Abstract
In this chapter we shall examine the main metaphysical presuppositions of the four Thomistic types of analogy.
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References
Cf. also Maritain, Les Degrés du Savoir, p. 822; Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 127–128; McInerny, “The Logic of Analogy” New Scholasticism (1957), pp. 156 if.
Cf. Vansteenberghen, Ontology (London, 1952), pp. 34–35. The fact that almost every mode of predication may be expressed in terms of proportionality has convinced Suarez that proportionality is not sufficient to obtain analogy of proportionality (Sed advertendum censeo non omnem proportionalitatem sufficere ad constituendam analogiam proportionalitatis. Cf. Disputations Metaphysicae, Disp. 28, Sect. iii, 10). This fact is probably also the reason why some philosophers, e.g. Robinson (Cf. Review of Metaphysics 1951–1952, pp. 466–467), consider metaphysical analogy as something trivial. See Klubertanz, o.c., pp. 83–4.
Cf. Anderson, “Mathematical and Metaphysical Analogy,” Thomist (1941), pp. 575 ff.
This hope has been expressed by both Geiger and Fabro. Cf. Geiger, La Participation dans la Philosophie de St. Thomas d’ Aquin, p. 317, note 3, where he says: “Le fondement ontologique de l’analogie est la participation.” The view that the solutions of the problems of analogy are to be sought in the notion of participation is stated even more vigorously by Fabro when he says: “Un’esposizione definitiva della dottrina tomista sull’analogia non puo’ the dipendere direttamente dalla nozione tomista di partecipazione” (La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione, 2 ed., p. 189, note 2). See also J. Habbel, Die Analogie zwischen Gott and Welt nach Thomas von Aquin (Berlin, 1928) pp. 13 & 31; F. A. Blanche, “Une Théorie de l’Analogie,” Revue de Philosophie (1932), p. 58.
Cf. G. Soehngen, “Analogia Entis in Analogia Fidei,” in Antwort, p. 267 ff.; Geiger, La Participation, pp. 27 ff.& 65 ff.; Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, pp. 39 ff.
The participation of univocal concepts in a common intention is logical; the participation of the secondary analogates in the first analogate is real, at least in analogy of intrinsic attribution. This is one of the cornerstones of St. Thomas’ doctrine of analogy. In his commentary to Aristotle’s Metaphysics he says: “Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur” (In IV Metaphysicorum, no. 536). Commenting on this passage Mclnerny says: “There is only one nature which receives the first and complete signification of the name; whatever else receives the same name refers to the first signification. This brings out the difference between things named analogically and those named univocally. The latter communicate equally in the ratio signified by the name: there is not some one nature which is named principally. Greater and lesser participation in the common ratio destroys univocation, but is of the very essence of analogy.” (R. Mclnerny, “The logic of Analogy,” New Scholasticism (1957), pp. 154–155. Cf. also Gilson, The Christian Philisophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1956), pp. 360 ff.; Maritain, Art and Scholasticism (New York, 1930), pp. 30 ff.
Cf. St. Thomas, In V Ethicorum, no. 939–940 (in mathematical proportionality there is equality of relations); In IV Sententiarum, 49, 2, 1 ad 2 (in non-mathematical proportionality there is only a similarity of relations). St. Thomas sometimes gives mathematical examples to explain metaphysical and theological analogy (e.g. In I Sententiarum 34, 3, 1 ad 2). In fact we find it convenient to express such analogies in the form of geometrical proportions, e.g., matter/form equals potency/act; creature/participated being equals creator/unparticipated being. Such formulas must not be interpreted in the quantitative mathematical sense. For mathematical analogy differs toto coelo from metaphysical and theological analogy. For differences between mathematical and metaphysical analogy see also Lyttkens, The analogy between God and the world, pp. 46–47; Anderson, “Mathematical and Metaphysical Analogy,” Thomist (1941) pp. 572 ff.; Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 300 ff.
Cf. e.g., Anderson, “Some basic propositions concerning metaphysical analogy,” Review of Metaphysics (1951–1952), p. 465. In Bond of Being Anderson says that analogy is rooted in the doctrine of potency and act. The view that analogy of proper proportionality is based on the real distinction between essence and existence is also defended by Phelan who says that “the ultimate basis upon which such analogies (of proportionality) rest, is the proportion existing between the essence (quod est) and existence (esse) of every being that is.” (Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy, p. 24).
Cf. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute, 1957), pp. 170 ff.
Klubertanz gives another interesting reason. He says that analogy of proper proportionality does not require a real distinction between terms because analogy considers the relation between predicate and subject, and “this relation holds no matter what the relation between these ‘terms’ and what they signify, and no matter what the relation between the ’significata’ themselves.” (G. P. Klubertanz, “The Problem of the Analogy of Being,” Review of Metaphysics (1957), p. 262. Cfr. Klubertanz, St. Thomas on Analogy, p. 99.
Cf. Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia (English Transl.), pp. 32, 35, 38; Anderson, Bond of Being, pp. 301, 305 ff.; Penido, Le rôle de l’Analogie, p. 000.
