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Some Comments on the Validity and Usefulness of the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Precepts

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Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching

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Abstract

We stated at the end of the status quaestionis that this chapter would be concerned with drawing some conclusions from the teaching of S. Thomas, and applying them to certain basic questions of natural law in the hope that some confused issues might be clarified. There are three points we propose to bring forward for discussion in this chapter.

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References

  1. O. Lottin, Morale Fondamentale, Tournai, 1954, pp. 183–184.

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  2. We noted the following writers in particular. H. Capitant, Introduction à l’étude du droit civil, Paris, 1923, p. 35 and 187; V. Cathrein, Recht, Naturrecht und Positives Recht, Freiburg 1909, pp. 132-133; Ed. Janssens, Cours de morale générale, t. I, Louvain, 1926, pp. 219-222; F. Gény, Science et technique en droit privé positif, Paris, 1913–1924, t. II, p. 173; C. Martyniak, Le fondement objectif du droit d’après saint Thomas d’Aquin, Paris, 1931, p. 97; L. Le Fur, Les grands problèmes du droit, Paris, 1937, p. 181

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  3. This terminology is suggested by O. Lottin, Morale Fondamentale, pp. 177-178

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  4. O. Lottin, loc. cit., p. 177. This writer also refers to S. Paul’s famous text from the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 2, verses 14-15.

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  5. For details concerning the dates this work is believed to have been written, see above, pp. 58-59.

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  6. See above, pp. 74-75.

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  7. Suppl, q. 65, a. 2, (italics mine).

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  8. In 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3; see also, In 2 Sent, d. 39, q. 3, a. 1.

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  9. For details concerning the date this work was written, see above, p. 83-84.

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  10. In V Ethic, lect. 12.

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  11. See above, pp. 84-85.

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  12. For details concerning the dates the several parts of this work were written, see above, pp. 86-87.

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  13. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.

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  14. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4, ad 2.

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  15. See above, Chpt. II, also pp. 37-38.

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  16. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.

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  17. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.

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  18. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4, ad 2.

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  19. cf. J. Dabin, The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch and Dahin, Cambridge, Mass., 1950, pp. 420–421. He refers to the lack of precision regarding the placing of the boundary lines between the different classes of precepts; see also, P. M. Van Overbeke, “La loi naturelle et le droit naturel selon S. Thomas,” Revue Thomiste, 57 (1957), p. 470, who refers to “the inevitable imprecision of the limits involved in the class of secondary precepts.”

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  20. See above, pp. 3-7.

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  21. See above, pp. 7-14.

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  22. See above, pp. 14-21.

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  23. V. Cathrein, Recht, Naturrecht und Positives Recht, Freiburg, 1909, pp. 132–133, cf. note the statement of this same principle on p. 222.

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  24. V. Cathrein, loc. cit., p. 133.

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  25. See above, pp. 93-97.

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  26. See above, pp. 3-4.

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  27. For an outline of the “restricted” view of natural law as found in the writers during the century before S. Thomas see, O. Lottin, Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas et ses prédécesseurs, Bruges, 1931; also, Ph. Delhaye, “Le droit naturel: recherches historiques et doctrinales,” L’Ami du Clergé, 69 (1959), pp. 617-625, 681-685; 70 (1960) pp. 33-39, 97-103, 145-153, 225-228.

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  28. H. Capitant, Introduction à l’étude du droit civil, Paris, 1923, p. 35; see above, pp. 4-5.

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  29. L. Le Fur, Les grands problèmes du droit, Paris, 1937, p. 181.

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  30. See above, pp. 7-8.

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  31. Ed. Janssens, Cours de morale générale, t. I, Louvain, 1926, p. 222. 6 Ed. Janssens, loc. cit., p. 218.

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  32. Ed. Janssens, loc. cit., p. 219.

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  33. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2 and a. 4; this same point is discussed in Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 1; see above, p. 25.

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  34. See above, pp. 35-36.

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  35. See above, pp. 36-37.

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  36. See above, pp. 40-41.

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  37. See above, p. 47.

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  38. See above, p. 48.

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  39. See above, p. 49.

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  40. See above, p. 50.

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  41. Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3; see above, p. 109.

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  42. Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3; see above, p. 109.

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  43. See above, pp. 104-105.

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  44. I. Trethowan, “The Philosophical Concept of Morality,” in, The Springs of Morality, London, 1956, p. 9.

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  45. See above, p. 40.

