Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Negotiation and Conclusion

  • Chapter
Book cover The Treaty-Making Power in the Commonwealth of Australia

  • 83 Accesses

Abstract

The constitutional order of the Commonwealth of Australia attributes to the head of the State the function of making treaties. The Australian Constitution does not expressly authorize delegation of the treaty-making power to other bodies or persons.1 Yet the first step with respect to the conclusion of a treaty usually is the appointment and use of an agent to negotiate and enter into agreements. In Australia as elsewhere generally the appointment of agents is a function of the Executive Government.2

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 74.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Only a few constitutions expressly authorize that the treaty-making power might be delegated to other bodies; see e.g. the provisions of the Austrian constitution, Articles 65 and 66 and the provision of the Cambodian Constitution, Article 45; see also J. M. Jones, Full Powers and Ratification (Cambridge, 1946), p. 56; see also L. Bittner, Die Lehre von den völkerrechtlichen Vertragsurkunden (Berlin-Leipzig, 1924), pp. 39ff.; P. Chailley, La nature juridique des traités internationaux selon le droit contemporain (Paris, 1932), pp. 2o7ff.; J. Basdevant, La conclusion et la rédaction des traités et des instruments diplomatiques autres que les traités, 5 Recueil des Cours 617 (1926); F. Dehousse, La ratification des traités (Paris, 1935), pp. 97ff.; E. Vitta, La Validité des traités internationaux (Bibliotheca Visseriana, Vol. 14, Leyden, 194o), PP. 74ff.

    Google Scholar 

  2. See Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Eleventh Session, April 20 to June 26, 1959. (U.N. Doc.A/CN. 4. 122), P. 47.

    Google Scholar 

  3. There are but a few cases which confirm the theory that under international law a Foreign Minister possesses competence to conclude treaties, see especially State of Russia v. National City Bank of New York et al., Annual Digest (5933-1934), PP. 63–65; a comment on the case is to be found in 28 A.J.I.L. 545 (1934); and USAFFE Veterans Association, Inc., v. The Treasurer of the Philippines, Philippines Court of First Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 24277, Judgement of January 5, 1956, Report in 5o A.J.I.L. 686 (1956); and see also a judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Eastern Greenland,P.C.I.J. Ser. AFB, No. 53, Judgment of April 5, 1933.

    Google Scholar 

  4. This would seem to be the stand taken by P. Guggenheim, who states: “Eine widerlegbare Vermutung für die Kompetenz zum Abschluss völkerrechtlicher Verträge besteht zugunsten des Staatsoberhauptes und des Ministers des Äussern.. ” Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts (Basel, 1948–51), z Vols., Vol. 1, p. 61. See also C. Rousseau, who explains the binding force of agreements in simplified form by “la présomption de légalité qui s’attache aux actes accomplis par un organ étatique-ici l’organe exécutif — dans les limites de sa compétence fonctionelle,” Principes Généraux du Droit International Public (Paris 1944), Vol. r, p. 258; and Blis, op. cit., p. 27 and p. 29, n. 4; on pp. 40–41 he states “that it seems justified… to suggest that the scope of this rule fto bind the state by a document falling within the treaty-making power of the executive branch of the Government] extends to acting foreign Ministers and assisstant foreign Ministers as well.”

    Google Scholar 

  5. T.S. (1956), pp. 5—i1; see also for the early practice, Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, 1934–37 Sess. Vol. III, No. 149 at p. 233 and No. 135 at p. 283.

    Google Scholar 

  6. See Hasluck op. cit., who gives a good account of the negotiations conducted with respect to the Australian-New Zealand Agreement of 1944.

    Google Scholar 

  7. See Sawer, “The United Nations.” in Australia in World Affairs 195o-55, op. cit., n. 23, Chapter II, supra, pp. 92–124.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Bittner calls the power to negotiate “Beurkundungsauftrag.” He understands under “Beurkundungsauftrag” an authorization and at the same time an instruction to sign; see also Blix, op. cit., p. 375.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Bittner calls the competence to act as proxies “Urkundspersonen mit voller Glaubwürdigkeit im völkerrechtlichen Verkehr,” see Bittner, op. cit., pp. 48-49, 57.

    Google Scholar 

  10. See Exchange of Notes between Australia and the United States of America regarding the Furnishing of Supplies and Services to Naval Vessels, T.S. No. 1 (1957); Exchange of Notes between Australia and Greece Regarding the Release of Greek Assets, T.S. No. 1 (1948); Exchange of Notes Between Australia and Poland Regarding Gift of Wool to Poland, T.S. No. 9 (1948); Exchange of Notes Between Australia and Hungary. T.S. No. io (1948); Exchange of Notes and Supplementary Exchange of Notes between Australia and Greece regarding Gift of Relief Supplies to Greece, T.S. No. II (1948); Exchange of Notes between Australia and Italy regarding Gift of Wool to Italy, T.S. No. 12 (1948); for further examples see T.S. (1948–196,).

