The President and the Treaty



The President is the principal policy-maker for the United States in foreign affairs, but his program does not automatically become the foreign policy of the nation. He cannot dictate to his major competitors or allies abroad; he cannot enforce his will on all of his opponents; and his ability to secure agreement among the diverse offices of the federal bureaucracy is at best restricted. The President’s constituencies can both strengthen and weaken his position; his dependency on others to supply him with information and to carry out his directives may severely limit him; competition within the executive branch may dilute his policies or require him to expend limited resources to consolidate his position; and attention devoted to one issue diverts him from other issues.


Foreign Policy Executive Branch Soviet Leader Atmospheric Testing Cuban Missile Crisis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 7.
    From the transcript of remarks to participants in the White House Seminar in Government, August 27, 1963, as reported in Congressional Quarterly (September 6, 1963 ), p. 1551.Google Scholar
  2. 8.
    James Rosenau, among others, has discussed the uneven access different participants have to the press. See his Public Opinion and Foreign Policy ( New York: Random House, 1961 ).Google Scholar
  3. 11.
    Theodore Sorensen, Decision Making in the White House ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1963 ), p. 44.Google Scholar
  4. 14.
    Whether or not the President actually increased his standing in the international community, particularly in Moscow, because of the missile crisis is not as important as his belief that his stature increased. Cf. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, John F. Kennedy in the White House ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965 ), p. 841.Google Scholar
  5. 15.
    This problem of administrative control has been discussed by Peter Woll in American Bureaucracy (New York: Norton, 1963), pp. 142–171.Google Scholar
  6. 17.
    For a discussion of role, see Neal Gross, Ward Mason, and Alexander McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis ( New York: John Wiley, 1958 ), pp. 48–69.Google Scholar
  7. 18.
    Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 727725.Google Scholar
  8. 37.
    McGeorge Bundy, “The Presidency and Peace,” Foreign Affairs,XLII (April, 1964), p. 363.Google Scholar
  9. 43.
    See Dean Rusk’s testimony, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 52. For a discussion of the diplomacy involved and the negotiating history of the agreement, see Arthur H. Dean, The Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), particularly pp. 1–106.Google Scholar
  10. 44.
    Rusk, Harriman and Martin Agronsky on NBC,“ Bulletin of the Department of State, XLIX, No. 1259 (August 12, 1963 ), p. 243.Google Scholar
  11. 46.
    Based on press reports from the New York Times,July 15–26, 1963 and interviews, Washington, D.C., Spring, 1964.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1970

Authors and Affiliations

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations