Abstract
Although formal diplomatic relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union were not established until September 1955,1 the Bonn government has pursued a specific policy toward the UiS.S.R. since the Federal Republic came into being.2 Despite the initial limitations which the Western Powers had imposed upon the Bonn government in respect to its conduct of foreign affairs, Konrad Adenauer, upon taking office as the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic, quickly assumed an important role in the formulation of policy. This is evidenced by Adenauer’s statement on foreign policy which he made to the Bundestag upon assumption of office on September 20, 1949,3 and by subsequent declarations of his government to the Bundestag or to the public at large, as well as by notes to the Allied High Commissioners.4 In several instances, particularly during the first years of the Federal Republic, the Bonn government utilized the Western Allied High Commissioners or their governments as its agents for the conduct of West German foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. An example of this procedure is a note by the Federal Chancellor on the subject of reunification, dated October 1, 1950, which was addressed to the chairman of the Allied High Commission, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. The contents of this note were forwarded by Sir Ivone, as well as by the United States and French High Commissioners, on October 9, 1950, to the chairman of the Soviet Control Commission for Germany.1 An example of involving the governments of the three occupying Western Powers is a note via the Allied High Commissioners to these governments, in which the request was made to propose the formation of a United Nations commission to supervise the holding of free elections in West and East Germany, preparatory to the unification of that country.2
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References
For a concise account of the negotiations in Moscow leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations, see Walter Boedigheimer, “Der Verlauf der Verhandlungen zwischen den Regierungsdelegationen der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Moskau vom 9. bis 13. September 1955” Europa Archiv (October 5, 1955), pp. 8259-8262; also New York Times, September 18, Section IV, p. 5, and September 19, p. 1; and Part V of this chapter.
Prior to the founding of the Federal Republic in the spring of 1947, the Minister Presidents of the British and American Zones established in Stuttgart a Bureau for Peace Questions, which was to prepare material and studies reflecting German viewpoints for submission to the occupation powers. This Bureau, inter alia, devoted itself to problems of the new boundaries, reparations, and international cooperation. See Wahrhaftig, op. cit., p. 19; and Krueger, op. cit., p. 314. In addition, the Parliamentary Council, which was the Constituent Assembly for the Basic Law, performed a foreign policy function in the fall of 1948, when it passed a resolution protesting the action of a Soviet military court which sentenced each of five participants in a Berlin freedom demonstration to 25 years of hard labor (Neue Zeitung, September 16, 1948).
See pp. 30, 31, supra.
Some examples are: the declaration of the Federal government to the Bundestag on October 21, 1949, in respect to the representation of all Germans by the Bonn government; a declaration regarding the holding of all-German elections, issued March 22, 1950; and the note of the Chancellor to the Allied High Commission of October 1, 1950, in respect to conditions of free elections. For the text of these declarations and note, see Die Bemühungen der Bundesregierung um die Wiederherstellung der Einheit Deutschlands durch gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, Part I, Documents and Files published by the Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (1959), pp. 7, 9, and 17 (These documents by the Federal government are referred to henceforth as Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen with appropriate pagination). See also Allemann, op. cit., p. 131.
Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, Part I, pp. 17-20.
Ibid., pp. 43-44.
VDB (Vol. 35, 1957), p. 10813. Under Article 2 of the constitution of the D.D.R., Berlin is also the capital of the East German regime. (See Heinrich Siegler, Dokumentation zur Deutschlandfrage, Von der Atlantik-Charta 1941 zur Genfer Aussenministerkonferenz 1959, Annexband: Vertr äge [Bonn, 1959], p. 70).
For the text of the various agreements see Siegler, Dokumentation pp. 6-32. For a more detailed discussion of these agreements, see Karl Loewenstein, op. cit., pp. 81-4.
Facts about Germany, published by the Press and Information Service of the Federal government (Wiesbaden 1959), p. 16; see also Articles 2 and 6 of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, May 26, 1952, as amended on October 23, 1954, and letters from the Three High Commissioners on the exercise of the Reserved Right Relating to Berlin and Declaration of the Federal Republic concerning aid to Berlin (Bundesgesetzblatt, II [1955], pp. 305-11, and pp. 500-2).
Article 144, section 2, Basic Law, and Facts about Germany, op. cit., pp. 15, 16. For additional information see Documents on the Status of Berlin, edited by the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Ausw ärtige Politik (Munich, 1959); R. Legien, The Four Power Agreements on Berlin, Alternate Solutions to the Status Quo? (Berlin, 1959); and a very complete bibliography “Das zweigeteilte Berlin.” Die Moderne Welt, 3 (1960/61), pp. 326-36.
See Documents on the Status of Berlin, op. cit., pp. 64, 65, for a pertinent quotation from the Soviet News, July 5, 1948, regarding the withdrawal of the Soviet representative; and pp. 74, 75 for the “Declaration by the Western Commandants on the Continued Operation of the Allied Kommandatura, December 21, 1948.”
See Article 2 of the “Statement of Principles Governing the Relationship between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin, May 14, 1949,” ibid., pp. 104-7. Although the text of this statement speaks of Greater Berlin, The Kommandatura’s powers are limited in actuality to West Berlin.
Articles III and IV. For the complete text of this declaration see ibid., pp. 141-4.
It was not until the delivery of the Soviet note of November 27, 1958, that the Berlin problem assumed world crisis proportions. In this note the Soviet government announced cancellation of the Four Power Agreements on Berlin, requested withdrawal of Western armed forces from Berlin, and threatened to transfer to East Germany all functions heretofore performed by Soviet authorities. (For the text of the note, see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 819-834.)
See pp. 94-95, supra.
Nettl, op. cit., p. 83.
For some more details, see Schlueter, op. cit., pp. 75-81; Castellan, op. cit., pp. 128-39; and Melvin Groan and Carl J. Friedrick, “The East German Regime and Soviet Policy in Germany,” Journal of Politics (February, 1958), pp. 44-63. For extracts from the program of the “National Front,” see Beate Ruhm von Oppen, Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945–1954 (London, 1955), pp. 467-469.
Siegler, Reunification, p. 36.
For the complete text of the declaration, see ibid., p. 123.
Ibid.
For the text of this statement see Ruhm von Oppen, op. at., pp. 486-488.
For the text of the notes see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 12-14.
For the text of this declaration, which was made before the Bundestag, see ibid., pp. 15, 16; also VDB (Vol. 5, 1950), p. 3184.
Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, p. 16; and VDB (Vol. 5, 1950), pp. 3185-3193.
For the text, see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 17, 18, 19 and 20; also Siegler, Reunification, p. 56.
For the text see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 27-31.
For the text of the declaration see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 41-43; also VDB (Vol. 9, 1951), pp. 6700-6712. The Bundestag approved the draft of an electoral law incorporating the fourteen points on February 6, 1952 (VDB [Vol. 10, 1952], pp. 8032-8091; and Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 71-74.)
For additional details on the various conferences and notes see pp. 102 ff, infra. For the text of Adenauer’s messages to Bulganin, see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 553, 603-605, 614-616.
For the text of the letter and for the Chancellor’s statement to the Bundestag on this matter, see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 43, 44 and VDB (Vol. 9, 1951), pp. 6892, 6893; for related documents see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 51-60.
United Nations Doc. A/1938, November 6, 1951.
Article 2, paragraph 7, precludes the United Nations from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. Article 107 reads as follows: “Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War had been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Government having responsibility for such action.” According to the interpretation of most commentators, Article 107 is transitional in nature and permits certain actions by the World War II Allied governments with regard to ex-enemy states, which might otherwise be contrary to the Charter. For details see L. M. Goodrich and E. Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents (Boston, 1949), PP. 534-5.
For details see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951 (New York, 1952), pp. 316-23; and United Nations Documents A/AC. 53/ L 11, 1 Dec. 1951, A/AC. 53L 12,4 Dec. 1951, A/AC. 53/L 13, 10 Dec. 1951. A/AC. 53/L 14, 7 Dec. 1951, A/AC 53/L 15, 13 Dec. 1951, A/2020, 19 Dec. 1951, and A/2021, 20 Dec. 1951. During the proceedings the Ad Hoc Committee heard statements of Dr. von Brentano on behalf of the Federal Republic, and Professor Reuter on behalf of the Western sector of Berlin, who pointed to the lack of political freedom in the Soviet Zone. The Committee also heard statements by representatives of the D.D.R. and of the Eastern sector of Berlin. They claimed that the task of determining whether conditions existed in Germany to hold truly free elections should devolve upon the Germans themselves, under the supervision of the four occupying Powers.
United Nations Doc. A/2122, 5 May 1952; also United Nations Doc. A/2122/Add. 1, 3 June 1952.
Ibid.
United Nations Doc. A/2122/Add. 2, 11 Aug. 1952.
For the text of the Chancellor’s letter, the various notes preceding the conference, the Bundestag resolution, and related documents, see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 119-26, 129-53; also VDB (Vol. 16, 1953), pp. 13255-64.
The Soviet Zone Volkskammer approved a draft of an electoral law on January 9, 1952. For the text see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 63-70.
For details of the Eden plan see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, II, pp. 35–37; also Siegler, Reunification, pp. 57-59.
Ibid., p. 59.
For the text of the directives see U. S. Department of State, The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18–23, 1955 (Washington, D. C, 1955), pp. 67-68. The pertinent part of the directives states: “The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.” See also Bulganin’s closing statement (ibid., pp. 77-80) which casts doubt on a consensus with respect to “free elections”; and T. K. Finletter, Foreign Policy: the Next Phase (New York, 1958), pp. 87, 88.
Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 399–400. See also U.S. Department of State, The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27–November 16, 1955 (Washington, D.G., 1955), pp. 30-3.
For the text of the note and memorandum, see Siegler, Reunification pp. 63–70. The note also quotes statements of Soviet Foreign Ministers Shepilov and Molotov in support of this principle.
Die Welt, July 1, 1961, p. 2. See also the joint statement of the Federal Republic and the three Western Powers in Berlin on July 29, 1957, emphasizing the right to political, economic and social self-determination (Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 669-671); and the statement of Dr. von Brentano, made to the Bundestag on the subject of free elections and the right of self-determination on March 20, 1958 (ibid., pp. 760-764; VDB [Vol. 40, 1958], pp. 847-854).
For the text of the letter see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 21, 22.
For the text of the East German and General Chuikov’s statements see ibid., pp. 35-39. The most important “democratic” organizations were the Communist dominated labor and youth organizations. See Schlueter, op. cit., p. 79.
For the text of the East German declarations, see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 49–50.
For the text of the Soviet notes of March 10, April 9, May 13, and August 23, and of the Western notes of March 25, May 13, July 10, and September 23, see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 85-112.
For a thorough discussion of the implications of the Soviet note, see J. P. Warburg, Germany: Key to Peace (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 180–214.
See Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, II, pp. 50-2; and Siegler, Reunification, p. 86.
Ibid., p. 87. A similar declaration was also made after the Paris and London treaties regarding West Germany’s entry in WEU and NATO were signed in 1954. The Soviet government apparently hoped by this conciliatory attitude to prevent ratification of these treaties as well. (Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 250-252.)
Ibid., pp. 345-46. Of significance in this connection also is a statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov made in San Francisco in June, 1955: “What regime is to exist and will exist in a reunified Germany — that is a matter which the German people will have to decide for themselves in all-German free elections.” (Tass, June 27, 1955, quoted in the German memorandum to the Soviet government of September 2, 1956; Siegler, Reunification, p. 69).
Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, II, pp. 226-7.
See in this respect also the declaration of the East German government made during the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers (ibid., pp. 261-72). The proposals contained in this declaration were submitted in Geneva by the Observers Delegation of the D.D.R. For Mr. Molotov’s statement see ibid., pp. 254-61. The declaration of Foreign Minister von Brentano, expressing his disappointment about the outcome of the Geneva conference is found on pp. 274-90, and that of the Western Foreign Ministers on p. 273.
