Abstract
A thorough assessment of specific foreign policies requires an understanding of the patterns of actions and responses between two particular states. Essential to such an understanding of interaction patterns is a determination and examination of the basic motivations and goals of the foreign policies of the respective countries. With full consideration of applicable strategic, economic, cultural, ideological, and historical factors, an attempt will be made to construct a framework of basic motivations and goals of West German and Soviet foreign policy, which will also provide an insight into the values attributed to the various policy goals. Basic motivations may imply ultimate values, which cannot be empirically confirmed. However, the compatability of foreign policy goals with basic policy motivation is at least to some degree subject to verification.1
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References
Cf. G. S. Hyneman, The Study of Politics (Urbana, 1959), p. 176.
Otto von Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke, Vol. XIV (Berlin, 1924–35), p. 474; see also G. W. F. Hallgarten, Imperialismus vor 1914, Vol. I (München, 1951), pp. 155-254, who provides an excellent exposition of Bismarck’s foreign policy; and E. W. Schnitzer, “German Geopolitics Revived,” Journal of Politics (August, 1955), pp. 407-23.
For an analysis of West German’s economic revival see H. G. Wallich, Mainsprings of the German Revival (New Haven, 1955).
See also Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, “Foreign Policy of the German Federal Republic,” in R. C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Affairs (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1958), pp. 78–131, particularly pp. 78-83, and John Dornberg, Schizophrenic Germany (New York, 1961), pp. 193-226. For background on the German national character see Thomas Mann, “Germany and the Germans,” Yale Review (December 1945), pp. 223-41; Robert H. Lowie, Toward Understanding Germany (Chicago, 1954); Willie Hellpach, Der deutsche Character (Bonn, 1954); Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany (New York, 1960); and M. Beaumont, J. H. E. Fried, and E. Vermeil, The Third Reich (New York, 1955). Also of interest in this respect are Ludwig Dehio’s comments in Deutschland und die Weltpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1955), pp. n-35.
Deutsch and Edinger, Germany Joins the Powers, pp. 38, 39. These are individuals who would do all they could to keep a new Nazi Party from coming to power. In June of 1956, support for the black, red and gold flag of the Republic had risen to 34 percent. It is noteworthy that in various elections the SPD has received between 31-38 percent of the electoral vote. See also W. P. Davison, “Trends in West German Public Opinion,” Op. cit., pp. 296, 297, who reports a more favorable ratio for democracy.
Deutsch and Edinger, Germany Joins the Powers, p. 40.
For more details on this problem, see W. P. Davison, “Trends in West German Public Opinion,” op. cit., p. 295.
Cf. Fritz René Allemann, Bonn ist nicht Weimar (Cologne, 1956), pp. 103–27. Allemann quotes what he considers to be a typical reply of a 19 year old German boy. When asked whether he believed that there was something which was worth so much as to give his life, he answered that as far as the fatherland was concerned, it was a concept without substance to him (p. 117). See also Willi Schlamm, Germany and the East-West Crisis (New York, 1959), pp. 3-36 and 97-146. Although Schlamm’s foreign policy ideas are extreme and contradictory, his judgment of present-day Germans appears to hit close to the mark. This is confirmed by other observers of the contemporary German scene, such as Dornberg, op. cit., pp. 1-8, 277-89; and Charles W. Thayer, The Unquiet Germans (New York, 1957), pp. 46-70. Similar thoughts were also expressed by Bundestag deputies in conversations with the author during the summer of 1961. Also in a similar vein, see Altmann, Das Erbe Adenauers (Tübingen, 1960), pp. 140-8; Alexander, op. cit., pp. 33-43; Wallich, op. cit., p. 20; and W. P. Davison, “Trends in West German Public Opinion,” op. cit., pp. 285-7.
Cf. Otto Kirchheimer, “German Democracy in the 1950’s,” World Politics (January, 1961), pp. 238–266, p. 265; and “The Political Scene in West Germany,” World Politics (April, 1957), pp. 433-45. See also the thoughtful comments of Helmut Ridder, “Die veruntreute Freiheit,” in Bl ätter für deutsche und internationale Politik (March 25, 1960), pp. 223-7, who asserts that the Germans have not been encouraged to form a tradition of a democratic ideology. For the relationship of ideology and foreign policy see Werner Levi, Fundamentals of World Organization (Minneapolis, 1950); and Karl Mannheim, Utopia and Ideology (New York, 1936).
See also W. W. Schuetz, Wir wollen überleben (Stuttgart, 1956), pp. 9–12 and 212-217, who considers the security of the Federal Republic as the primary foreign policy motivation. Assurance of security is a basic foreign policy motivation of any state. In the case of West Germany, this motivation is refined here to mean reduction of strategic vulnerability.
Krueger, op. cit., p. 305; see also M. S. Handler, “Key Aide in Bonn Offers Unity Idea: Defense Minister Suggests Use of Potential to Attain Objective,” New York Times, February 20, 1957, quoting Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss as stating that “the hard political requirements of the German people might cause them to make a decision according to the Austrian problem.” A strong supporter of a neutralized, but weak Germany, is James P. Warburg, Germany, Key to Peace (Cambridge), 1953, particularly pp. 250-75, and also by Warburg “The Central European Crisis: a Proposal for Western Initiative,” Annals, (July, 1959), pp. 16-29.
Schnitzer, op. cit., pp. 421, 422, points out that certain geopoliticians believe that Germany, once it has been restored to the position of a great power, will take the leadership of the whole of Europe. Then Germany can choose her partners freely or play off one of the world powers against the other.
Deutsch and Edinger, Germany Joins the Powers, p. 224, state that a few military men, politicians, and perhaps even a few diplomats and writers might toy with the idea of a strong, independent Germany, but that a majority of leaders in every elite group would probably oppose it.
John G. Campbell in “East Europe, Germany and the West,” Annals (May, 1958), pp. 153–63, believes that a Germany, united, but neutral or “neutralized” may seem to be too risky for the Soviet leaders (p. 158).
Tetens, op. cit., pp. 175-7. This rather polemical book clearly attempts to “sell” a certain concept, namely that the United States government should watch out for a German double cross through a new deal with the Soviet Union. Concern about such a course of West German foreign policy was voiced in many Western quarters after the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union (New York Times, June 10, 1955, p. 24; and September 19, 1955, p. 1). See also Schnitzer, op. cit., p. 420, who reports that many German geopoliticians, while disliking the Soviet system and fearing the intentions of the Soviet Union, believe that the future belongs to the U.S.S.R.
If, on the other hand, Russia’s position were considerably weaker than that of Germany, her problem of strategic vulnerability would be largely solved.
Franz Joseph Strauss, “Verteidigung st ärken, um zu verhandeln,” Aussenpolitik, (February, 1961), pp. 77–8; also “Sicherheit and Wiedervereinigung,” Aussenpolitik, (March, 1957), pp. 140-7.
See pp. 69-71, supra.
Deutsch and Edinger, Germany Joins the Powers p. 40.
See Tables 17.1 and 17.2, ibid., pp. 228-31, which show the increase of business Germany obtained from former colonial territories in 1954 compared with 1938. Of course, old trade ties still exist, but their influence is waning. Britain and France, partners with Germany in Europe, may not appreciate the West German policy of economic penetration of their former colonies, but Germany justifies her policy as a means of preventing these countries from becoming easy victims of Communism (ibid., p. 232, footnote 14).
Ibid.
In this regard, see also the thoughtful comments of Ludwig Dehio, “Die deutsche Politik an der Wegegabel,” Aussenpolitik (August, 1955), pp. 489–94. The desire for economic strength and prosperity of the German people mitigates against reunification since incorporation of East Germany may pull down the economic level of the Federal Republic.
Deutschland im Wiederaufbau 1958, pp. 19-38. A. Grosser, in La Démocratie de Bonn (Paris, 1958), believes that the West German foreign policy goals are, or were, sovereignty, European unity, and reunification (p. 227).
See also Perry, op. at., p. 58, who states that the pursuit of a goal that can only be attained over a long period of time is “commonly attended by negative interest — avoidance of obstacles, or hostility to opposition; and these negative values have to be subtracted from the positive value generated by the pursuit itself.… Furthermore, the longer the time that is taken to realize an object, the longer its instrumental values are postponed, or the greater the risk of their being lost altogether. Money cannot be spent until it is acquired, and if a lifetime is taken in its acquiring, there will be no spending; and the less of what can be bought with it has to be balanced against the value of its being acquired.”