    Google Scholar 

  11. See Exchange of Notes regulating Commercial Relations with Belgium, Commonwealth Act No. 38 of 1939. Exchange of Notes regarding the Military, Naval and Air Clauses of the Treaty of November 27, 1919, and the Convention of July 24, 1923, respecting the frontiers of Thrace. Exchange of Notes regarding the Exchange of Official Publications, T.S. No. Io (1953). Exchange of Notes regarding the Limitation of Naval Armaments, 139 B.F.S.P. 182. Exchange of letters regarding the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia, T.S. No. 8 (1951). Exchange of Notes concerning the Final Settlement of all Claims arising out of the 1939–45 war, T.S. No. 11 (1941).

    Google Scholar 

  12. See to this generally also Clive Parry, “Some Recent Developments in the Making of Multi-Partite Treaties,” 36 The Grotius Society Transactions 149 (195o) at 25o and note 3 therein and the Report of the International Law Commission Covering Its Eleventh Session, April 20 to June 26, 1959 (U. N. Doc. A/CN. 41122), P. 47.

    Google Scholar 

  13. A similar practice has been adopted in the United Kingdom, see document cited n. 57 supra, Chapter I, p. zo. McNair, op. cit., supra, p. 122, n. 1, points out, however, that this Full Power has no special connection with the making of treaties.

    Google Scholar 

  14. See to this statement made in the International Law Commission on June 22, 195o, by Mr. Francois (U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR. 52), p. 21, and see also Paul Guggenheim, op. cit.,supra, Vol. 2, p. 61: “Eine widerlegbare Vermutung für die Kompetenz zum Abschluss völkerrechtlicher Verträge besteht zugunsten des Staatsoberhauptes und des Ministers des Äussern…”

    Google Scholar 

  15. See, however, State of Russia v. National City Bank of New York 69F. (2nd) (C.C.A. 2nd 1934). The case is digested in the Annual Digest ( 2 933 - 34), Pp. 63–65. A comment is to be found in 28 A.J.I.L. 545 (1934); USAFFE Veterans Association, Inc. v. The Treasurer of the Philippines, Philippines, Court of First Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 24277. Judgment of January 5, 1956. Report in 5o A.J.I.L. 686 (1956); Eastern Greenland Case, P.C.I. J. Ser. A/B No. 53, Judgment of April 5, 1933.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Charles Fairman, “Competence to bind the State to an International engagement,” 3o A. j.LL. 439 (1963), at 459.

    Google Scholar 

  17. G. Cohn, “La théorie de la responsabilité internationale,” 68 Recueil des Cours 286 (1939) II.

    Google Scholar 

  18. G. Fitzmaurice, Report on the Law of Treaties (U.N. Doc. A/CN4/1o6 March 14, 1956), p. 27; Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Eleventh Session, April zo to June 26, 1959 (U.N.Doc.A/CN4, 122). pp, 46–47.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Compare the procedure established for the bringing into force of the Versailles Treaty which was not dissimilar; by an express clause of the treaty (Article 438) the Ambassadors to Paris of certain powers signing were allowed to issue instruments of ratification upon receipt of telegraphic authorization from their Governments. Although this procedure was designed to achieve a provisional entry into force of the treaty, there is nothing provisional about the entry into force achieved through the deposit of notes of acceptance, signed by diplomats.

    Google Scholar 

  20. See, however, B. G. Palliere, “La formation des traités clans la pratique internationale contemporaine,” 74 Recueil des Cours 509 (1948) I; and A. Leriche, “L’évolution récente de la société internationale et les traités multilatéraux,” 29 Revue de droit international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques, 35 (1951), with respect to the practice of the United Nations; see notes on the practice of the United Nations Secretariat in relation to certain questions raised in connection with the articles of the Law of Treaties (U.N. Doc. A, CN4’12i, June 23, 1959) and see also Blix, op. cit., p. 71, 0. 5.

    Google Scholar 

  21. See more generally Blix, op. cit., pp. 56ff. and the cases cited therein.

    Google Scholar 

  22. See with respect to the approval of the Governor-General and the advice of the Federal Executive Council the Minute Paper quoted above.