For the text of the note and memorandum, see Siegler, Reunification, pp. 63-70.
For the text of the Soviet note, see ibid., pp. 93-8, particularly p. 95.
Cf. Paul Sethe, Zwischen Bonn und Moskau (Frankfurt a/M, 1956), p. 47.
See also Eugene Hinterhoff, Disengagement (London, 1959), p. 154, who states that unfortunately the United States had embarked on a rigid policy of rearming Germany, which neither France nor Britain nor the great majority of Germans wanted at that time. Hinterhoff believes that the decision to rearm Germany was based on the wrong assessment of the Soviet military threat in Europe, which, according to Hinterhoff, in fact never existed. He reasons that if the Soviet Union wanted to invade Europe, she could have easily done so before NATO came into being, or even when NATO was being formed and the French contingents were melting away in Indo-China. Hinterhoff believes that the Soviet Union was deterred from aggression — if she ever seriously contemplated it — not merely by the atom bomb, but by fear of a mass uprising in Eastern Europe, which was a more serious danger to the Soviet Union than a few German divisions in West Germany. For additional background material on the the Soviet note see Boris Meissner, op. cit., pp. 292-307.
Karl Georg Pfeiderer, a Bundestag deputy of the FDP and a former member of the German Embassy in Moscow, expressed similar thoughts in a talk on June 6, 1952, which aroused considerable interest. In regard to the issue of “free elections” he said: “I fear that with all this argument about all-German elections, the negotiating states and we ourselves have come to a dead end in our deliberations.… What ought we to do then? We certainly ought not to abandon the thought of elections, because they are necessary and must come. But we ought to postpone all thoughts of elections and set out clearly and openly from the main aim of our policy, which is the evacuation of the Soviet Zone by the Russians and the liquidation of the system prevailing there. And if we do this, then the question is simply: what does this cost, how high is the price politically?” For the partial text, see Siegler, Reunification pp. 105-6; for background on Pfeiderer see Sethe, op. cit., pp. 72-4.
Sethe, op. at., p. 50.
Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 141–2; also VDB (Vol. 11, 1952), pp. 8753-99.
The consistent demand of the West German government for “free elections” may have contributed psychologically to the East German uprising on June 16 and 17, 1953. Demands were made by some revolting Berlin workers for the resignation of the government of the D.D.R. and for free elections (M. Croan and E. J. Friedrick, “The East German Regime and Soviet Policy in Germany,” Journal of Politics [February 9, 1958], p. 47; for additional information see also Stefan Brant, The East German Uprising [New York, 1957], and for the statements of the government of the D.D.R. and of the Commandant of the Soviet sector of Berlin, see Ruhm von Oppen, op. cit., pp. 590-592.
Wilhelm Cornides argues that the tactics of the Western Powers of demanding free elections first also lacked sincerity, because it had to be recognized that the time gained by the Soviet rejection of the Western demands was used by the Western Powers, in concert with the Federal government, to link the West German state to the Western military alliance, and through it make Germany’s ties with the West indissoluble. Wilhelm Gornides, Die Weltmächte und Deutschland, Geschichte der jüngsten Vergangenheit, 1945–1955 (Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1957), p. 264; see also Wilhelm Grewe, Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit (Stuttgart, 1960), pp. 228-234, about “missed opportunities”; A. Grosser, op. cit., pp. 233-245, and Adalbert Worliczek, Bonn-Moskau, Die Ostpolitik Adenauers, (Munich, 1957), pp. 30-34.
For the text of the proposal see Rudolf Schuster, (ed.), Verfahrensvorschläge zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands 1949–1959, published by the Forschungsinstitut der deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik, n.d., pp. 59-62. Among the signers of the proposal were a former Minister of the Interior, Dr. Gustav Heinemann and a Bundestag deputy Helene Wessel.
Ibid., p. 66. Another suggestion to abandon the “free elections first” doctrine came in 1954 from a British MP, Viscount Hinchinbrooke (ibid., pp. 71-2).
See also Warburg, op. cit., pp. 190-2.
Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, p. 8; and VDB (Vol. 1, 1949), p. 308, which gives the complete text of the Chancellor’s declaration in the Bundestag. See also pp. 19-20, supra.
On September 18, 1950, this position was placed on record for the first time by the Western Foreign Ministers’ Conference in New York and was later adopted by all member states of NATO, since it was held that only the West German government was constituted in accordance with the principles of liberty and right (Siegler, Dokumentation, p. 102).
For the text of this letter see ibid., p. 390; and Ruhm von Oppen, op. cit., pp. 517-520.
Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 703–4.
The rupture of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia did not affect the existing consular and economic relations. Despite the lack of official diplomatic relations with the European Soviet Bloc countries, West Germany has made efforts to build up an active trade as well as joint cultural and sports activities with these countries. (Deutschland im Wiederaufiau 1958, p.
Siegler, Dokumentation, p. 103.
For the text of this draft see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 63–70.
For the text of the proposal see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 189–191; for the reply of the Western Powers, see ibid., pp. 191-4.
Ibid., p. 206.
For the complete text of Molotov’s address see ibid., pp. 429-33. Molotov had attempted to invite representatives of the two “sovereign” German states to participate in the Conference, but the Western Foreign Ministers declined to follow his suggestion (ibid., p. 427).
For the text of the declaration see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, II, pp. 80–7, see also VDB (Vol. 18, 1953-1954), PP. 518-550.
For the text of Brentano’s statement see VDB (Vol. 27, 1955), pp. 6101-6111, particularly p. 6105; Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 503-7.
Ibid., pp. 669-71, also pp. 181-3, 399-402 for the Eden plans.
For the text of the appeal of the Peoples Chamber see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 37–8. Further see ibid., pp. 35-7 and 39.
For the text of Adenauer’s address see ibid., pp. 44-8, see also p. 100, supra, concerning the Federal government’s fourteen points.
Ibid., pp. 54-5; also VDB (Vol. 9, 1951), pp. 6892-3.
Facts on File, September 5–11, 1952, p. 280.
