Abstract
On May 13, 1940 Queen Wilhelmina and the Cabinet left the Netherlands. Parliament stayed behind in The Hague, to be suspended by the Germans on June 21, 1940. Until autumn 1945, when Parliament reconvened, the ordinary Dutch legislative process— which required laws to be approved by both the Crown and the two chambers of Parliament — was interrupted. In consequence, the Dutch government in London had to issue many decrees which were theoretically invalid, because they concerned subjects which the Constitution requires to be dealt with by Crown and Parliament. Further, many of the London decrees altered existing laws, which process automatically requires the cooperation of Parliament. All the decrees of key interest to the purge should really have been approved by Parliament: No. D 60, which, among other things, gave the M.G. the supreme authority over the mass-arrests; No. D 61, which contained the code for the Special Courts; No. D 62, which established the Special Courts; the Tribunal Decree; the Zuivering-Decrees, 1944 and 1945; the decree which instituted the out-of-court- settlements— all required parliamentary approval.
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References
“There has been no logically defended opposition against Staatsnoodrecht. Although in a few newspapers and periodicals statements appeared which attacked Staatsnoodrecht as legally unsound, this opinion was not further elaborated.” (Noach, op. cit., p. 11).
Inleiding tot de Studie van het Nederlandsche Recht (Zwolle, 1948), p. 65. This pre-war standard textbook has been brought up to date by Professor Lange-meyer. (The original author of this book, Mr. L. J. van Apeldoorn, could not be mentioned on its title page or cover, because he had been a Quisling).
R. Kranenburg, Het Nederlandsch Staatsrecht (Haarlem, 1947), I, 448–449.
Quoted by Noach, op. cit., p. 7.
Ibid., pp. 10-11.
“To camouflage blatant violations of the Constitution, the concept of Staatsnoodrecht was introduced, which is just another way of saying that Might comes before Right.”
A. A. L. F. van Dullemen, Staatsnoodrecht en Democratie (Alphen, 1947), p. 23. Cf. also the same author: Staatsnoodrecht en Rechtstaat (Alphen, 1946).
R. Kranenburg, “Staatsnoodrecht”, Tijdschrift voor Overheidsadministratie, 1946, p. 89. D. van Eck, op. cit., p. 34. A. A. L. F. van Dullemen, Staatsnoodrecht en Democratie, p. 23.
Noach, op. cit., p. 11.
Ibid.,?. 8.
R. Kranenburg, Het Nederlandsch Staatsrecht, II, 23. Cf. also the sentence of the Special Court of Cassation of December 5, 1945. (Na-Oorlogsche Rechtspraak No. 150).
Professor Duynstee (Noach, op. cit., p. 14); A. A. L. F. van Dullemen, Staatsnoodrecht en Democratie, p. 23.
In World War I the Belgian Parliament authorized the King and his Cabinet to issue decrees, having the force of laws, in connection with the war effort.
Report Parlementaire Enquête-Commissie, Vol. II a, pp. 75-75.
Ibid., pp. 75-77.
Ibid., Vol. II c, pp. 395-396. For similar reasons the government in 1922 had refused to consider a proposal to add an emergency clause to article 21 of the Constitution. (P. J. Oud, Het Constitutioneel Recht van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Zwolle, 1947], I, 98).
R. Kranenburg, “Staatsnoodrecht”, Tijdschrift voor Overheidsadministratie, 1946, p. 89.
Inleiding tot de Studie van het Nederlandsche Recht, p. 225.
M. W. Mouton, Oorlogsmisdrijven en het Internationale Recht (The Hague, 1948), p. 409.
Pompe, op. cit., p. 18. Cf. also Professor Jonkers in Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1948, p. 45.
Noach, op. cit., pp. 28-29, 2-3.
G. Russel, De Londense Besluiten in het Licht van Staatsnoodrecht (1948), 48–49. De Lint, op. cit., pp. 21, 49.
Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht, LIV, 143.
Revue de droit pénal et criminologie, 1947–1948, p. 969.
Journal of Criminal Science, 1948, p. 116.
Noach, op. cit., pp. 3-4. Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1945, p. 302; 1946, p. 277.
“Danish Purge Laws”, pp. 448-449. Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1947, p. 51.
Dautricourt, La Trahison, pp. 215-216.
Quoted by Prof. Franz Neumann, Behemoth (New York, 1944), p. 445.
Noach, op. cit., p. 3. Kranenburg, Het Nederlandsch Staatsrecht, II, 32. Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1947, p. 701.
“Danish Purge Laws”, p. 454.
Professor Jonkers, Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1948, pp. 42–43.
De Lint, op. cit., p. 42.
