Abstract
As we noted in our opening chapter, there was considerable difference of opinion over the kind of variability which could be attributed to natural law. Before analysing the different forms of variability, it is necessary that we state in very general terms what we mean by this word. While we will, in the course of our discussion, be interested in any form of variability which may be relevant to natural law, it is the following kind which will interest us most. We wish to discover whether a certain precept may on one occasion be in accord with natural law and yet not be so on another occasion. In other words, we are asking whether it could ever be correct to say of a certain action X (defined by precept a) that to have performed it in the past (perhaps ten years or perhaps a century before) would have been to act in accordance with natural law, but to perform it at this moment would be contrary to natural law. This we submit is a field of investigation which has never been adequately considered. In our opening chapter we saw that very few writers were in complete agreement as to what form of variability could be attributed to natural law. It is the nature of the variability that we hope to clarify in this present chapter. Here and there we will give examples to illustrate a particular point, but these must be regarded as incidental to our main discussion. What we are interested in is not so much which precepts of natural law may be regarded as variable, but rather, whether it is meaningful to speak of variability at all, and (if it is) to ascertain the reasons why such variability may occur.
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References
Ia IIae, q. 58, a. 5.
IIa IIae, q. 47, a. 15.
A. D. Sertillanges, La philosophie morale de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, 9th ed. Paris, 1961, p. 112: “la mesure de leur variabilité sera celle de leur éloignement par rapport au thème général que doit réaliser la fonction.”
M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, I, Dublin, 1909, p. 611: “What is necessary for the satisfaction of an appetite under one set of circumstances may not be necessary under another.”
A. D. Sertillanges, op. cit., p. III: “II s’ensuivra que dans certains cas, cela ne sera plus à faire qui, envisagé en général, paraissait évidemment juste, et que, subjectivement, cela pourra ne paraÎtre point juste qui est cependant à faire.”
R. Jolivet, Traité de philosophie, IV, Morale, Paris, 1962, p. 117.
H. Rommen, The Natural Law, London, 1947, pp. 224–225. On this same point see also, René Simon, Morale, Paris, 1961, pp. 186-187. He describes this present issue as one of “apparent variability”.
O. Lottin, Morale Fondamentale, Paris, 1954, pp. 179–180.
R.Jolivet, op. cit., pp. 119-121.
R.Jolivet, op. cit., pp. 119-121.
O. Lottin, op. cit., p. 180.
P. M. Van Overbeke, “La loi naturelle et le droit naturel selon S. Thomas,” Revue Thomiste, 57 (1957), p. 470.
J. Fuchs, Le droit naturel, Tournai, 1960, p. 54. See also, Theologia Moralis Generalis, Pars Prima, Rome, 1960, pp. 66-68.
R. Simon, Morale, pp. 184-187.
L. Oeing-Hanhoff, “Thomas von Aquin und die Situation des Thomismus heute,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 70 (1962), pp. 17–33.
G. Fay, “Human Evolution: A Challenge to Thomistic Ethics,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (1962), pp. 50–80. See also, “Towards a Thomistic-Anthropological View of the Evolution of Obligation,” N.L. For., 7 (1962), pp. 38-53.
Ia IIae, q. 77, a. 2. cf. Ia IIae, q. 17, a. 2.
B. M. Crowe, “Human Nature — Immutable or Mutable?” I.T.Q., 30 (1963), p. 208.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4, q. 58, a. 5; Ia Pars, q. 113, a. 1.
Ibid. cf. M. B. Crowe, op. cit., p. 208 f.n. 16. He points out that Caesar, although critical of the morals of the Germans, was not quite as hard on them as S. Thomas assumes. To substantiate this point he cites the exact words of Caesar: “latrocinia nullam habet infamiam quae extra fines cuiusque civitatis fiunt, atque ea iuventutis exercendae ac desidiae minuendae causa fieri praedicant…”
Ia IIae, q. 99, a. 2, ad 2. cf. Suppl., q. 54, a. 3, ad 2; where this point is repeated: “That certain barbarians are united carnally to their parents does not come from the natural law but from the passion of concupiscence which has clouded the natural law in them.”
It is necessary to distinguish between the difference of moral belief, due to the over-influence of the passions, and due to a genuine instance of intellectual difficulty. Often the dividing line between these two cases is not clear. The notion of genuine intellectual difficulty and the suggested variability associated with this will be considered in section IV.
IIa IIae, q. 47, a. 15; cf. S. Deploige, The Conflict Between Ethics and Sociology, (trans. C. C. Miltner), London, 1938, p. 320: “Morality varies necessarily from one group to another according to their degree of civilization.”
In Politic, II, 12, cited by S. Deploige, op. cit., p. 321.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 5.
See above pp. 93-97 ff.
cf. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 5, ad 1: “The written law (human law) is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction.”
