Grundzüge der Theoriebildung über Sprache bei John Locke (1632–1704)

Abstract

“I must confess, then, that, when I first began this discourse of the understanding... I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it. But when... I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so near a connexion with words² that, unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge, which, being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was, for the most part, so much by the intervention of words that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between our understandings and the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend that, like the medium through which visible objects pass, their obscurity and disorder does not seldom cast a mist before our eyes and impose our understandings... But I am apt to imagine that, were the imperfections of language as the instrument of knowledge more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controversies that make such a noise in the world would of themselves cease, and the way to knowledge and perhaps peace, too, lie a great deal opener than it does.”¹

“Wenige Philosophen haben die Wichtigkeit der Sprache für alle Thätigkeiten des menschlichen Geistes so klar erkannt, wenige haben so unausgesetzt darauf hingewiesen, wie notwendig es sei, den Einfluss der Worte auf die Gedanken zu beobachten, wie Locke in seiner Abhandlung über den menschlichen Verstand.” (F. M. Müller)