Cf. E. Przywara, Polarity, (Oxford, 1935) pp. 117–119; Mascall, Existence and Analogy, pp. 108 ff.; Goergen, Kardinal Cafetans Lehre von der Analogie, pp. 96 & 99.
For a different approach to the limitations of the analogy of proper proportionality and the ontological priority of the analogy of attribution see R. Masiello, The Intuition of Being according to the Metaphysics of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1955), pp. 14, 18 ff. Masiello has developed the same views in the essay “The Analogy of proportion according to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas” The Modern School-man (1958), pp. 91–105.
Cf. Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, 2; Johannes a S. Thoma, Logica (ed. Marietti) II, p. 486; Penido, Le Rôle de l’Analogie, p. 37; Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World, pp. 338 ff.; Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 98 ff.
This property of analogy of extrinsic denomination is attentively analyzed by Cajetan in De JYominum Analogia, c. 2, where he uses a great variety of adverbs (formaliser, intrinsece, proprie, absolute, distincte) to say that the first analogate is the only one to realize the idea expressed by the analogous name. He, then, concludes: “sanum ipsum animal est; urina vero, medicina et alia sana dicuntur non a sanitate eis inhaerente, sed extrinsece ab illa animalis sanitate, significative vel causaliter.” (op. cit. c. 2). See also Goergen, Kardinal Cajetans Lehre von der Analogie, pp. 73 ff.; Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 93 ff.; Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World, pp. 338 ff.
For a good exposition of the similarities and differences between extrinsic attribution and improper proportionality see Goergen, Kardinal Cafetans Lehre von der Analogie, pp. 84–85; cf. also Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 176–177.
Cf. Penido, Le Rôle de l’ Analogie, pp. 43 ff.; Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 178 ff.; Goergen, Kardinal Cafetans Lehre von der Analogie, p. 85. That improper proportionality is rooted in a likeness of action is stated again and again by Aquinas. See, for instance, De Malo 16, 1 ad 3 (the likeness consists in a similitudo operationis), De Potentia 7, 5 ad 8 (the likeness consists in a similitudo effectus), De Veritate (the likeness consists in a similitudo effectus); cf. also In IV Sententiarum 45, 1, 1 quaestiunc. 1 ad 2; S. Theol. I, 13, 6.
Cf. Anderson, The Bond of Being, p. 123, 127 ff., 255 ff.; Maritain, Degrés du Savoir, p. 122; Cajetan, De Nominum Analogia, c. 3 (English Transl. no 23); Hayen, L’Intentionnel selon s. Thomas d’Aquin, p. 67.
Cf. Roland-Gosselin, “Peut-on parler d’intuition dans la philosophie Thomiste?” Philosophia Perennis, II, pp. 709–730; A. Hufnagel, Intuition und Erkenntnis nach Thomas von Aquin, Münster 1932; R. Jolivet, “L’intuition intellectuelle et le problème de la métaphysique” Archives de Philisophie, 1349; L. B. Geiger, “Abstraction et séparation d’après s. Thomas,” Revue des Sciences Phil. et Theol. (1947), pp. 3–40; J.H. Nicolas, “L’Etre et le connaître” Revue Thomiste (1950), pp. 119–153; 330–359; Van Riet, “La Théorie Thomiste de l’Abstraction” Re. Phil. de Louvain (1952), pp. 359 ff.; P. Merlan, “Abstraction and Metaphysics in St. Thomas” Journal of History of Ideas (1953), pp. 284–291; Maritain, Existence and the Existent (1949), pp. 28 ff. note 14; R. Masiello, The Intuition of Being according to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, (Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1955); Hayen, L’intentionnel selon s. Thomas, pp. 58–59; Cunningham, “A Theory on abstraction in St. Thomas” Modern Schoolman 1958, pp. 259 ff.; Penido, Le rôle de l’analogie, pp. 59 ff.
For a defense of the use of abstraction see Maritain, Existence and the Existent, pp. 28 ff. note 14; for a justification of the use of Intuition by Thomists see Jolivet, “L’intuition intellectuelle et le problème de la métaphysique,” Archives de Philosophie 1934; for the meaning of separation and precision see Geiger, “Abstraction et séparation d’après s. Thomas” Re. Sc. Phil. et Theol. 1947, pp. 3–40 and Cunningham, “A Theory on abstraction in St. Thomas,” Modern Schoolman 1958, pp. 259 ff.; for the use of incomplete abstraction cf. Penido Le rôle de l’analogie, pp. 59 ff.; for the use of abstractive intuition cf. De Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, pp. 35 ff.
Cf. Anderson, The Bond of Being, pp. 256 ff.; Penido, Le rôle de l’analogie, pp. 75 ff.; Maritain, Preface to Metaphysics, pp. 64–65; Gardeil, “La Structure analogique de l’intellect,” Revue Thomiste (1927), pp. 8–13; Hayen, L’Intentionnel selon s. Thomas, pp. 68–70; Goergen, K. Cajetan Lehre von der Analogie, pp. 91 ff.
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© 1963 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Mondin, B. (1963). Metaphysical Presuppositions of Aquinas’ Four Types of Analogy. In: The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9526-3_3
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