Abstract
The machinery for the formulation of West German foreign policy is composed of many parts. Its framework is the Basic Law, but more important than the framework are the official and unofficial actors whose interests and aspirations determine the purpose and output of this machinery. As a consequence, this chapter will begin with a discussion of the constitutional framework, which will be followed by inquiries into the influences on the decision making process in foreign policy exerted by political parties, economic interest groups, the foreign service bureaucracy, and public news media.
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References
Article 2; for the text of the Occupation Statute see Edward H. Litchfield and Associates, Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N. Y., 1953), Appendix L, pp. 616-8. The Occupation Statute was negotiated in the spring of 1949, and went into effect September 21, 1949 (Official Gazette of the Allied High Commission for Germany [September 23, 1949], pp. 2 and 13).
VDB (Vol. 1, 1949), p. 23.
Ibid.
This Protocol was an agreement reached between the Allied High Commissioners and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Petersberg near Bonn on November 22, 1949. For the text, see Litchfield, op. cit., Appendix M, pp. 619-22. For a discussion of the Protocol in the Bundestag, see VDB (Vol. 1, 1949), pp. 472-527. The Protocol was unusual in that it was a negotiated document signed by representatives of both the occupying and occupied governments. In its suggestion of occupatio pacifica it was distinctly out of place in the general pattern of Allied-German relationships of the period. See Litchfield, op. cit., p. 48.
Herbert Krueger, “German Diplomacy,” in S. D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimmons (eds.), Diplomacy in a Changing World (Notre Dame, Ind., 1959), pp. 315, 316.
Official Gazette of the Allied High Commission for Germany (March 6, 1951), p. 792.
Ibid., pp. 795 ff. West German trade with states of the Soviet bloc remained under Allied control.
Krueger, op. cit., pp. 318, 319.
For the text see Litchfield, op. cit., Appendix N, pp. 622-637. This convention is better known as the “Contractual Agreement”; it satisfies most of the criteria of the traditional occupatio pacifica (ibid., p. 51).
Official Gazette of the Allied High Commission for Germany (1955), p. 3272.
Bundesgesetzblatt, Vol. II (1955), pp. 305 ff. For the text of all Paris agreements, see European Yearbook. Vol. IV (The Hague, 1956), pp. 300-57.
The “Rules of Procedure” adopted by the Federal government in pursuance of Article 65 and approved by the Federal President on May 11, 1951 (Gem. Min. Blatt [1951], No. 15, p. 137), state specifically in Article 1, paragraph 1, that the Chancellor determines foreign policy.
Articles 76 through 79 of the Basic Law.
Articles 63, paragraph 1; 73, 59a, and 105.
See J. F. Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago, 1958), pp. 128–130; and Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Joins the Powers (Stanford, 1949), p.52.
Articles 67 and 68.
See also Golay, op. cit., pp. 128-37.
For greater detail see Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Berlin, 1928), pp. 267-271; and Friedrich Giese, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Frankfurt, 1953), p. 100. In this connection Article 58 should be mentioned. It requires the countersignature by the Chancellor or appropriate Minister for any act of the President which may have a political effect.
See also S. L. Wahrhaftig, “The Development of German Foreign Policy Institutions,” in H. Speier and W. P. Davison (eds.), West German Leadership and Foreign Policy (Evanston, 1957). pp. 27, 35, 36.
Article I, paragraph 1 of the “Rules of Procedure” of the Federal government. Further, since the President’s signature is required to promulgate legislation (Art. 82, Basic Law) and to ratify treaties, the Chancellor depends to some extent on his goodwill. Therefore, it is usually good political practice for the Chancellor to maintain good relations with the head of the State. (See for more detail, Wahrhaftig, in Speier and Davison, op. cit., pp. 107, 108; and Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., pp. 55 and 58.
See also Werner Krauss, “Die parlamentarische Kontrolle der Aussenpolitik,” Aussenpolitik (August, 1955), pp. 513–527. Krauss points to the recent increase in prestige of the Committee and to the fact that it gives the opposition parties an opportunity to file a minority report with the Bundestag.