Other possible motivations for Russian expansionistic designs will be touched upon in the discussion of theories of Soviet foreign policy.
A comprehensive compilation of theories of Soviet foreign policies and a listing of writers supporting the various theories has been made by William A. Glaser, “Theories of Soviet Foreign Policies: A Classification of Literature,” World Affairs Quarterly (July, 1956), pp. 128–52. No new basic theories seem to have been expounded since 1956. Important contributors to existing theories will be cited at the appropriate place. For additional insight into Soviet foreign policy, the study of the following books is suggested: David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin (Chicago, 1961); A. Z. Rubenstein (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (New York, 1960), particularly pp. 3-33, and 403-24; R. A. Goldwin, G. Stourzh, M. Zetterbaum, Readings in Russian Foreign Policy (New York, 1959), particularly pp. 657-719; Alexander Dallin (ed.), Soviet Conduct in World Affairs (New York, 1960); Kennan, Russia and the West; Waldemar Gurian, “Permanent Features of Soviet Foreign Policy,” The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1947 (London, 1947), pp. 5-39; and Waldemar Gurian (ed.), Soviet Imperialism — its Origins and Tactics (Notre Dame, Ind., 1953).
V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. V. (New York, 1943), p. 141.
V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVIII (New York, 1930), p. 395.
Joseph Stalin, Leninism (New York, 1942), p. 360. See also Stalin, “The Tasks of Business Executives,” ibid., pp. 200-1; and J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Moscow, 1940), p. 28, where Lenin is quoted as having said that the task of the victorious revolution is to do the utmost possible in one country for the development, support, and awakening of the revolution in all countries.
Historicus, “Stalin on Revolution,” Foreign Affairs (January, 1949), pp. 205–6. Historicus points out that Stalin’s conception of Communist strategy and tactics is highly flexible. It rests on a continual assessment of the status of forces in both the capitalist and socialist systems. According to Stalin, one of the chief conditions to which tactics must be adjusted is the ebb and flow of the forces favoring revolution. “Aggressive tactics should be taken with a rising tide; tactics of defense, and even retreat go with an ebbing tide.” (Stalin, Problems of Leninism, pp. 81-95.)
Quoted in Historicus, op. cit., p. 204
For enumeration of some of the writers and statesmen, see Glaser, op. cit., footnotes 6 and 7. Among the writers are Maurice Hindus and Edward Crankshaw; among the statesmen are Harry S. Truman, Winston S. Churchill, Dean Acheson, Walter B. Smith, and James F. Byrnes.
Robert J. Kerner, “Foreign Policies of the Great Powers,” in Committee on International Relations, Foreign Policies of the Great Powers (Berkeley, 1939), pp. 146–7.
Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed (Garden City, New York, 1937), p. 278; and James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (New York, 1941), Ch. XIV. See also Leon Trotsky, Stalin (New York, 1941), pp. 384 ff. For a somewhat similar opinion as far as the relationship within the ruling clique is concerned, see N. Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, 111., 1954).
Glaser, op. cit., p. 134.
Robert F. Byrnes, “Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe Since Stalin,” The Annals (January, 1956), pp. 166–178; Glaser, op. cit., p. 137; and R. Strausz-Hupe and Stephan T. Possony,) International Relations (New York, 1954), p. 558.
Glaser, op. cit., p. 138; Harold P. Lasswell, World Politics Faces Economics (New York, 1945), pp. 52-60; and Byrnes, op. cit., p. 137. The fear of capitalist encirclement has been expressed by Soviet leaders, including Stalin. See Historicus, op. cit., p. 204.
Arnold J. Toynbee, The World and the West (Oxford, 1953), pp. 1–17.
Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: its History and Ideology (Notre Dame, Ind., 1953), pp. 230–252.
Glaser, op. cit., pp. 138-40.
Ibid., pp. 142-4. Of particular importance in connection with these concepts is the work of H. V. Dicks, “Observations on Contemporary Russian Behavior,” Human Relations (1952), pp. 111-77.
Glaser, op. cit., pp. 149, 150. Some writers seem to take the position, however, that the various motives for Soviet foreign policy are contradictory, and that this is the reason for the tension and vacillation which appears to exist continually in Soviet foreign policy (ibid., p. 148).