Facts on File, October 31–November 6, 1952. p. 350.
Facts on File, July 17–23, 1953, p. 238.
Robert F. Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 174-5; and Werner Erfurt, Die sowjetrussische Deutschlandpolitik (Esslingen, 1956), p. 112; see also the telegram from the East German Committee for German Unity to the German Trade Union Association, in 1955 (Schuster, op. cit., p. 88), and its letter to the “Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland” (ibid., p. 92).
For more details of the plan see ibid., pp. 62-4.
Ibid., p. 93. For a somewhat similar concept put forth by Hermann Rauschning, see pp. 99-100.
For the text of the SPD proposals see Siegler, Reunification, pp. 107-9.
In 1957 the Federal Republic purchased DM 671.5 million of goods from the Soviet Zone and sold goods worth 784.8 million. Inter-zonal agreements have been in force since 1950. (Facts about Germany, op. cit., p. 115.)
Deutschland im Wiederaufbau 1958, pp. 15-6, 443.
Ibid., p. 16.
For a partial text see Siegler, Dokumentation p. 583.
For more details see Siegler, Reunification pp. 99–100.
For details of the Grotewohl plan see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 668–9.
For the text of the declaration see ibid., pp. 679-80.
For the text of the Soviet note see ibid., pp. 689-94.
For the text of Dr. von Brentano’s statement, see ibid., pp. 741-2; and VDB (Vol. 39, 1957/58), pp. 297-304. See also the letter of Chancellor Adenauer to Premier Bulganin of January 8, 1958, (Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 734-9).
For the text of the note and memorandum, see ibid., pp. 637-47.
Cf. Schlueter, op. cit., p. 116.
Another argument of the Federal government, which is primarily of a psychological nature, is the fact that the extablishment of a confederation meant turning back the clock for over 100 years (cf. Grewe, op. cit., 458-9). For a thorough compilation of legal, historical, and political arguments against the “confederation plan,” see Rudolf Schuster, “Die Scheinkonföderation als Nahziel der sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik,” Europa Archiv (June 20, 1959), pp. 349-68; for a treatment of the constitutional problems of reunification see also Theodor Eschenburg, Die deutsche Frage (Munich, 1959), particularly pp. 37-41.
For additional information see Nettl, op. cit.; and George Castellan, op. cit.
Klaus Mehnert in 1952, J. H. von Merkatz and Professor Erich Kaufmann in 1953; for details see Schuster, Verfahrensvorschläge, pp. 52-4, 64-6, 70. Max Beloff, in “Which Road to German Unity,” Daily Telegraph, February 5, 1959, comments that “from the internal German point of view, confederation might indeed provide, if not an immediate road to unity, at least some mitigation of the evils of the partition as well as machinery through which it might be possible to negotiate dismantling of some of the more oppressive features of the East German regime.… “
Cf. p.p. 113-4, supra.
This suggestion was made in 1956 by Thomas Dehler, then chairman of the FDP, who appeared to support direct talks between the two governments. (Schuster, Verfahrensvorschläge, p. 156). The problem will be discussed further in the final chapter.
Beloff, loc. cit.
See for this aspect the detailed proposal of Erich Küchendorf of February 20, 1959, who conceived the term “transfederation” which he believed to characterize more accurately the necessary governmental structure than did the term confederation. (Schuster, Verfahrensvorschläge, pp. 232-8.)
For details on the mechanics see Küchendorf in ibid.; and H. L. Brill, “Rechtsfrage über die Wiedervereinigung,” Der Deutsche Beamte, 10 (1955), p. 149, who also suggests that the treaty on reunification be ratified by the parliaments of West and East Germany with the majority of votes normally necessary for constitutional amendments.
In either case, the potential of such activities through the use of the confederation structure should not be overestimated since the confederation government normally has no direct contact with the citizens of the members of the confederation, but only with the member governments.
Cf. Beloff, loc. cit.
Altmann, op. cit., p. 166; see also Grewe, op. cit., pp. 458-62; Sethe, op. cit., pp. 166-8; and Alexander, op. cit., p. 243.
Kurt Sieveking, former Bundesrat President and Lord Mayor of Hamburg, asserted that the possibilities of a confederation should be exploited. See text of his speech on January 21, 1957, in Siegler, Reunification, pp. 115-6. Other supporters of the confederation concept appeared to be former Federal Minister G. Heinemann, Mathias Zeller, Senator Plate and possibly Herbert Wehner. (See Schuster, Verfahrensvorschläge, pp. 158-9, 160-1, 175-80, and 192-4.) Whether mass opinion or the majority of the elites in government, political parties, industry, and labor would have supported the confederation concept, is doubtful. (See K. W. Deutsch and L. J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers [Stanford, 1959]. p. 220 and New York Times, February 2, 1962, p. 2).
Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, p. 18.
Ibid., p. 44.
For the text of this Declaration see Ruhm von Oppen, op. cit., pp. 29-35.
Ibid., pp. 40-50. See also Siegler, Reunification p. 38, who quotes as another source for this obligation. Stalin’s statement on V-Day: “Three years ago, Germany intended to carve up the Soviet Union by separating from it the Caucasus, the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic states. Things turned out very differently, however, and Germany is forced to accept unconditional surrender. But the Soviet Union is not considering carving up or destroying Germany.”
For the text of the document see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 221–239.
U.S. Dept. of State, Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, pp. 67–68
For the proceedings in Moscow see Siegler Dokumentation, pp. 359–389.
For the text of the note see ibid., pp. 689-94.
In his statement rejecting the confederation proposals, Foreign Minister von Brentano expressed the fear that conclusion of an international treaty with the D.D.R. would release the Four Powers from their obligation (ibid., p. 742).
Cf. VDB (Vol. 1, 1949), p. 30; (Vol. 9, 1951), p. 6700; (Vol. 18, 1953), p. 19; and (Vol.39, 1957/58), P. 24.
Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 390–393.
For the text of the notes see ibid., pp. 557-69 and 637-47.
See Chapter 2, Supra.
The East German charges reflected the deliberations of the Prague conference of Eastern Bloc Foreign Ministers of October 20 and 21, during which strong protests were voiced against any remilitarization of Germany. (For details, see Meissner, op. cit., pp. 241-6, and Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 22-5.
For the text of the declaration see ibid., pp. 27-31; and also VDB (Vol. 6, 1951), pp. 4757-61. The size of the Peoples’ Police was estimated at 50,000 men and was considered to be easily expandable into an East German army of 200,000 to 300,000 men (Nettl, op. cit., pp. 136-8). See also United States and British notes of May 23, 1950 regarding German Police in the Soviet Zone (Ruhm von Oppen, op. cit., pp. 493-495).
For en extract of the text of the memorandum see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 101-2. This memorandum was to have been prompted by Churchill’s suggestion of the creation of a European army which was to include German contingents. Ibid.; and Warburg, op. cit., pp. 131-2.)
Siegler, Dokumentation, p. 104.
For the complete text of Adenauer’s speech see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 44–8.
New York Times, February 20, 26, 1952; and Warburg, op. cit., p. 186.
For the text of this and the subsequent notes of the government of the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers, see Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 85-112.
VDB (Vol. 11, 1952), pp. 8753-7.
VDB (Vol. 12, 1952), pp. 9789-801; and (Vol. 15, 1953), pp. 12301-61; also Bundesgesetzblatt II, 1954, pp. 57 ff.; and Litchfield, op. at., pp. 622-37.
Siegler, Dokumentation, p. 173.
For the text of these proposals see ibid., pp. 195-8. Molotov stated on February 14 and 15 that he was willing to admit the United States to membership of the pact, that dissolution of NATO was not a prerequisite, and that he was willing to discuss the possibility of the Soviet Union joining NATO (31 March). See ibid., p. 201; and Siegler, Reunification, p. 161.
See Siegler, Dokumentation, p. 209.
A few hours before the French Assembly opened its debate on the EDC treaties on August 28, the Soviet Union’s satellite, Poland, offered France a treaty of alliance and mutual security, directed mainly against Germany Facts on File, August 27–September 2, 1954). The Soviet Union also induced East German leaders to appeal directly to the French government and to political groups in France to oppose EDG. (Robert Byrnes, op. cit., p. 174; and Erfurt, op. cit., p. 112.)
Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 269–72.
They consisted primarily of details regarding “free elections.”
For the complete text of the significant letters of Adenauer and Ollenhauer see ibid., p. 273-9.
For the complete text of the interview see ibid., pp. 284-6.
VDB (Vol. 23, 1955), pp. 3881-935.
See for the text of this treaty, Siegler, Dokumentation, Annexband: Verträge, pp 296-8. For documentation of other East bloc treaties see Boris Meissner (ed.), Das Ostpaktsystem (Frankfurt a/M, 1955).
For the text of the two proposals see U. S. Department of State, Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, pp. 31-34, and 59; as well as Siegler, Dokumentation pp. 316-9, and 338-9. French Prime Minister Edgar Faure also made an interesting proposal in which he advocated control of armaments of a unified Germany on the level agreed to for the Federal Republic within the framework of the WEU, a NATO guarantee to the Soviet Union for a veto on the use of armed forces by the Federal Republic to achieve reunification or alter German boundaries, and establishment of a Pan-European security system open to all European states, and existing side by side with WEU and NATO (ibid., pp. 311-6).
VDB (Vol. 31, 1957), p. 8792.
Bulletin (September 8, 1956), pp. 1626-30, see also Schlueter, op. cit., p. 100.
The radar installations of the Western Powers would be installed in Poland while those of the Soviet bloc possibly at the Western frontier of Germany.
For the complete text of the proposals see U. S. Department of State, Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 27, 32, 136, 199-29 and Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 396-405. These proposals were made pursuant to the directives of the Chiefs of State (Summit Conference) to the four Foreign Ministers, which requested them to examine in Geneva in October of that year the following proposals: (1) A security pact for Europe or part of Europe including the obligation not to use armed forces; (2) limitation, control, and inspection of the armed forces and their armament; and (3) the establishment of a zone situated between East and West, in which deployment of armed forces would be subject to mutual consent (ibid., pp. 345-6).
For the text of the Soviet proposals, see ibid., pp. 320-8; and U.S. Department of State, Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, pp. 48-51, 54, 55.
For the text of the various proposals made during the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, consult U.S. Department of State, Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, pp. 76–283.
For the complete text see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 503–9. The Bundestag approved the declaration the next day (VDB [Vol. 27, 1955], pp. 6101-11, also 6155-88).
See also Worliczek, op. cit., pp. 65-70 and 78-83.
Significant in this connection is Khrushchev’s statement to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party on February 14, 1956. Khrushchev said: “Establishment of a collective security system in Europe, renunciation of the Paris agreements, and establishment of cooperation between the two German states is the right way to settle the German question.” (Quoted from Leo Gruliow, op. cit., II p. 35.)
Johann B. Gradl, “Die deutsche Frage als internationales Problem,” Aussenpolitik (August, 1958), pp. 487–96, points out that this policy also offered some protection against a direct “deal” between the Big Three Powers and the Soviet Union at the expense of Germany (p. 491).
See Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 361–5 and 371-2. See also p. 346 for summit agreement.
See p. 138, supra.
See ibid., p. 532.
However in an interview given to the editors of U.S. News and World Report on February 10, 1956, von Brentano indicated that a withdrawal from NATO could not be made a bargaining point for the reunification of Germany. During a foreign affairs debate in the Bundestag on June 28, 1956, von Brentano also warned against proposals of non-alliance and revision of the Paris treaties, which the Federal government would not adopt under any circumstances. (VDB [Vol. 31, 1956], pp. 8412-29.)
For the complete text of the note and memorandum, see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 557-69.
F.i. Gerstenmaier’s statement to the Bundestag on June 30, 1961. (Die Welt, July 1, 1961).
Cf. Siegler, Reunification, pp. 156–7.
The note also stated that at the time when the Big Powers were searching for a way to reach an agreement on the general reduction of armaments, and while many states had already reduced their forces and armaments, the government of the Federal Republic had proclaimed the establishment of an army of 500,000 men. In view of the millions of lives lost in the last World War and the immense damage suffered by thousands of Soviet towns and villages, the Soviet Union irrevocably rejected any resurrection of militarism in West Germany, no matter in what form. For the text of the note see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 571-7. The chief of the Press and Information Service, von Eckardt, contended that the note contained certain positive features, such as an acknowledgment of the right of West Germany to have armed forces and a Soviet desire for a continuation of the discussions on these matters (see Siegler, Reunification, p. 71).
For the text of the note, see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 689–94.
It should be noted that the concept of disengagement was already reflected in the neutralization and security proposals submitted by the Soviet government at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1954. The Western Powers rejected these proposals and demanded as a first step reunification through free elections, (see pp. 133-4, supra; and ibid., PP. 195-201).
For the text of the address see ibid., pp. 619-20.
Cf. Siegler, Reunification, pp. 156–7.
See Siegler, Dokumentation, p. 636.
Ibid., pp.657, 662-3.
See Siegler, Reunification, pp. 167–9.
See ibid., pp. 156-9. Earlier, on April 28, Chancellor Adenauer, in a letter to the Soviet ambassador to the Federal Republic, brought to his attention a previous conversation in which the Chancellor had informed him that the Federal government neither possessed nor had sought supplies of atomic weapons of any kind, and that the Federal government would do everything in its power to bring about general, controlled nuclear disarmament.
See VDB (Vol. 36, 1957), pp. 12065-74. The Soviet reply to the West German note of May 22 assumed from the contents of the note that the Federal government did not renounce definitely its intention to arm its forces with atomic weapons. (See Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 657-62.)
For the complete text of Rapacki’s address see ibid., pp. 698-703.
Both Poland and Czechoslovakia may have also hoped that acceptance and implementation of the Rapacki plan might lead to reduction of Soviet interference in their territories.
See ibid., pp. 703 and 668.
For the text of Bulganin’s message, see ibid., pp. 721-727. Another message with similar contents as the one dated December 10, was dispatched January 8, 1958.
For the complete text of this message see ibid., pp. 734-9.
For the text of von Brentano’s declaration, see VDB (Vol. 39, 1957-58), PP. 297-304 and 311-2.
Gernot Scheuer, “Materielle Voraussetzungen für eine Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands in der Sicht nicht-amtlicher Vorschläge,” Europa Archiv (March 20, 1960), pp. 177–191, recognizes many more sub-divisions, but most of them can be grouped under the major divisions outlined here.
See also p. 8, supra.
Pfeiderer published his concept in a memorandum entitled “Treaty Machinery and Eastern Policy.” For the text see Siegler, Dokumentation, p. 167. Pfeiderer was strongly opposed to a policy of non-allignment and complete neutrality. He stated in his memorandum: All thought of neutralization of the Federal Republic through a third power, or her voluntary neutrality based upon self-protection, can as easily be disregarded as the Soviet proposal …., according to which the Federal Republic is not to attach itself to any Western system. The dangers of these apparent solutions are so numerous and have been so thoroughly discussed that it is enough to say that their rejection in Germany is pretty general.
For the text of Mr. Mende’s address see Siegler, Reunification, pp. 109–11.
See Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 602–3.
See Siegler, Reunification, pp. 112–4.
Arnold Brecht, “Gangbare und ungangbare Wege zur Frage der Wiedervereinigung,” Aussenpolitik (November, 1955), pp. 685–94.
W. W. Schuetz, Die Stunde Deutschlands, Möglichkeiten einer Politik der Wiedervereinigung (Stuttgart, 1954), pp. 103–34. Other writers who basically agree with the policy of alignment with the West and East are Eberhard Menzel, “Der Europäische Sicherheitspakt — ein Schritt zur Entspannung im Ost-West-Konflikt und zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands,” Europa Archiv (June 5–20, 1955), pp. 7891-906; Bernhard Leverenz, Wiedervereinigung unserer oberstes Ziel (Bonn, 1957), pp. 6, ff. Menzel denies that the Locarno system offers a valid example for the present situation, but considers the basic concept as a fruitful point of departure. See also E. W. Meyer, “Gedanken zur Politik der Wiedervereinigung,” Aussenpolitik (October, 1958), pp. 614-630, particularly p. 629; and Gradl. op. cit., pp. 491, 493, 494.
Brecht, op. cit., p. 693.
Hinterhoff, op. cit., furnishes a complete listing of all Western and Eastern plans of disengagement (pp. 414-42).
Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West, p. 61.
Ibid., p. 62, see also Kennan’s somewhat more pessimistic comments in respect to Soviet aims in Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, particularly pp. 347, 348, 386-395.
Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West, pp. 32–65; for the text of the pertinent sections of the broadcasts see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 713-20. See also G. F. Kennan, “Disengagement Revisited,” Foreign Affairs (January, 1959), pp. 187-210, in which he defends his concept, but also admits that the harsh realities of the new Berlin crisis of November, 1958, and the “lowering clouds of sputnik” have made it “perhaps too much to ask that men should find the heart to address themselves to the slender possibilities for political compromise in Europe.”
For the text see H. Siegler, Dokumentation, p. 618; see also Henry A. Kissinger, “The Search for Stability,” Foreign Affairs (July, 1959), pp. 537-60, who considers Gaitskell’s plan to be the most “persuasive scheme” for disengagement but who has serious reservations as to its practicability and wisdom.
For the complete text of the plan see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 650–2. The SPD plan also reiterated thoughts expressed earlier by Fritz Erler, an SPD deputy, who asserted in the spring of 1956 that the claim to make a reunited Germany a member of NATO would be as much an obstacle to reunification as would be a Communist demand that a reunited Germany must be bolshevized. (See Siegler, Wiedervereinigung und Sicherheit Deutschlands [Bonn, 1959], pp. 158-9).
Ibid., pp. 163-4. Of significance is also a proposal made as early as 1954 by Professor Alfred Weber. He suggested that a unified Germany should have a fixed and controlled military status that would make it impossible for her military forces to constitute a menace cither to the Soviet Union or to the Western Powers. Such a military status would be created by four factors: (1) withdrawal of all foreign troops in the event of reunification; (2) rearmament for defense only, which would mean exclusion of offensive weapons such as bombers; (3) ban of all military alliances; and (4) control by the United Nations to ensure maintenance of these limitations (Alfred Weber, “Nicht Neutralität, aber militärische Ausklammerung,” Aussenpolitik [October, 1954], pp. 627-31). The names of the adherents of the policy of non-alignment mentioned so far do not exhaust the list; for additional writers in this field, see Scheuer, op. cit.
James P. Warburg, What Cornerstone for United States Foreign Policy? Germany and NATO in Perspective (New York, 1961), pp. 10–11. See also Warburg, Germany pp. 245-326; Warburg, “The Central European Crisis, a Proposal for Western Initiative,” Annals (July, 1959), pp. 16-29; and Hinterhoff, op. cit., p. 375.
See Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 619–20.
“Kennans Vorschläge,” Diplomatische Korrespondenz (December 4, 1957), pp. 2–4; see also David J. Daliin, “Communist Politics in the Western World,” Annals (July, 1959), pp. 1-7, particularly pp. 6, 7.
See pp. 137-8 and 139, supra. See also Terrence Prittie, Germany Divided (Boston, 1960), pp. 204-5.
See Chapter 1, supra.
See Siegler, Dokumentation, p. 100; the Bundestag agreed with the declaration with an overwhelming majority, VDB (Vol. 4, 1950), pp. 2457-8. For the joint declaration of the governments of Poland and the D.D.R., and their agreement regarding the demarcation of the German-Polish border of June 6 and July 6, 1950 respectively, see Ruhm von Oppen, op. cit., pp. 497-500.
See Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 95 and 96.
For the partial text of the note see ibid., p. 99.
See also Warburg, Germany, pp. 190–4.
For the text of the Soviet note and subsequent communications, as well as the Western replies, see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 137-62. United States’ efforts aimed at providing a basis for a peace settlement were made as early as 1945 when James F. Byrnes, then Secretary of State, proposed a long-term treaty for Germany’s demilitarization. This proposal was rejected by the Soviet government (see p.p. 17-18, supra)
Siegler, Reunification, pp. 134–5. See VDB (Vol. 11, 1952), pp. 8798-800.
Gruliow, op. cit., p. 105.
The Eden plan, submitted to the Berlin Conference and prepared with the cooperation of experts of the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic, was not very explicit about a peace treaty beyond stating that a provisional, all-German agency would be empowered to negotiate with the Four Powers on the preparation of a peace treaty. For the text of the Eden plan and the Soviet draft of the peace treaty, see Siegler, Dokumentation pp. 181-8.
Ibid., p. 209; and Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, II, pp. 80-7. See also VDB (Vol. 18, 1953-54), pp. 518-50.
“World Documents,” Current History (1955), pp. 249–50.
On July 29, 1957, a joint declaration by Foreign Minister von Brentano and the ambassadors of the three Western Powers in Bonn stated that as long as Germany was divided, there would be no peace treaty with Germany and no stability for Europe (Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 669-71).
Ibid., p. 1068; and Szaz, op. cit., pp. 1 and 4. For further background information see the books mentioned in footnote 4, p. 16; and Göttinger Arbeitskreis, Deutschlands Ostproblem (Würzburg, 1957). An excellent, very complete bibliography can be found in Szaz, op. cit., pp. 223-47.
For the text of the various statements see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 100, 101; see also VDB (Vol. 4, 1950), pp. 2457-8.
See Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, I, pp. 119-20.
See Siegler, Dokumentation, p. 390.
See Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen, II, pp. 240-8; and VDB (Vol. 26, 1955), p. 5646.
Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 536, 582 and 592.
Ibid., p. 616.
Drzewieniecki, op. cit., pp. 146-7; he also quotes the very sharp reply from the Polish government in protest to von Brentano’s statements in regard to the Oder-Neisse Line early in 1957 as published in the Polish press (ibid., pp. 148-9). See p. 162, supra; and Wladyslaw Gomulka, “The Policy of the Polish People’s Republic,” Foreign Affairs (April, 1960), pp. 402-418.
New York Times, March 26, 1959, p. 8.
Morgenthau, Reunification op. cit., pp. 129-30. In this connection see also the thoughtful comments by Alain Gueulette, “La Ligne Oder-Neisse” in A. Grosser (ed.), Les Relations Internationales de l’Allemagne Occidentale (Paris, 1956), pp. 31-43.
Siegler, Wiedervereinigung, pp. 162–3.
For details see Hinterhoff, op. cit., p. 371, who states that in May, 1959, a number of mass meetings took place during which resolutions were passed demanding the return of the former German territories. See also Thayer, op. cit., pp. 180-203; Dornburg, op. cit., p. 235; and Prittie, op. cit., pp. 101, 102.
Wiskemann, op. cit. Grosser discusses the German reaction to this book in La Démocratic de Bonn, op. cit., p. 269, and tells of menacing letters to the author and of book reviews which were often more hateful than serious. A serious critique of the book can be found in Wolfgang Wagner, “Deutschlands östlicher Nachbar,” Aussenpolitik (February 1957), pp. 94-103.
Wiskemann, op. cit., pp. 292-4. She also states that with regard to the principle of ceding territory to the Germans, it should perhaps be recalled that territorial gains in the past have seemed to fortify the worst elements in that nation, while weakening those groups which have a genuine feeling of human responsibility. Further, if one considers the recent record of the German minorities in Eastern Europe, it is difficult to wish them back there (ibid., p. 294).
Drzewieniecki, op. cit., pp. 146-7.
