Abstract
In Chapter II, we established the thesis that for S. Thomas, certain moral precepts are present in the minds of all men. Following the terminology employed in that chapter, we know that these very general precepts of the natural law are self-evident. It is this concept of self-evidence which is going to play a major role as we proceed with our analysis of S. Thomas’s thought concerning the distinction between primary and secondary precepts. It will be remembered that S. Thomas uses this term “self-evident” in a strictly technical sense.1 What he means is not that the precepts in question are innate (in the sense that they are given to man at birth), and thus must be known to everyone; rather, he means that the truth of these precepts becomes apparent, immediately we examine the terms involved. For instance, immediately we reflect on the concept of “goodness” we see without fail that whatever the content of “good” is (and this is something we come to know, after varying degrees of reflection), it is something that ought to be done. And likewise, whatever we discover to be evil—this we immediately know, ought to be avoided. S. Thomas, it will be remembered, draws a parallel between the primary principles of the speculative reason, and those of the practical reason.2 The former are known by the activity of reason called the intellectus, 3 while the latter are known by means of a special habit called synderesis. 4 Thus we concluded our investigation in Chapter II by asserting the existence of a group of moral precepts, which were (in the special sense of the term) self-evident, and consequently, able to be grasped by all men.
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References
We referred to his use of the term, propositio per se nota. Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2; q. 51, aa. 2, 3, Ia Pars, q. 2, a. 1; q. 79, a. 12; Summa Contra., I, 10, Ibid. IV, 95; In VI Ethic, lect. 3; De Ver., q. 22, a. 5, ad 3.
See above, pp. 38-41.
cf. Ia Pars, q. 19, a. 5: “intellectus dicitur habitus primorum principiorum”; Ia Pars, q. 58, a. 3 and q. 79, a. 12; De Ver., q. 16, a. 1; q. 17, a. 1.
See above, pp. 25-26.
Some argue that the distinction in question is neither useful nor valid. Cf. O. Lottin, Morale Fondamentale, Tournai, 1954, pp. 184-185; P. M. Van Overbeke, “La loi naturelle et le droit naturel selon S. Thomas,” Revue Thomiste, 57 (1957), p. 470. While others argue for the retention of the distinction: Ph. Delhaye, Permanence du droit naturel, Louvain, 1960, pp. 80 f.; W. Farrell, The Natural Moral Law According to S. Thomas and Suarez, Ditchling, 1930, p. 108; R. Jolivet, Traité de Philosophie, t. IV Morale, Lyons-Paris, 1962, pp. 115-116
Maritain, The Rights of Man and the Natural Law, London, 1944, p. 58; A. D. Sertillanges, La Philosophie Morale de S. Thomas d’Aquin, Paris, 1961, pp. 104-105; R. Simon, Cours de Philosophie Thomiste: Morale, Paris, 1960, pp. 182-183.
P. Mandonnet — J. Dedtrez, Bibliographie Thomiste, Introd. p. xv; M. Grabmann, Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Bd. XXII, Hft. 1-2, p. 287; A. Waltz, “Chronotaxis vitae et operum s. Thomas de Aquino,” Angelicum, 16 (1939), p. 467.
P. Glorieux, art. Sentences, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. P. Phillippe, “Plan des Sentences de Pierre Lombard d’après S. Thomas d’Aquin,” Bulletin Thomiste, 9 (1932) pp. 131-154; G. Verbeke, “Authenticité et chronologie des écrits de S. Thomas d’Aquin,” Rev. Phil, de Louvain, 48 (1950), p. 263.
M. B. Crowe, “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics” II, Irish Theological Quarterly, 23 (1956), p. 229.
M. Grabmann, “Les commentaires de S. Thomas sur les ouvrages d’Aristote,” Annales de l’ Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Louvain, 3 (1914) pp. 248–254, cf. V. J. Bourke, S. Thomas and the Greek Moralists, Aquinas Lecture, Milwaukee, 1947.
It is evident that had S. Thomas had access to the extensive amount of Biblical research that is available today, many of the contradictions (which are strictly exegetical rather than philosophical) would have been resolved. Cf.B. Häring, The Law of Christ, Cork, 1961, p. 247; referring to the “contradictions” indicated, he says: “These latter actions can very readily be explained as being justifiable compensation for unpaid forced labour. The other two facts are not in violation of the fifth commandment which forbids the taking of a life of an innocent person, on one’s own authority. The meaning of the commandment is that not man, but God alone, is the absolute master over life and death. Therefore, as God acts through the forces of nature, so also can He act through the human instruments He chooses in the exercise of His exclusive right. He can and may set the term of an innocent man’s life, which may be the greatest of graces rather than an evil.”