It has been argued that World War II might have been prevented if responsible statesmen had paid more attention to Hitler’s Mein Kampf, which contained a blueprint of his future actions.
George A. Morgan in G. Groove Haines, The Threat of Soviet Imperialism (Baltimore, 1954), p. 261. See also Vernon V. Aspurian, “Soviet Foreign Policy,” in Roy G. Macridis, Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1958), pp. 132-210, who distinguishes three possible relations between speech and practice in Soviet diplomacy: (1) identity; (2) approximation, usually implying a temporary accomodation or modification of a preconceived intention, unless the latter itself receives explicit reformulation; and (3) divergence. Cleavage between word and conduct may, in time, result from faulty execution, misinformation, miscalculation, or deliberate confusion.
J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, p. 26.
Ibid.
Diplomaticus, “Stalinist Theory and Soviet Foreign Policy,” Review of Politics (October 1952), pp. 468–83, particularly p. 469.
Jan F. Triska, “A Model for Study of Soviet Foreign Policy,” The American Political Science Review (March, 1958), pp. 64–83, especially p. 70.
For an excellent discussion of the problem see Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Communist Ideology and International Affairs,” Journal of Conflict Resolutions (September, 1960), pp. 266–91; also Aspurian, op. cit., pp. 137-56.
Triska, op. cit., p. 70; see also X. (G. F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947), pp. 566-82, particularly p. 572.
Leo Gruilow (ed.), Current Soviet Policies, II (New York, 1957), pp. 29, 22, 37, 38; “Khrushchev sees Red Power Lead,” New York Times, January 28, 1959, pp. 1 and 3; Triska, op. cit., pp. 72 ff; Adam B. Ulam, “Expansion and Coexistence: Counterpoint in Soviet Foreign Policy,” Problems of Communism (Sept.–Oct. 1959), pp. 1-6, p. 3; Philip E. Moseley, “Soviet Foreign Policy: New Goals or New Manners,” Foreign Affairs (July, 1956), pp. 541-53. Khrushchev’s strong commitment to Marxist doctrine runs also like a red thread through his speeches, recently published in the United States (Nikita Khrushchev, For a Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism [New York, 1960]). Significant is also the new Communist manifesto, issued in July, 1961, which again reflects the importance attributed to ideology in the conduct of foreign affairs New York Times, August 1, 1961, pp. 13-20).
Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 288; and Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet Policy in the Current International Situation (New York, 1960), pp. 3-8; see also Leopold Labedz, “Ideology Under Khrushchev,” Problems of Communism (Nov.–Dec. 1959), pp. 1-10; and Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West, pp. 16-31.
X, (G. F. Kennan), op. cit., pp. 574-5. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, “The Concept of the Balance of Power in Soviet Policy Making,” World Politics (October, 1951), pp. 85-111, particularly p. 105.
See quotations in Historicus, footnote 1, p. 80 supra.
V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. II, Pt. 2, p. 482–7. The following quotation of Lenin is also significant: “The task of a truly revolutionary party is not to declare the impossible renunciation of all compromises, but to be able through all compromises, as far as they are unavoidable, to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary task.…” V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXI, Book I, p. 152.
See also N. Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York, 1951). Chapters 15, 16, 17, 19, 20. Kennan, op. cit., pp. 20-3; and Robert Strausz-Hupe, Protracted Conflict (New York, 1959), which provides many good examples of Soviet tactics.