    Google Scholar 

  23. See as to some interesting remarks on the decreasing importance of Full Powers, F. S. Dunn, The Practice and Procedure of International Conferences (Baltimore, 1929), pp. 169–173, 205–206; see also Article 4 of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties which provides that Heads of State, heads of governments, foreign ministers and heads of a diplomatic mission (Article 4, Section 2(a)) are not required to furnish evidence of their authority. The Article

    Google Scholar 

  24. See Herbert W. Briggs, “The Validity of the Greenland Agreement,” 35 A.J.I.L. (1941) 508 and notes cited therein.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Some of the relevant documents are printed in 1z-x2 N.T.I.R. (1941) Dokumentsam1ing; for the text of the agreement see United States, Executive Agreement Series, No. 204. The text is also found in 35 A.J.I.L. 129 (1941) Suppl. and in 2 ZaSRV 107 (1942).

    Google Scholar 

  26. “Der Grönland `Vertrag’ von Washington,” 5 Monatshefte für auswärtige Politik, 431 (1 94 1).

    Google Scholar 

  27. “The Validity of the Greenland Agreement,” 35 A.J.I.L. 506 (1941).

    Google Scholar 

  28. International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States (2nd rev. ed. Boston, 1 945), Vol. 2, p. 1386.

    Google Scholar 

  29. E. Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (4th ed. by N. Bland, London, 1957), para. 128, p. 82.

    Google Scholar 

  30. With respect to the problem that a party to the agreement has neglected to exhibit competent authorization and the effect of such inaction, see I. C. 9facGibbon, “Estoppel in International Law,” 7 I.C.L.Q. 468 (1958) at 471.

    Google Scholar 

  31. See to this more fully, Stewart, op. cit., pp. 25off. and O’Connell, “The Crown in the British Commonwealth,” 6 I.C.L.Q. 103 (1957) at 114–115, who brings the discussion up to date.

    Google Scholar 

  32. Publications of the League of Nations, V. Legal, 1927, V. 16, Doc. C. 211 1927 V.

    Google Scholar 

  33. It should be noted that, theoretically at least, an oral agreement is possible, since the consensus of the contracting parties may be expressed by other means than signature. Oral international conventions are in fact extremely rare.

    Google Scholar 

  34. Ajil 734 (1953) Suppl. part III, p. 734. This procedure is an innovation in the field of international law, representing a departure from the contractual implications still to be found in the procedure of negotiating treaties. See also Bailey, “Australia and the International Labour Convention,” 1 The Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law, 101 (1953) Proceedings.

    Google Scholar 

  35. For the text of the treaty, see T.S. No. z (1952); see, furthermore 22 Current Notes 499 (1951) and United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 25 (1951) at p. 148; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 216 (1952), pp. 217ff. The instruments of ratification have been deposited on April 29, 1952, by each of the signatories and the treaty came into force in accordance with Article IX thereof.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Article 9 of the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties of the Harvard Research Group, 29 A.J.I.L. 778 (1935) Suppl. Part III.

    Google Scholar 

  37. League of Nations Publications, V. Legal 193o, V. II, Doc. A, ro, 193o, V., “General considerations,” No. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  38. See, e.g., the Japan-Australia Trade Treaty of July 6, 1957; see also Article Ir (c)(a) of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties.s, 1958, T.S. No. 5 (1959): Art, 41(2):

    Google Scholar 

  39. This convention shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. Agreement between Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany relating to Air Transport together with Exchange of Notes, Bonn, May 22, 1957, T.S. No. 2 (1959): Art. 16:

    Google Scholar 

  40. This Agreement shall be subject to acceptance by the signatory Governments. Agreement on the Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation Services in Iceland, Geneva, September 25, 1956, T.S. No. 8 (1959): Article XIX:

    Google Scholar 

  41. This Agreement shall be subject to acceptance by the signatory Governments. Agreement between Australia and Canada for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Ottawa, August 4, 1959, T.S. No. 16 (1959): Article VII:

    Google Scholar 

  42. The present Agreement shall be ratified and the exchange of the instruments of ratification shall be held at Canberra as soon as possible. Protocol to the International Convention of znd Dec., 1946, for the Regulation of Whaling,Washington, November 19, 1856, T.S. No. zo (1959): Art. III:

    Google Scholar 

  43. This Protocol shall be open for signature and ratification or for adherence on behalf of any contracting Government to the 1946 Whaling Convention.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tulane University, New Orleans, USA

    Günther Doeker

Authors
  1. Günther Doeker
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Doeker, G. (1966). Negotiation and Conclusion. In: The Treaty-Making Power in the Commonwealth of Australia. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9560-7_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9560-7_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8718-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9560-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation