Abstract
In Chapter III, we Concentrated our attention on the doctrine of primary and secondary natural law precepts, as it occurred in S. Thomas’s early writings—the Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Commentary on the Ethics. This brings us now to the Summa Theologica, our author’s last and major work. Here, as might be expected, we find some of S. Thomas’s most mature reflections concerning the division of precepts, and we note that, in contrast to the teaching in the Commentary on the Sentences, the approach is exclusively philosophical. In Question 94 of the Prima Secundae, such questions are raised as: whether the natural law contains several precepts or only one; whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by natural law; whether the natural law is the same for all men; whether the natural law can be changed? These questions reflect the systematic and exhaustive nature of S. Thomas’s approach.
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References
M. Grabmann, Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin, p. 295; cited by M. B. Crowe, in “The term Synderesis and the Scholastics,” I.T.Q., 23 (1956), p. 242.
M. W. Grabmann, op. cit., p. 295.
A. Walz, “Chronotaxis vitae et operum s. Thomae de Aquino,” Angelicum, 16 (1939), p. 467; cited by M. B. Crowe, “The term Synderesis and the Scholastics,” I.T.Q., 23 (1956), p. 242.
cf. M. B. Crowe, op. cit., citing O. Lottin, “La date de la Quaestio disputata De Malo de S. Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue d’historie ecclésiastique, 24 (1928), pp. 373-388.
G. Verbeke, “Authenticité et chronologie des écrits de s. Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue philosophique de Louvain, 48 (1950), pp. 263–264.
cf. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2; here there is a discussion concerning the distinction between the primary, self-evident principles according to the order of the natural inclinations. However, this text has already been discussed in connexion with our treatment of the doctrine of naturales inclinationes in Chapter II.
This procedure of “dividing the text” has the advantage of enabling the reader to see immediately the distinction between the two concepts employed. The continuity of of each text will be preserved by the use of continuous lines, indicating the manner in which one part of a text follows from another. This same procedure has been employed by P. M. Van Overbeke, “La loi naturelle et le droit naturel selon saint Thomas,” Revue Thomiste, 57 (1957), pp. 450-495.
Ia IIae., q. 94, a. 4.
Ia Pars, q. 85, a. 3: “Secundum intellectum cognitio magis communis est prior quam cognitio minus communis.”
Ia Pars, q. 85, a. 3.
Ia Pars, q. 85, a. 3: “to know animal indistinctly is to know it as animal; whereas to know animal distinctly is to know it as rational or irrational animal, that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our intellect knows animal before it knows man.”
S. Bertke, The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance of the Natural Law, Washington, 1941, p. 41.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4, ad 2.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4, ad 2.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4, ad 2.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4, ad 2.
All would agree that it is easier to state principles concerning a general class of acts (e.g. killing) than it is to talk about the morality of a particular action (the right of society to take the life of a criminal) which falls within this class.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 5.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 6.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 6.
Suppl., q. 65, a. 2. It will be remembered that this was only one of the two criteria which S. Thomas employed — the other (which was for him the more important one) dealt with the relationship between the division of ends and the precepts of natural law.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 6.
As used by S. Thomas, the adjective means “near”, “kindred”, “adjacent” or “proximate”. We note the extensive use of this term in the Treatise on Law, where it is used in the following places: Ia IIae, q. 92, a. 2; Ia IIae, q. 94, aa. 5,6; Ia IIae, q. 102, a. 6; Ia IIae, q. 105, aa. 2, 3, and 4.
cf. P. J. Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law, Michigan, 1958, p. 115, citing Burke says: “the lines of morality are not like ideal lines of mathematics.
Ia IIae, q. 91, a. 3.
Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 2. cf. J. Leclerq, Le fondement du droit et de la société, Louvain, 1957, p. 59. He makes the point that it is difficult to determine the exact boundary between precepts of natural law and those of positive law.
Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 2.
Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 2.
S. Thomas employs this term on at least two occasions in the Treatise on Law. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4; ibid. q. 95, a. 2.
This would be an example of a remote conclusion.
This term is used on several occasions in the Treatise on Law, but we note that the usage is consistent. Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 4; ibid. q. 99, a. 4; ibid. q. 100, a. 7; ibid. q. 104, a. 3.