Vera Micheles Dean, The United States and Russia (Cambridge, 1948), states on pp. 146–7 that Marxism is not eo ipso imperialistic. This may be correct, but Marxism of the Lenin-Stalin brand has not been content with merely domestic goals, and is seeking to accomplish world-wide objectives. See also L. Labedz, op. cit., pp. 9, 10, who agrees with the view that Soviet “Marxism” is expansionistic. Kennan states that “powerful evidence suggests that as early as 1943, [Stalin] was already resolved to exploit a German defeat, if at all possible, for the purpose of expelling the British and Americans from Europe, and assuring the early Communization of the continent.” (George F. Kennan, “A Historians View of Potsdam and His Readers,” review of Between War and Peace: the Potsdam Conference by Herbert Feis [Princeton, 1960] in The American Slavic and East European Review [April, 1961], pp. 289-94.) On the other hand, John Lukacs, in a very recent book, A History of the Cold War (New York, 1961), appears to consider as the main motivating power of Soviet foreign policy the combination of the quest for national security and the continuation of Russian messianic expansionism, which seem to him to be the major elements of the “national interest of the Russian Empire.” (pp. 212-219.) A similar concept is held by Samuel L. Sharp, “National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics,” in Alexander Dallin (ed.), Soviet Conduct in World Affairs (New York, 1960), pp. 46-58. This is, however, hardly an adequate explanation of Soviet activities in Africa and Latin America. See also Leonard Shapiro, “Has Russia Changed,” Foreign Affairs (April, 1960), pp. 391-401; and Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 272, who points out that the concept of “national interest” may not be relevant to an understanding of Communist foreign policy, but that, in order to be useful, it must be linked to the ultimate ideological objective. In general agreement with this concept is Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics: the Dilemma of Power (Cambridge, 1950); and H. W. Schlueter, Die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands (Bad Godesberg, 1960), pp. 34-5. Other combination theories are put forth by Waldemar Gurian, “Permanent Features of Soviet Foreign Policy,” pp. 5, 26, 29-31, 39, who considers Marxism and Russian Nationalism as the prime motivating forces of Soviet foreign policy; George Backer, The Deadly Parallel — Stalin and Ivan the Terrible (New York, 1950), chapter 6, who believes that a combination of oligarchy, Marxism, and Eurasian characteristics are mainly responsible for the nature of Soviet foreign policy; Hans Kohn, Nationalism in the Soviet Union (Leiden, 1933), who uses a combination of Marxist and Byzantine characteristics to explain the Kremlin foreign policy; Edmund A. Walsh, Total Empire (Milwaukee, 1951), who combines for his explanation of Soviet motivations Marxist, Russian imperialist, and national defense theories (pp. 139, 156-63); and James Burnham, The Struggle for the World (New York, 1947), who considers Communism to be not only an international movement but also Russian imperialism with an emphasis on ideology — hence the mainspring of Soviet policy (pp. 75-113). Burnham also points out that Communism has been making use of the force of nationalism and that Soviet leaders have attempted to mold “multi-national Bolshevism” as an instrument of world political policy (pp. 87, 88).
See footnote 1, p. 80 supra, also Triska, op. cit., pp. 77 ff.
Historicus, op. cit., pp. 207-8.
Moseley, “Soviet Foreign Policy,” op. cit., p. 553, discussing Khrushchev’s foreign policy statements to the Twentieth Communist Party Congress, points out that his “restatements of Soviet goals, enlivened by new and flexible tactics, are, at bottom, an expression of continuity of basic goals m Soviet policy.”
The other theories of Soviet foreign policy, namely, lust for personal power of a small bureaucratic clique, basic conflict of Byzantine civilization with other civilizations, Eurasian preoccupation, and psychological interpretation, do not seem to serve as a fully satisfactory explanation for the basic motivations of Soviet policy, although some of the factors stressed in these theories may on occasion be influential in the Soviet foreign policy decision making process.
Because of the scope of this study, it would not serve a useful purpose to examine all major objectives of Soviet foreign policy, although it is fully realized that there is a certain jnterdependency of the world-wide goals of Soviet policy.
Drew Middleton, “New British Proposals,” in G. S. McClellan, The Two Germanies (New York, 1959), p. 167; and Franz-Joseph Strauss, “Soviet Aims and German Unity,” Foreign Affairs (April, 1959), pp. 366-77.
Kellermann, op. cit., pp. 62-6.
Ibid., p. 65.
Boris Meissner, Russland, die Westmachte und Deutschland, Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1943–1953 (Hamburg, 1954), pp. 343–5.
Hans Schimanski, “Die Deutschlandpolitik im Lichte der kommunistischen Ideologie,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (May 20, 1959), pp. 251–64.
Klaus Mehnert, Stalin Versus Marx (London, 1952), pp. 126–128.
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Feld, W. (1963). The Interaction Pattern: Basic Motivations and Goals of West German and Soviet Foreign Policy. In: Reunification and West German-Soviet Relations. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9408-2_3
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