Warburg, Germany p. 254, states that “the greatest danger to the West in reunifying the two Germanies as an independent, neutral nation.… lies in a possible future German deal with Russia at the expense of Poland. So long as the present frontier stands, this deal cannot be eliminated.” Warburg suggests that Germany should be permanently deprived of East Prussia and Upper Silesia, but that the remaining former German territories annexed by Poland in 1945 be returned. He further assumes that the Soviet Union would transfer East Prussia to Poland at a later date, in order to compensate her for the loss of the Polish Ukraine. He justifies his suggestion for Polish annexation of Upper Silesia by the facts that the population of this rich industrial province was partly Polish, that the territory had at various times belonged to Poland, and that Germany did not need the resources of this territory in view of the coal fields and heavy industry in the West.
An exception is William S. Schlamm, who advocates a peace treaty with the United States now, and suggests the possibility of a preventive war to regain the territories beyond the Oder-Neisse Line (op. cit., pp. 212-37). See also one of his critics, Wolf Schenke, Der Anti-Schlamm (Hamburg, 1959). For further background see Günther Hindrichs, Ausgewählte Dokumente zur Frage einer Friedensregelung mit Deutschland, 1941–1959 (Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik, 1959).
Hinterhoff, op cit., p. 371. See also Claus Jacobi, “German Paradoxes,” Foreign Affairs (April, 1957), pp. 432-40, who states that the government and the Socialist opposition realize that these lands are irrevocably lost (p. 438). Cf. also Grosser, op. cit., pp. 248-9, who expresses similar opinions.
Dornberg, op. cit., pp. 119, 129, and 193-226; also Flora Lewis, “The Unstable States of Germany,” Foreign Affairs (July, 1960), pp. 588-97. See also O. H. von der Gablentz, Die versäumte Reform (Cologne, 1960), pp. 129-31, who states that Poland is the key to German self-determination and to the reduction of world tension. Von der Gablentz deplores the continuous stress that is laid in German domestic politics on the various injustices which have been inflicted on the Germans since it tends to conceal the injustice meted out by Hitler on behalf of the Germans in Poland.
Grewe, op. cit., p. 219.
See p. 160, supra.
In 1938 the Soviet Union imported goods from Germany worth 668.7 million Reichsmark and exported 625.9 million. In 1952 this trade had shrunk to one million DM. in imports and less than that in exports. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union attempted to enter into direct trade negotiations with West Germany as early as May, 1953. This offer was declined by the Federal government at that time (New York Times, May 27, 1953, p. 13).
For the text of the notes see Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 354-8.
For the complete text of Adenauer’s statement see ibid., pp. 361-5.
For the text of the various statements see ibid., pp. 365-81. For a general account of the problem of the German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union and other East bloc countries, see Helmut Bohn, Die Letzten, Was wurde und wird aus den deutschen Gefangenen in Sowjetrussland und in den anderen Ostblockstaaten (Cologne, 1954), and Wilhelm Backhaus, Begegnung im Kreml, So wurden die Gefangenen befreit (Berlin, 1955), which emphasizes the human side of the negotiations in Moscow.
(Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 373–5. When Adenauer was asked by Khrushchev whether it would be possible to conclude a trade agreement during the visit to Moscow, the Chancellor answered that in view of the ignorance of his delegation as to the concrete economic conditions presently prevailing in both countries this would be impossible ibid., p. 383).
VDB (Vol. 26, 1955), p. 5646; also see pp. 113-14 and 162, supra.
For the complete text of the press conference see Siegler, Dokumentation, p.p. 390–3.
VDB (Vol. 26, 1955), pp. 5670-1.
Facts on File (September 22–28, 1955), pp. 318-9.
Deutschland im Wiederaufbau, 1956, p. 405; and Siegler, Dokumentation p. 770-1; lists of names of missing civilians continue to be forwarded to the Soviet government, which promised during the Moscow visit to attempt to locate and return these individuals to Germany (ibid.). For a background on the activities of the West German embassy in Moscow, see also “Kroll: Allein am Feind,” Der Spiegel, June 1, 1960, pp. 20-30.
See also Alexander, op. cit., pp. 236-7; and Sethe, op. cit., pp. 133-4.
For the text of the treaty see Siegler, Dokumentation, Annexband: Verträge, pp. 320–2.
Grewe, op. cit., p. 223.
See Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 373–5.
For the text of the resolution see ibid., pp. 548-52.
For the text of the note see ibid., pp. 571-7.
For the text of the note see ibid., pp. 597-602.
Facts on File (July 11–17, I956), pp. 234-5, and (March 14–20, 1957), p. 86.
West German imports from the Soviet Union had risen from 93 to 185 million German marks, whereas exports to the Soviet Union had increased from 52 million to 267 million German marks (Siegler, Dokumentation, p. 603; the text of the note: pp. 603-6).
Ibid., pp. 770-1; also 614-6 and 652-3. On April 11, 1957, Felix von Eckhardt, West German Press Chief, stated that the intention to conclude a trade agreement with the Soviet Union did not imply any intention to negotiate a new Rapallo treaty (ibid., p. 614). See also Deutschland im Wiederaufbau, 1956, I, p. 29; and Michel T. Florinsky, “The U.S.S.R. and West Europe,” Current History (January, 1959), pp. 1-6. For the text of the cultural a-greement see Bulletin, June 2, 1959, pp. 933-7. The trade development between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union is shown by the following figures: (See footnote 5, p. 172, for trade figures for 1956). Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, published by the Statistische Bundesamt (Wiesbaden, 1960), pp. 308-9.
For more details concerning the opinions of West German businessmen see Almond, in Speier and Davison, op. cit., pp. 236-7.
See Siegler, Dokumentation, pp. 354–8, and particularly pp. 359-63.
See particularly ibid., pp. 569, 576, 645-7, and 691-4.
For the text of these messages, see ibid., pp. 597-601, 603-6, 611-2, 614-6, 721-7, 728-33, and 734-9.
For details, see the article in Der Spiegel, “Kroll: Allein am Feind,” op. cit.; also Grosser, op. cit., p. 245.
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Feld, W. (1963). The Interaction Pattern: The Foreign Policy Issues between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. In: Reunification and West German-Soviet Relations. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9408-2_4
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