“Doodstraf en Cassatie bij de Bijzondere Rechtspleging”, Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht, LV, 188-190. Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1945, pp. 334-335.
Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht, LIV, 140. Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1947, 65; 1946, 275.
“The difference in punitive measures decreed by different Special Courts and Tribunals, or even by different chambers of the same Tribunal, is so great that any notion of applying objective judicial standards seems to have fallen into disuse.” (Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1947, pp. 217-218). The masses of arrestees, the limited possibilities of appeal, and the “protection” granted economic collaborators for reconstruction purposes contributed to the lack of uniformity in sentences. Furthermore, the Tribunals were supposed to be “people’s courts”, and therefore followed public opinion with its gradually less severe attitude towards crimes of collaboration. Consequently, sentences immediately after the Liberation were invariably much more severe than those after 1947. (Noach, op. cit., p. 23). Also, it was noted that Tribunals in the Catholic provinces of Brabant and Limburg tended to be less severe than those in, for example, the orthodox Protestant province of Zeeland, corresponding to different regional ideas about the seriousness of collaboration. (Mr. Woltjer, Landelijk Comité voor Rechtszekerheid, Inieidingen, 1948, p. 33). The provinces of Brabant and Limburg had been liberated in September of 1944, and thus had been spared the extreme hardships and brutalities of the last seven months of the war. Less severe sentences against Quislings in Brabant and Limburg can partly be explained by this. Fortunately, many disproportionately severe sentences were corrected by pardons, or early-release rules [vervroegde invrijheidstelling.
Pompe, op. cit., p. 11.
Noach, op. cit., p. 165.
Toezicht, I, 45.
H. A. Lunshof, Vlag Halfstok (Amsterdam, 1948), p. 8.
H. M. van Randwijk, De Held en de Rovers (Amsterdam, 1947), p. 8.
Verslag Stichting Toezicht, p. 56.
The press must also be held responsible for many public misconceptions regarding Quislings. Many observers noted that the Dutch press as a whole has served poorly in matters relating to the purge, with superficial, inexpert, sensationalized, and even malicious reports. (Verslag Stickling Toezicht, pp.53-54. Professor Kempe, op. cit. p. 190. Board of Editors, Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1949, p. 237. Professor van Oven, Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1947, pp. 150-153). Furthermore, the truly staggering costs of the purge surely did not increase its popularity. Professor Duynstee estimated that in 1946 Holland was spending 5 per cent of its national income on the purge. (Je Maintiendrai, May 24, 1946).
G. Russel, op. cit., p. 50.
Het Kompas, September 14, 1946.
H. A. Lunshof, Moderne Inquisitie (Amsterdam, 1946), p. 23. In February, March, and April of 1950 Mr. Lunshof wrote eight lengthy articles in the Telegraaf about injustice and irregularities supposedly committed in the purge-action against P. N. Menten, a Dutch business man who resided in Poland from 1918–1943. In his characteristic style Mr. Lunshof described this “af fair”, in which he found “crystallized all elements of injustice which dominated the Netherlands since the Liberation. …”
Cf. Chap. VII.
Mr. J. E. van der Starp, Een Dolkstoot in de Rug van het Nederlandse Volk (Dordrecht, 1950), p. 37. In March 1951, Mr. van der Starp faced court action for libel in connection with another of his violent brochures. The court psychiatrist found that at the time of the writing of the brochure van der Starp “was not fully responsible mentally [verminderd toerekeningsvatbaar], as aresult of the difficult times he had had in his youth”. (Het Vaderland, March 7, 1951)
Cf. Verslag Stichting Toezicht, p. 24.
This statement was made by a Social-Democratic ex-resistance man in the Nieuwe Courant of January 15, 1949. For a detailed account of resistance criticism of the purge, see Witboek van de Grote Advies-Commissie der Illegaliteit, pp. 152-196.
On “lampistes”, cf. Ganshof van der Meersch, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
Zuivering en Illegaliteit, p. 14.
One author charged that also the London government had been affected by a rage to reform, and accordingly issued decrees which failed to correspond to pre-war laws and practices. (Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1946, pp. 122-124).
Mr. Stokvis, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1948–1949, p. 622.
Ibid., 1947–1948, p. 612.
De Waarheid, June 28, 1946.
Pompe, op. cit., p. 11.
Toezicht, I, 88.
Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1947, p. 272.
Pompe, op. cit., p. 42.
The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry revealed that Dutch authorities in London had expected a rapid liberation of the entire Netherlands, and had never anticipated the situation that actually developed after the Allied defeat at Arnhem. (Nieuwe Courant, December 17, 1949).
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© 1952 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Mason, H.L. (1952). Reactions to the Purge. In: The Purge of Dutch Quislings. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9532-4_5
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