749; See also V, 5; pp. 719–20 where this is discussed at length.
Ibid., V, 13; p. 753; mentioned in Outlines of Pyrrhonism II, 195 (ed. cit., I, pp. 276–77).
Ex. Van., V, 13; pp. 756–57; also 11,22; pp. 562–63. Pico was fascinated by the subject of poisons as were many of his predecessors and contemporaries. See Thorndike, op. cit., V, pp. 472–87, and passim for a consideration of some of the many discussions on this subject during the later Middle Ages.
“... nullam propositionem vere et simpliciter esse universalem, quae vei non dicatur de omni ... ve; de millo ...” Ex. Van., V, 12; p. 753.
“At dicet quispiam sit aut ego aut alius inductionem perficere nequivero, tarnen mul-tis retro saeculis, ab omnibus, vel plurimis, hoc vel illo observatum est modo: quare univer-sim potero ego colligere, etiamsi universim singula non percensuerim. Sed non est ita, nam-que ad historiam te aliorum remittis observatorum et fide simplici humana duceris, et praeterea non omnes potuisti observatores percalluisse, quid si alii diverse observaverunt? quid si decepti sunt vel proprio sensu vel fide historiae? Ut in depraehendendis motibus globo-rum coelestium multos non recte recensuisse, quod observatum fuerat, retro est a nobis com-probatum.” Ex. Van., V, 13; p. 754.
This has recently been pointed out in the case of Mersenne and Gassendi. See particularly Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (Assen, 1960), pp. 131–53
Tullio Gregory, Scetticismo ed Empirismo: studio su Gassendi (Bari, 1961).
See Wolfson, op. cit., and our discussion of the relation of Grescas to Pico in chapter V of the present study.
Ex. Van.,V, 13; p. 758.
On Gassendi’s importance in this respect see the interesting example given in Paul F. Cranefield, “A Seventeenth Century View of Mental Deficiency and Schizophrenia: Thomas Willis on ‘Stupidity and Foolishness,” in Bulletin of the History of Medicine XXXV (1961), pp. 291–316, esp. pp. 292, 305–306. It is also interesting to note that Pico’s correspondent, Girolamo Rorario, was the author of a work on the intelligence of animals (dated 1547) See Hieronymi Rorarii, Quod animalia bruta ratione utantur melius homine (Paris, 1648), the first printing, edited by Gabriel Naudé. The book was reprinted at Amsterdam in 1654 and 1666 and at Helmstedt in 1728. Bayle devoted a long article to Rorario and his work. See Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, new ed. (Paris, 1820), XII, pp. 588–622.
Ex. Van., V, 8; pp. 731–33. The example of the prudence and intelligence of animals are drawn from a wide range of sources.
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Schmitt, C.B. (1967). The Rejection of Aristotelian “Science”. In: Gianfrancesco Pico Della Mirandola (1469–1533) and His Critique of Aristotle. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idees, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9679-6_5
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