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Abstract

Malenkov’s resignation from the Premiership at the February 1955 Supreme Soviet session marked the close of the second period of the post-Stalin era.1 It would be an oversimplification to consider this merely the climax of personal rivalries, although that element was present. His downgrading actually symbolized the destruction of the coalition which had ruled Russia for the 18 months following Beria’s unsuccessful bid for power and the formation of a new one oriented around Khrushchev, but not completely dominated by him.

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  1. The first hints came from Hungary when Drayas, the Minister of Culture, (November 21, 1954) and M. Rákosi, Party First Secretary, (December 3, 1954) both “expressed alarm at the tendency of prominent officials under the pretext of `self-criticism’ to attack fundamental regime policies and institutions.” Published in Free Europe Press, “The New Line in the Soviet Sphere: A Chronology of Major Events, November r6 — March 19, 1955,” and Free Europe Press, “The Second Analytical Survey of Major Trends in the Soviet Orbit (July 1954—June 1955).” (Hereafter referred to as the “Second Analytical Survey.”)

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  2. U. Yusupov, Uzbek Premier, was replaced by N. A. Mukhitdinov after Khrushchev personally denounced him, his cabinet, and the Uzbek Party’s Politburo for their failure to deliver cotton. New York Times, Dec. 29, 1954, P. 5.

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  3. Pravda printed only a 1700 word Tass dispatch which mentioned the speech in four of the last five paragraphs but gave no more than a hint of its subject. Pravda, Nov. 21, 1954, P. 2, Current Digest, VI, 46, p. 17, and the New York Times, Dec. 24, 1954, p. 12.

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  16. The exact role of the Central Committee in these events is unknown. Despite its increased influence after Stalin’s death there was nothing to indicate that it played as significant a part in 1955 as it did in July 1957. Everything points to the 1955 changes having originated in the Presidium. The purpose of the meeting was apparently to brief local officials in much the same manner as Soviet diplomats stationed in Western capitals had been briefed two weeks earlier. Ibid., Feb. 13, 1955, Part 4, p. r.

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  21. The importance of this ministry had been diminished by the creation of the Ministry of Electric Power Station Construction on November 22, 1954. However, if it still retained authority over atomic power installations then Malenkov retained significant importance. Mosely, “How ‘New’ is the Kremlin’s New Line?”, p. 376.

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  35. In 1957 after four years of intensive efforts to raise production the average Soviet farmer was producing approximately the same quantity of grain (eight quintals per hectare) as Czarist peasants had. This was one sixth the output of his American counter-part. Even Polish peasants under Gomulka’s policies averaged 14 quintals per hectare. “Grain Yields,” BBC, Jan. 13, 1958.

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  42. Before 1955 it occupied only ro,000,000 acres but by 196o there were to be 70,000,000 acres. Forty million of these were planted the first year despite a very late spring. Volin, “Khrushchev’s Economic Neo-Stalinism,” p. 462.

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  45. Previously the central administration had established rigid acreage quotas for each collective. (Pravda and Izvestia, March II, 1955, p. I, Current Digest, VII, 7, pp. 16–17.) Future distribution of foodstuffs was to be based not only upon a region’s needs but also its original contribution. Pravda and Izvestia, Feb. 3, 1955, pp. 1–5, ibid., VII, 6, p. to.

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  49. Intelligence Report No. 6922, U.S. Department of State, May I I, 1955.

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  50. New York Times, May 23, 1955, p. 1.

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  51. The American delegation was a counter-part to a Soviet one invited to the United States by the Des Moines (Iowa) Register after Khrushchev had admonished the Central Committee in January 1955 to look to American experience in corn production for guidance.

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  53. Ibid., May 23, 1955, p. 11, Clifton Daniel, and Volin, “The New Battle for Grain in Soviet Russia,” p. 198.

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  54. New York Times, Aug. 20, 1955, Welles Hangen, p. 35. The 1955 cotton crop was also adversely effected by the weather. In Tadzhikistan torrential rains and hail followed a late frost. Altogether two or three resowings were required on three quarters of the plantations. Economic Survey of Europe in 1955, p. 170.

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Embree, G.D. (1959). Domestic Political and Economic Crises. In: The Soviet Union between the 19th and the 20th Party Congresses, 1952–1956. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9550-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9550-8_4

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