For more details see Wahrhaftig in Speier and Davison, op. cit., p. 36; H. Nawiaski Die Grundgedanken des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1950), p. 89; H. M. Dorr and H. L. Bretton, in Litchfield and Associates, Governing Post-War Germany (Ithaca, N. Y., 1953), p. 218.
Wahrhaftig in Speier and Davison, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
See also Article 125 which defines how one-third of the Bundestag members is to be computed.
Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of July 30, 1952 (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [1952], p. 1209).
See the interesting article by W. Appelt, “Ist der Streit um die Verfassungsm ässigkeit des EVG-Vertrages eine Streitigkeit im Sinne des Art. 93GG., “Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (May 2, 1953), pp. 641–3. Appelt argues that the Court should abstain from making political decisions. A final decision on the constitutionality of the EDC treaty was never made since it was not approved by the French Parliament. Several other decisions of the Constitutional Court which were requested by the Social Democratic opposition have been important for the conduct of foreign relations. In the “Petersburg Agreement Case” (International Law Reports [1952], Case No. 65, pp. 413 ff.) the Court held on July 29, 1952, that an agreement contracted with the Allied High Commission was not considered to be a treaty within the meaning of Article 59 since such a treaty must be concluded with another state On the other hand, the Court opined, in another decision on June 30, 1953, that “agreements with.… international or supra-national organizations were treaties within the meaning of Article 59. (“Port of Kehl Case,” International Law Reports [1953], pp. 407 ff.). Finally, in the “Commercial Treaty (Germany) Case,” International Law Reports (1953), Case No. 99, pp. 461 ff., the Court held, on July 29, 1952, that a commercial treaty with France was valid without parliamentary approval since it dealt with purely technical questions of a commercial nature. “A treaty does not become a political treaty merely by reason of the fact that it deals quite generally with public affairs, the good of the community, or affairs of state.… The contents and object of a treaty within the meaning of Article 59 (2) must be directed towards governing political relations with foreign states.” Some German jurists are of the opinion that this decision increases the foreign policy power of the Chancellor beyond the intent of the framers of the Basic Law (cf. Giese, op. cit., p. 100).
See Wahrhaftig in Speier and Davison, op. cit., pp. 39-41, for details and examples. It is interesting to note that although the German constitution of 1871 provided a theoretical basis for a somewhat larger potential influence of the Imperial Bundesrat on foreign policy than was accorded to the post-1949 Bundesrat by the Basic Law, the activities of the Imperial Bundesrat in the field of foreign relations were quite limited before 1914. (Cf. Ernst Deuerlein, Der Bundesratsausschuss für die ausw ärtigen Angelegenheiten, 1870–1918 [Regensburg, 1955]. See also Article 32, paragraph 3, of the Basic Law which allows the states to conclude treaties with foreign states regarding matters for which they have legislative competence. Such treaties, however, require the consent of the Federal government for their validity.
See also Article 146 which foreshadows an eventual all-German constitution.
Cf. Gabriet A. Almond, in The American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1950), pp. 139–43. See also Cohen, op. cit., pp. 1-8.
The Basic Law specifically recognizes in Article 21 the important role of the political parties in the formulation of national policy.
See pp. 35-37, supra.
Wahrhaftig, in Speier and Davison, op. cit., p. 51.
Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 75. In the 1957 Bundestag the deputies of the minor parties constituted 12 per cent of the total membership. For an excellent account of German political parties, see S. Neumann, “Germany: Changing Patterns and Lasting Problems,” in S. Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties (Chicago, 1956), pp. 354-92.
Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 64; see also the declarations on the CDU/CSU’s foreign policy made in the Bundestag by Dr. von Brentano in 1949 (VDB [1949] Vol. 1 pp. 44, 45), by Dr. Gerstenmaier (VDB [1953–54] Vol. 18, pp. 88-94), and by Dr. Krone (VDB [1957–58] Vol. 39 pp. 36, 37).