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  46. E. D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, p. 54. cf. p. 54, where this writer criticises A. Vermeersch for not distinguishing between the principle “good should be done and evil shunned” and the following two: “laws should be obeyed,” “promises should be kept.” Of the principle “good should be done,” D’Arcy comments, “the important thing is that we constantly use it, not that we readily enunciate it; it does not matter very much if we never explicitly formulate it at all.” cf., A. Vermeersch, Theologiae Moralis Principia, I, Rome, 1923, p. 289.

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  47. See above, p. 41.

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  48. E. D’Arcy, op. cit., p. 60.

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  49. cf. Suppl., q. 65, a. 1.

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  50. Suppl., q. 65, a. 1; see above, pp. 68-71.

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  51. See above, pp. 74-75.

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  52. Suppl., q. 65, a. 2.

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  53. Ia IIae q. 100, a. 6; cf. Suppl., q. 65, a. 1, ad 9, where S. Thomas states the following: “natural inclinations in the appetitive faculty follow the natural concept in the cognitive faculty.”

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  54. See above, pp. 70-71.

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  55. For a more extensive statement of this criticism, see above, pp. 70-71.

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  56. For a complete statement of this criticism, see above, pp. 72-75.

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  57. Suppl., q. 65, a. 2.

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  58. Suppl., q. 65, a. 2.

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  59. For a statement concerning the primary and secondary ends of marriage, see above, pp. 62-63.

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  60. P. M. Van Overbeke, “La loi naturelle et le droit naturel selon S. Thomas,” Revue Thomiste, 57 (1957), p. 470; “les préceptes seconds n’y sont pas de véritables préceptes de vrais commandements, de vraies exigences de la nature humaine, mais plutôt de simples vota naturae”; for this same point by another writer, see, O. Lottin, Morale Fondamentale, p. 180.

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  61. cf. J. Cunnane, The Natural Moral Law, (unpublished thesis), Maynooth, 1941, p. 176; “This distinction between primary and secondary precepts, has no other justification except to meet the Biblical cases of the real or apparent breaches of the natural law. The dragging in of a Divine inspiration into this, rather than any other application of the natural law, is not convincing.”

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  62. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 5; we note this same thought already expressed in the Commentary on the Ethics. In V Ethic, lect. 12.

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  63. See above, pp. 92-93.

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  64. See above, pp. 93-97.

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  65. For a discussion and an example of the form of procedure to be followed, see pp. 129-130.

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  66. See above, pp. 100-102.

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  67. In V Ethic, Iect. 12: “Necesse est quod quidquid ex justo naturali sequitur, quasi con-clusio, sit justum naturale”; cf. P. M. Van Overbeke, op. cit., p. 470. He states that the degree of deduction matters very little whether it is “close” or “distant”. In the light of this teaching he suggests we dispense with the term propinquus.

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  68. O. Lottin, Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas et ses prédécesseurs, Bruges, 1931, p. 98.

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  69. P. M. Van Overbeke, op. cit., p. 470. cf. J. Dabin, The General Theory of Law, in The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch and Dabin, Cambridge, Mass., p. 421.

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  70. See above, pp. 100-102.

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  71. O. Lottin, Morale Fondamentale, p. 183.

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  72. O. Lottin, Morale Fondamentale, p. 183.

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  73. O. Lottin, op. cit., p. 183, “est-il nécessaire, ou même utile, de conserver cette formule dans l’enseignement didactique des écoles”?

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  74. P. M. Van Overbeke, op. cit., pp. 469-470; “cette distinction selon la doctrine du Commentaire sur les Sentences pourrait être franchement abandonnée, comme d’ailleurs saint Thomas lui-même semble l’avoir fait, puisqu’il n’en parle déjà plus dans le Summa contra Gentiles. Le vrai motif de cet abandon nous semble des plus obvies: les préceptes “seconds” n’y sont pas de véritables préceptes, de vrais commandements, de vraies exigences de la nature humaine, mais plutôt de simples vota naturae.”

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  75. R. F. Bégin, Natural Law and Positive Law, Washington, 1959, p. 85.

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  76. S. Bertke, The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance of the Natural Law, Washington, 1941, p. 63.

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  77. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.

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  78. Ia IIae, q. 77, a. 2, q. 58, a. 5, q. 94, a. 4: Suppl., q. 54, a. 3, ad 2.

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  79. Ia IIae., q. 10, a. 1; cf., Ia IIae., q. 94, a. 6.

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  80. S. Bertke, op. cit., p. 73.

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  81. S. Bertke, op. cit., p. 73.

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Authors
  1. R. A. Armstrong M.A., Ph.D.
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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Armstrong, R.A. (1966). Some Comments on the Validity and Usefulness of the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Precepts. In: Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9388-7_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9388-7_5

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