J. Maritain, On the Philosophy of History, London, 1959, pp. 82–84.
J. Maritain, loc. cit., p. 82.
J. Maritain, loc. cit., pp. 82-83; cf. G. Renard, Le Droit, Vordre et la Raison, Paris, 1927, p. 23, 29 and 120.
J. Maritain, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
J. Maritain, op. cit., p. 83: “For many, many centuries, and even Christian centuries, it was considered quite normal to kill prisoners of war. No difference was recognised between an enemy soldier in combat and one who had been taken prisoner … But now we have a completely different view of our obligations towards prisoners of war.”
W. L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, London., 1962, p. 945.
J. Maritain, op. cit., p. 84.
Often the distinction between these two suggested reasons is a confused one. For some precepts, it is difficult to ascertain whether their apparent change is due to the influence of the passions or to an insufficiently developed understanding of the nature of man. For convenience, we have separated these two reasons, but it is perfectly possible that they may both influence us in our formulation of a precept.
It is important that we distinguish between the change in natural law as considered in this section brought about by the development in our understanding, and the change we will be discussing in section VII brought about by a change in the intrinsic structure of society.
A. D. Sertillanges, La philosophie morale de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, p. 112.
H. Rommen, The Natural Law, S. Louis, Mo., 1947, p. 181, f.n.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 1.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 1.
M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, I, Dublin, 1909, p. 611.
A. D. Sertillanges, La philosophie morale de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, Paris, 1961, p. 107.
A. D. Sertillanges, op. cit., p. 111.
R. Jolivet, Traité de philosophie morale, t. IV, Morale, 6th ed., Paris, 1962, p. 117.
For a discussion concerning the apparent variability involved in the precept, “killing ought to be avoided,” see, J. Fuchs, Theologia Moralis Generalis, Pars Prima, Rome, 1960, pp. 81-82. cf. L. Bender, Philosophia iuris, 2nd ed., Rome, 1955, pp. 185-186, cited by M. B. Crowe, “Human Nature — Immutable or Mutable?,” I.T.Q., 30 (1963), p. 229.
O. Lottin, “La Valeur des formules de S. Thomas d’Aquin concernant la loi naturelle,” Mélanges Joseph Maréchal, II, Bruxelles, 1950, pp. 370–372.
H. Rommen, The Natural Law, trans. T. R. Hanley, S. Louis, Mo., 1947, pp. 224–225.
A. Van Hove, Prologomena ad Codicem Juris Canonici, Malines-Rome, 1945, n. 55 ff.
M. B. Crowe, “Human Nature—Immutable or Mutable?,” I.T.Q., 30 (1963), pp. 209–211, 226.
J. Rickaby, Oxford and Cambridge Conferences, 2nd series, London, 1902, pp. 17–19.
J. Fuchs, Theologia Moralis Generalis, Pars Prima, Rome, 1960, pp. 66–88.
J. Fuchs, op. cit., p. 68.
R. Jolivet, op. cit., pp. 119-123.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4. For further references to this example, see below, p. 165, f.n. 1.
IIa IIae, q. 66, a. 6, ad 1: cf. ibid., a. 7.
We note that the example concerned with the repayment of debts (or deposited goods) is to be found first in Bk. 1 of Plato’s Republic. As well as the reference we will be referring to in Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4, this example is also mentioned in the following: IIa IIae, q. 51, a. 4; ibid, q. 62, a. 5, ad 1; ibid, q. 120, a. 1; In V Ethic., lect. 12; 1 In III Sent, d. 37, q. 1, a. 3; In IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
For a discussion on the role of the practical syllogism in moral reasoning, see, D. J. Allan, “The Practical Syllogism”, Autour d’Aristote, Recueil d’études offert à Monseigneur A. Mansion, Louvain, 1955, pp. 325-340.
The Nicomachean Ethics, I, 3, 1094b 24-27; cf. M. B. Crowe, op. cit., pp. 209-210.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
O. Lottin, “La Valeur des formules de S. Thomas d’Aquin concernant la loi naturelle,” art. Mélanges Joseph Maréchal, II, p. 371.
O. Lottin, “La Valeur des formules de S. Thomas d’Aquin concernant la loi naturelle,” p. 371. cf. W. Conway, “Situation Ethics”, I.T.Q., 21 (1954), p. 61; he agrees with Lottin in arguing that certain secondary precepts, because of the way they are formulated, make provision for particular circumstances, so that the practical conclusions from the application of these principles to concrete situations may vary with the circumstances.
J. Rickaby, Oxford and Cambridge Conferences, 2nd series, London, 1902, pp. 18–19.
J. Fuchs, Theologia Moralis Generalis, pp. 81-82: “Exempli causa, propositio ‘depositum reddendum est’ nondum respicit limitationem possibilem iuris; principium ‘non licet alios occidere’ non addit conditiones ‘directe’ et ‘propria auctoritate privata’, negligens sic quaes-tiones poenae capitis, defensionis sui, auctorizationis divinae in materia iuris (cfr. casum Abraham-Isaac); norma ‘non licet auferre invito domino rem alienam’ non indicat possi-bilitatem transferendi ius in aliud subiectum iuris, sive ex parte Dei sive per legitimam auc-toritatem” cited by M. B. Crowe, “Human Nature—Immutable or Mutable?”, p. 217.
A. D. Sertillanges, La philosophie morale de S. Thomas d’Aquin, p. 112: “Là donc où les principes seconds, appliqués selon leur teneur propre, risqueraient de compromettre, au lieu de la servir, l’efficacité des principes premiers, que ce soit sur le même terrain, que ce soit sur un autre, il devient nécessaire de suspendre l’application, et, si l’on peut transposer ainsi cette formule fameuse, “sortir de la légalité pour rentrer dans le droit,” c’est-à-dire, ici, abandonner la formule générale de l’application pour la valeur universelle du principe, c’est la sagesse.”
R. Jolivet, Traité de philosophie, Morale, p. 117; cf. H. Rommen, The Natural Law, pp. 224-225. This writer, as with Jolivet, is prepared, without offering any explanation, to speak of “principles which do not apply with universality.”
A. Van Hove, Prolegomena ad Codicem Juris Canonici, Malines, 1945, n. 55.
A. Van Hove, op. cit., n. 52: “In his ergo quae iure naturae praecipiuntur, praecepta primaria et secundaria non sunt distinguenda, cum omnia aeque sint imposita iure naturae.”
See above pp. 162-163.
For a detailed statement of Jolivet’s position, see above pp. 16-18.
IIa IIae, q. 33, a. 2; cf. In 3 Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3.
Ia IIae, q. 71, a. 5, ad 3; cf. Ia Pars, q. 88, a. 1, ad 2; IIa IIae, q. 3, a. 2, q. 79, a. 3, ad 3, q. 140, a. 2, ad 2; In 3 Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; In 4 Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1.
The classical distinction between counsels and precepts is usually formulated as follows: a “counsel” is a maximum standard or ideal at which men ought to aim, a “precept” is a minimum standrad below which men must not fall. It will be remembered that Lottin and Van Overbeke put forward the suggestion that some of the secondary precepts authorised by S. Thomas in the Commentary on the Sentences are not really part of the natural law because the natural law does not oblige us to fulfil them. As we noted in the teaching of Van Overbeke, such precepts are required not by the demand but by the recommendations of nature. While disagreeing with the view expressed by these two writers over the question of interpretation in the Commentary on the Sentences, we would agree that “counsels” do not constitute part of the content of natural law.
O. Lottin, “La Valeur des formules de S. Thomas d’Aquin concernant la loi naturelle,” pp. 371–372.
Suppl, q. 41, a. 1, ad 3; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ad 13; IIa IIae, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1.
R. J. Deferrari and M. I. Barry, Complete Index of the Summa Theologica, Washington, 1956, p. 119. Although not all dealing with human nature and the question of natural law, there are well over 3,000 references to be found for the term natura. This makes clear the apparent unimportance of the notion of “mutable” human nature.
This section of the Summa Theologica was compiled after S. Thomas’s death by drawing on appropriate passages from the Commentary on the Sentences, and shaping them to the plan S. Thomas had already outlined. Therefore, although the Supplementum is part of the Summa Theologica, it in fact represents S. Thomas’s thought of the period twenty years before.
Nichomachean Ethics, VII, lect. 14.
Suppl, q. 41, a. 1, ad 3.
De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ad 13.
M. B. Crowe, “Human Nature—Immutable or Mutable?” p. 225.
IIa IIae, q. 57, a. 2.
See above, pp. 164-170.
cf. M. B. Crowe, “Human Nature—Mutable or Immutable?”, p. 226; speaking of this mutability describes it as, “that which makes possible a change in the will of depositor usually well-intentioned about the use he will put his property to, but possibly ill-intentioned.”
J. Fuchs, Theologia Moralis Generalis, Pars Prima, Rome, 1960, pp. 77–81; cf. R. Jolivet, Traité de Philosophie: Morale, Lyons-Paris, 1962, pp. 119-123.
J. Fuchs, loc. cit., p. 77.
M. B. Crowe, “Human Nature—Immutable or Mutable?”, p. 215.
J. Fuchs, loc. cit., pp. 79-81.
L. Oeing-Hanhoff, “Thomas von Aquin und die Situation des Thomismus Heute,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 70 (1962), pp. 17–33. cf. For an article dealing with the mutability of human nature from the point of view of social anthropology, see, C. Fay, “Human Evolution: a Challenge to Thomistic Ethics,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (1960), pp. 50-80.
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Armstrong, R.A. (1966). The Concept of Variability among the Secondary Precepts of Natural Law. In: Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9388-7_6
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