Abstract
The nature of international law displays a highly problematical issue in the Western legal theory. This is due to the fact that many writers, when they speak of law, think of it in terms of national or municipal law, and, consequently, judge the nature of international law by the same standards. This analysis convinced some to deny international law the definition of law since the international society lacks the three indispensable elements required for producing a rule of law; namely, the legislature, the executive and the sanction. Others endeavour to prove that the international society combines the three premises, and, thereby, the phenomena of international law could be described by rules of law of the same kind as the rules by which national law may be described. A third group, among whom is Kelsen, try to compromise by advocating a common criterion for the concept of law. “Thus, the antagonism of freedom and coercion — fundamental to social life — supplies the decisive criterion. It is the criterion of law, for law is a coercive order.” Claiming that this argument is correct, it is possible to describe so-called international law as law in the same sense as national law. Assuming that international law is law in the same sense as national law, how can we define the normative or categorical relation between the two systems ? Western writers are not agreed on this topic.
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References
Kelsen, Hans, Principles of International Law, New York 1959, p. 5.
Anderson, J. N. D., “Law as a Social Force in Islamic Culture and History,” BSOAS, 1957, XX, p. 13. The Islamic classical theory, in this regard, classifies the rules into two sections: (1) ’ibadat, ordinances of divine worship which include the articles of the creed, and, (ii) mu’āmalāt, transactions, or’ ādāt, usages, which compromise rules relating to worldy interests.
Oppenheim’s International Law by H. Lauterpacht, 8th ed. London 1955, vol. I, p. 39.
Qur’ān; XVI: 91: 92.
A 7, p. 19.
Sherwani, Haroon Khan, Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration, Lahore 1959, p. 303.
Some Muslim writers unduly maintain that the notion of sovereignty, being of French origin, is alien to Islamic thought. In fact terms are not the monopoly of a particular school of thought. We use modern terminology in this study to make it easier for the reader to grasp our ideas. Besides, regardless of the phrase we use, the legal organization of any society depends on the existence of an authority endowed with supreme powers, i.e. sovereign authority.
Qur’ān; VI: 163.
Qur’ān; IV: 139.
Qur’ān; XXXV: 10.
Qur’ān; VI: 164.
Qur’ān; XXI, 23.
“This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of the Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God our peace and defence … And he that carryeth this Person, is called Sovereigne.” Quoted from Brierly, James Leslie, The Basis of Obligation in International Law and Other Papers, Oxford 1959, p. 25.
Qur’ān; II: 30.
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Qur’ān; LXII: 38.
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Gardet, op. cit., p. 23.
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Korowicz, op. cit., p. 18. Korowicz suggests the following definition: “Public International law is the body of rules which govern mutual relations of States and the situations of other collectivities as well as for organizations and individuals, which are not subject to the internal legal order of a State.” Korowicz, ibid., p. 15.
Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct, op. cit., p. 3.
Hamidullah, ibid, p. 4.
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Brierly, op. cit., p. 3.
Brierly, op. cit., p. 8.
Oppenheim, op. cit., 3rd ed., vol. I, p. 14.
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Abu Heif, Ali Sadek, Al Qunan al Dawli al’ Ām, Alexandria 1965, p. 92.
Brierly, op. cit., p. 17. See, for the discussion of Article 38 of the Statute of the I.C.J., Chapter II of this Part.
Kelsen defines law as a “system or hierarchy of norms which prescribe what always ought to happen in given circumstances.” The validity of all norms, in the final analysis, rest on the “basic norm” of the “first constitution” of the state concerned. Kelsen H., General Theory of Law and the State, Cambridge, Mass. 1949, p. 123.
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’Ibada here is not limited to religious duties. It embraces every field of law as well.
Anderson, op. cit., p. 13.
Brierly, op. cit., p. 58.
Anderson, J. N. D., Islamic Law in the Modern World, London 1959, p. 7.
Anderson, Islamic Law, op. cit., p. 6.
It is obvious, from the brief account we have given of the Western theories, that those theories, more or less, tolerate or have to tolerate the idea of natural law if they were to patch their lacuna.
The Ash’aris are named after al Ash’ari, the founder of orthodox scholasticism, kalam.
Anderson, Islamic Law, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
Al Ghunaimi, Muhammad Talaat, “Al’ Urf Fil Qanùn al Dawli,” Al Huqūq Review, vols. 3, 4, 9th year, Alexandria 1961, p. 186.
Grotius, Hugo, Du Droit de la Guerre et de la Paix, traduction Barbeyrac. Discours préliminaires, p. 64.
See, in support of this view: Hubballah, Muhammad, “Mawqif al Islam menai Ma’rifah wal Taqadum al Fiqri,” an article in Al Thaqafa al Islameya wal Hayat al Mu’asera.
Al Ghunaimi, M. T., Drūs fi Usūl al Qanūn al Wad’ī, Alexandria, p. 150.
The Mu’tazalis are those who profess the doctrine of ’itizal. They compose the great theological school which created the speculative dogmatics of Islam. At present they are branded as heretical.
The Maturidis are the followers of Al Maturidi “the titular head of the Maturidite School of theology which, with the Ash’arite School, form orthodox Sunnite Islam.” Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, op. cit., p. 362.
Logos, it is to be recalled, is the medium of discovering and understanding the divine injunctions, i.e. the principles of Muslim natural law.
Brierly, op. cit., pp. 65, 67.
Brierly, op. cit., pp. 65, 67.
Coulson, op. cit., pp. 1-2.
Coulson, op. cit., p. 6.
Lauterpacht, M., The junction of law in the International Community, Oxford 1933, p. 2.
Fayzee, op. cit., p. 33.
See for example, the awards rendered in the following cases: (i) The Canevro Case between Italy and Peru (8 May, 1912). (ii) The French Peruvian Case (11 October, 1921) (iii) The Foreign Congregations in Portugal (2 September, 1920).
Quoted from Daneff, S., “Conception du Droit International Privé d’après la Doctrine et la Pratique en Bulgarie,” R.A.D.I. vol. 33, No III, p. 505.
In a way, we can say that the Charter of the United Nations adheres to the concept of “ordre public,” if we judge by some of its articles. Take, for example, Article 51 which describes self-defence as a natural right.
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© 1968 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Al Ghunaimi, M.T. (1968). Nature and Genesis of International Law. In: The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9508-9_4
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