O. Lottin, “La valeur des formules de saint Thomas d’Aquin concernant la loi naturelle,” Mélanges Joseph Maréchal, II, Paris, 1950, p. 369. H. Meyer, The Philosophy of S. Thomas Aquinas, London, 1948, pp. 501-502. For a discussion concerning the conflict between natural law and positive law, see: R. F. Bégin, Natural Law and Positive Law (The Catholic University of America: Canon Law Studies, No. 393), Washington, 1959, pp. 139— 162. For a discussion concerning the difficulties involved in determining the “limits” of natural law, see: J. Leclercq, Le fondement du droit et de la société, Louvain, 1957 p. 59
Ia IIae, q. 95, a. 2, ad 1.
P. Delhaye, Permanence du Droit Naturel, Louvain, 1960, p. 81; J. Maritain, Man and the State, London, 1954, p. 77 f.n. makes the following point: “the vocabulary of the Commentary on the Sentences … concerning the ‘primary’ and’ secondary’ precepts of Natural Law, is at variance with the vocabulary of the Summa Theologica…”
P. Delhaye, loc. cit., p. 81.
J. Cunnane, The Natural Moral Law (unpublished thesis), Maynooth, 1941, p. 119.
Vide supra, Chapter II.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
We observe that the term secunda praecepta is used for the first time in Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 5.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 1.
Ia IIae, q. 94, aa. 2, 4.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 1.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 1; S. Thomas in fact introduces another class of precepts concerning “matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by a Divine instruction,” i.e. articles of faith. However, since this division falls outside the scope of philosophical discussion this class need not concern us further.
P. M. Van Overbeke, op. cit., p. 470.
Contrast the lack of clarity in this distinction as compared with the one formulated earlier: distinguishing primary precepts (those that are known irrespective of circumstances educational background etc.) from secondary ones, which are derived from these.
D. MacLaren, Private Property and the Natural Law. (Aquinas Paper. No. 8), Oxford, 1948.
J. Cunnane, The Natural Moral Law, (unpublished thesis). Maynooth, 1941, p. 172.
W. Farrell, The Natural Moral Law of S. Thomas and Suarez, Ditchling, 1930, pp. 107–108.He
W. Farrell, loc. cit., p. 108.
P. M. Van Overbeke, op. cit., p. 470. vide In V Ethic, lect. 12: “Necesse est quod quid-quid ex justo naturali sequitur, quasi conclusio, sit justum naturali.”
O. Lottin, “La valeur des formules de saint Thomas d’Aquin concernant la loi naturelle,” Mélanges Joseph Maréchal, II, Paris, 1950, p. 369.
O. Lottin, loc. cit., p. 370.
O. Lottin, loc. cit., p. 370.
R. Jolivet, Traité de Philosophie, IV, Morale, Lyons-Paris, 1962, pp. 105–106.
Ia IIae., q. 100, a. 3. This point will be developed at greater length in the final part of this chapter.
A. D. Sertillanges, La Philosophie morale de S. Thomas d’Aquin, Paris, 1961, p. 110: “A l’égard des conséquences immédiates, très générales encore, de ces principes premiers, saint Thomas s’exprime avec précaution, les appelant ici quasi-conclusions, ailleurs tantôt conclusions, tantôt principes. C’est qu’en effet ces conclusions là ont leur évidence propre, ainsi qu’il a été dit, et elles portent en soi de quoi se faire universellement reconnaÎtre.”
J. Leclercq, Leçons de droit naturel, I, Le fondement du droit et de la société, Namur-Louvain 1957, p. 59.
P. Delhaye, Permanence du Droit Naturel, Louvain, 1960, p. 82.
O. Lottin, “L’ordre moral et l’ordre logique d’après Saint Thomas,” Annales Inst. Supr. Phil, 5 (1924), p. 353.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 8, ad 5; “the commandment about the Sabbath has a determination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural law.” Likewise the 1st and 2nd commandments require infused faith.
For convenience, we will divide his statements into three columns, the reason for this will be evident shortly.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3, ad 1.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 11.
We question for instance whether in fact the Decalogue, considered as a set of precepts able to be known by the activity of human reason, are any more easily evident than some of the secondary precepts which do not belong to the Decalogue. Certainly S. Thomas nowhere proves his point.
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Armstrong, R.A. (1966). The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Summa Theologica. In: Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9388-7_4
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