Deutschland im Wiederaufbau 1953, pp. 14-16; also Deutschland im Wiederaufbau 1958, pp. 19-25.
The parliamentary leaders consisted of the chairman of the CDU delegation in the Bundestag and his two deputies, the chairman of the GSU delegation and his deputy, and the chairmen of the five major Bundestag committees concerned with foreign affairs (Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 67, Fn. 8).
Ibid., p. 67. The data stem from an analysis made in December 1956. For details see ibid., pp. 133-140, Tables 9.1-9.7.
Ibid., p. 69.
Cf. Henry J. Kellermann, “Party Leaders and Foreign Policy,” in H. Speier and W. P. Davison (eds.), West German Leadership and Foreign Policy (Evanston, 1957), pp. 57–95; pp. 93-94.
For details on this issue see Chapter 3, Section II, infra. For a representative statement by a GDU/CSU deputy in this respect, see Dr. Krone’s remarks to the Bundestag on October 29, 1957 (VDB [Vol. 39, 1957–58], p. 36).
For more details see Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., pp. 70 ff; and Neumann op. cit., pp. 378-80. For a discussion of the distinction between a party of interest representation and one of interest integration, see S. Neumann, “Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties,” in Neumann, op. cit., pp. 404-5.
In a poll in July 1956, a near majority of SPD supporters considered the party primarily middle-class or bourgeois in character (E. N. Neumann and E. P. Neumann, Jahrbuch, der öffentlichen Meinung, 1957 [Aliensbach, 1957], p. 267).
SPD Program for Four Power Negotiations on German Reunification (May 9, 1955). For additional information on SPD policy with respect to reunification, see Jess B. Hendricks Jr., “The Foreign Policy of the Social Democratic Party 1949–1953” (unpublished Master’s thesis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University), pp. 90-98 and 103-115.
Deutsch and Edinger, op cit., p. 71.
It is interesting to note that of the 151 SPD Bundestag deputies in 1953, almost onethird were born in provinces now under Soviet control. Many had gone to the West before occupation of their homeland, but twenty per cent were actually refugees. In the 1949 Bundestag, 36.7 per cent of the SPD deputies were born in provinces which have been since 1945 under Soviet control; 17 per cent of these deputies were actual refugees. The GDU/GSU percentages for refugee deputies are much smaller, namely 10 per cent for 1949 and 8 per cent for 1953. See John Snell, “Schumacher’s Successors: The Personal Factor in the Shaping of Contemporary German Social Democracy,” The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly (March, 1956), pp. 333-42, p. 340.
Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit. pp. 72, 73.
For complete statements on the SPD’s policy objectives in regard to reunification, see the comments of Erich Ollenhauer, the SPD chief, to the Bundestag in November 1957 (VDB [Vol. 39, 1957–58], pp. 54, 55), and in September 1955 following the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (VDB [Vol. 26, 1955], pp. 5655-9). See also Chapter 3, Section II, infra.
See Lewis J. Edinger, German Exile Politics (Berkeley, 1956), pp. 6, 171-8; and Snell, “Schumacher’s Successor,” op. cit., p. 341.
See Kellermann, op. cit., p. 91.
p. 43, supra.
Kellerman, op. at., p. 92; and Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., pp. 73, 74.
Ibid., p. 75.
It may also imply that the differences between the foreign policy advocated by the GDU/GSU and the SPD may be actually less pronounced than they appear from the statements of the leadership of either party.
Deutsch and Edinger, op. rit., p. 89; see also David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York, 1953), p. 264; and Wahrhaftig, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
According to an analysis of the 476 deputies elected to the Bundestag in 1957, 13 per cent openly represented business interest groups, another 13 per cent represented farmers and their associations, while 10 per cent were officials of trade unions and social welfare organizations. Interest group representation has been particularly pronounced in the committees of the Bundestag (Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., pp. 91, 92).
The six others are: the Federal Association of Private Banking, the Association of German Wholesalers and Exporters, the Central Organization of German Retailers, the German Shipowners Association, the German Section of the International Chamber of Commerce, and the Committee for Foreign Trade of German Business (ibid., p. 99).
Ibid., pp. 99 and 100; also Tables 9.1-9.7, pp. 133-140.
G. A. Almond, “The Politics of German Business,” in H. Speier and W. P. Davison (eds.), West German Leadership and Foreign Policy (Evanston, 1957), pp. 195–241.
Ibid., pp. 225, 226. The fear was also expressed that the longer the East Zone was occupied by the Soviet Union, the more “Sovietized” it would become, which would increase the power of the Communists in a unified Germany. Consequently, speed in the realization of German unity was essential.
Ibid., p. 226.
Ibid., p. 227.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 227, 228.
Cf. Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit, pp. 101-2.
In 1957, 21 per cent of the SPD Bundestag deputies were leading officials in trade unions, whereas only 4 per cent of the GDU/GSU deputies indicated such an affiliation. 38 per cent of all SPD deputies were members of trade unions and cooperatives, compared with 16 per cent of the GDU/CSU deputies (ibid., p. 94).
Ibid., p. 102.
Otto Kirchheimer, “West German Trade-Unions: Their Domestic and Foreign Policies,” in H. Speier and W. P. Davison (eds.), West German Leadership and Foreign Policy (Evanston, 1957), pp. 136–94. This study seems to concentrate primarily on the attitudes of the leadership of the German Confederation of Trade Unions.
Ibid., p. 170. It was also signed by SPD leaders
Ibid., pp. 175, 176.
Ibid., p. 178.
Ibid., pp. 179-84.
Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 103.
There is, of course, a possibility that some business leaders backed Adenauer’s foreign policy because the GDU/GSU protected certain domestic interests of business.
See Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 78; Wahrhaftig, op. cit., pp. 28-30; see also Edgar Alexander, Adenauer and the New Germany (New York, 1957), pp. 129-49.
Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and P. W. Millo (New York, 1958), pp. 197–244, particularly 228-35.
See also the comments of Paul Seabury, The Wilhelmstrasse (Berkeley, 1954), pp. 81-9.
In and around Bonn are several hundred offices representing various economic associations and pressure groups. The activities of the staffs of these offices are quite intense; staff members have entrance into the appropriate units of ministerial bureaucracies and often make recommendations on legislative policy, the formulation of regulations, and the execution of public policy. Common background, shared experiences, old friendships, and professional contacts link many key officials in the present German civil service to prominent members of certain economic and social interest groups, such as employers’ and veterans’ associations. For more details see Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., pp. 95-6; and Wahrhaftig, op. cit., p. 46.
Seabury, op. cit., p. 5. The National Liberal Party stood between the conservatives of the right and the progressives of the center. It favored a constitutional monarchy, but was opposed to parliamentary government. Although the National Liberals had established themselves as the representatives of the industrial elite, the party also attracted many followers among the middle classes (Neumann, op. cit., pp. 356-63).
Seabury, op. cit. pp. 84-6. See also Hajo Holborn, “Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Early Weimar Republic,” in G. A. Craig and F. Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats 1919–1939 Princeton, 1950), pp. 123-171.
For more details see Seabury, op. cit., pp. 161-3. For background information cf. Gordon A. Craig, “The German Foreign Office from Neurath to Ribbentrop,” in Craig and Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 406-36; and Carl E. Schorske, “Two German Ambassadors: Dirksen and Schulenburg,” in ibid., pp. 477-511.
Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 84; Wahrhaftig in Speier and Davison, op. cit., p. 33.
Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 84.
Ibid., pp. 84, 85. For the 1954–56 shift in age composition and other details, see Tables 9.1-9.7, Group B. Diplomats, ibid. Of interest in this respect is the share of diplomatic with major anti-Nazi records of arrest or exile; this share rose from 7 per cent in 1954 to 12 per cent in 1956. More broadly defined anti-Nazi records appeared in the biographies of 21 per cent of the 1956 group of diplomats.
Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., Table 9.7, p. 139. See also Seabury, op. cit., pp. 12, 19-21, who states that in 1926 about 25 per cent of the higher officials of the Foreign Service were noblemen and that in 1929 half of the mission chiefs were aristocrats. John Herz, “German Officialdom Revisited: Political Views and Attitudes of the West German Civil Service,” World Politics (October 1954), pp. 63-83, asserts that only some officials, particularly in the ministerial bureaucracy in Bonn, belong to the upper middle class, whereas the remainder tend to fall into the lower middle class (p. 72). This ratio may not be applicable to the Foreign Service; rather the reverse may be true.
John Herz, “Political Views of the West German Civil Service,” in H. Speier and W. P. Davison (eds.), West German Leadership and Foreign Polity (Evanston, 1957), pp. 96–135, particularly pp. 99-102. This study is based on a series of interviews with representatives of various levels of the West German Civil Service hierarchy in 1953 and 1956.
See also Herz, “German Officialdom Revisited,” op. cit., pp. 63–93.
See Seabury, op. cit., pp. 81-5; Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 88.
Ibid., pp. 100, 113, 114.
See Herz, “German Officialdom Revisited,” op. cit., pp. 64, 65. Hardly any officials voted for either the ultra-rightist parties or the Communists. These parties are now either prohibited or have become non-existent (Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 75).
See also the pertinent remarks by Taylor Cole, “The Democratization of the German Civil Service,” Journal of Politics (February, 1952), pp. 3–18, particularly pp. 10-18.
Herz in Speier and Davison, op. cit., pp. 117, and 119-132.
Herz distinguishes several groups of neutralists, each having a different concept of, and motivation for, neutralism (ibid., pp. 116-9).
Pp. 56-58, supra.
For details see W. P. Davison, “The Mass Media in West German Political Life,” in H. Speier and W. P. Davison (eds.), West German Leadership and Foreign Policy (Evanston, 1957), pp. 242–81; Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., pp. 111-123.
Ibid., pp. 112 and 116.
Davison, op. cit., p. 243.
Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 112. It may be significant, in this respect, that according to a poll taken in March 1955 only 39 per cent of the respondents said they followed political news from abroad. Certain news items, however, elicited higher reader interest, such as a new Soviet proposal on reunification in 1955 (46 per cent). Ibid., p. 113.
An excellent example of ridiculing an official is the lead story on the West German ambassador to the Soviet Union, Hans Kroll, in Der Spiegel, June 1, 1960, pp. 20-30.
Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., pp. n 1, 112.
Ibid., pp. 120, 121. An anti-Nazi background was a strong recommendation for obtaining a military government license to operate a newspaper.
Davison, op. cit., p. 280.
Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 123.
Poll of the Institute for Market and Opinion Research (EMNID) and other polls quoted in Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., p. 178. The difficulty of translating demands of public opinion in foreign affairs into new government policy is explained on pp. 38-39, supra.
Ibid., p. 126; see also W. P. Davison, “Trends in West German Public Opinion, 1946-1956,” in H. Speier and W. P. Davison (eds.), West German Leadership and Foreign Policy (Evanston, 1957), pp. 282-304, p. 291.
Hans Roeper, “Neue Chancen im Russlandgesch äft,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitvng, May 14, 1955.
Davison, “Trends in West German Public Opinion,” p. 291. In 1953 the Institut für Demoskopie asked respondents whether they would be willing to pay three billion marks (three quarter billion U. S. dollars) to the Soviets if that would lead to unification. Substantially more than half supported such a program although it amounted to 15 per cent of the 1953 Federal budget, and would have meant a substantial tax rise (ibid., p. 292).
For a tabulation of the degree of supports given by the various elites to specific foreign policy decisions from 1952 to 1958, see Deutsch and Edinger, op. cit., Tables 16.1 to 16.5, pp. 204-15.
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Feld, W. (1963). The Formulation of West German Foreign Policy. In: Reunification and West German-Soviet Relations. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9408-2_2
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