Suppl, q. 65, a. 1.
Ia IIae., q. 18, a. 5; ibid. q. 3, a. 5; Ia Pars, q. 79, a. 6.
Ia IIae, q. 91, a. 2; De Ver., q. 22, a. 1; Ia IIae q. 94, a. 5, ad 3.
G. Vann, Morals and Man, London and Glasgow, 1960, p. 51.
For an extensive discussion of the term inconvenientem, meaning unbecomingness, un-fittingness, incongruity, cf. IIa IIae, q. 154, a. 9, ad 2.
G. Vann, op. cit., p. 51.
Suppl., q. 65, a. 1.
Suppl., q. 65, a. 1. Unfortunately, the other references he makes to this division of ends are not illuminating, and do not further our understanding of this problem. Cf. Ia IIae., q. 73, a. 9; IIa IIae, q. 17, a. 4, Ibid., q. 25, a. 1; Summa Contra., III, c. 109. These all make reference to the distinction between the finis principalis and the finis secundarius.
Ia IIae, q. 73, a. 9; IIa IIae, q. 17, a. 4; ibid. q. 25, a. 1; Summa Contra., III, c. 109.
Suppl, q. 65, a. 1.
In recent years, considerable controversy has centred around the question concerni the “ends of marriage.” cf. H. Rondet, Introduction à l’étude de la théologie du mariage, Paris 1960, pp. 130 ff. We note that the Code of Canon Law (1013) describes procreatio et educatio prolis as the finis Primarius matrimonii, and mutuum adiutorium et remedium concupiscentiae as the finis secundarius. For more recent criticisms of this traditional view, see: Enda McDonagh Marriage, Source of Life (offprint from Irish Theological Quarterly, October, 1962), pp. 3-5 J. Fuchs, “Biologie und Ehemoral,” Gregorianum, XLIII (1962), pp. 225-253; J. Fuchs, Die Sexualethik des heiligen Thomas von Aquin, Köln, 1948; see also H. Doms, The Meaning of Marriage, London, 1939.
J. Leclercq, Marriage and the Family, trans. T. R. Hanley, New York, 1949, p. 15.
A. L. Ostheimer, The Family. A Thomistic Study in Social Philosophy, The Catholic Uni versity of America Philosophical Studies, Vol. 50, Washington, 1949, pp. 124–37.
Suppl, q. 65, a. 1.
Suppl, q. 65, a. 1.
cf. J. Cunnane, The Catholic Notion of the Natural Law, Maynooth, 1941 (unpublished thesis), where it is suggested, p. 119, that the primary and secondary precept distinction of the Commentary on the Sentences, involving the division of ends, was framed to provide a solution to the textual contradictions of the Bible. He suggests that the distinction has no philosophical validity. Dr. Cunnane surprisingly omits all reference to the second approach of secondary precepts being derived from more general precepts in the same manner as conclusions in speculative knowledge from general principles.
Van Overbeke, op. cit., p. 463 (f.n.); S. Bertke, op. cit., pp. 34-45.
Suppl., q. 65, a. 1.
Suppl., q. 65, a. 1.
Suppl., q. 65, a. 1.
Suppl, q. 65, a. 2, ad 8.
Suppl, q. 65, a. 2.
Suppl., q. 65, a. 2.
J. Rickaby, “Variability of the Moral Standard,” The Month, XC (1897), p. 191; describes secondary precepts as not always applying in a particular case.
Suppl, q. 65, a. 5.
Suppl, q. 65, a. 2.
Suppl, q. 65, a. 1; “Now the law prescribing the one wife was framed not by man but by God… Consequently a dispensation in this matter (the conclusions of natural law) could be granted by God alone… at a time when it behoved the aforesaid (secondary) precept not to be observed, in order to ensure the multiplication of the offspring … For the principal end is ever to be borne in mind before the secondary end.”
Van Overbeke, “La loi Naturelle et Droit Naturel selon S. Thomas,” Revue Thomiste, 57 (1957), p. 470: “les préceptes’ seconds’ n’y sont pas de véritables préceptes, de vrais commandements de vraies exigences de la nature humaine, mais plutôt de simples vota naturae.” cf. O. Lottin, Morale Fondamentale, p. 184.
Suppl, q. 65, a. 1.
Suppl, q. 65, a. 2. cf. no mention of the concept of “ends”, in defining the primary and secondary precepts.
P. Delhaye, Permanence du Droit Naturel, Louvain, 1960, p. 81.
cf. M. B. Crowe, Philosophical Studies, XI, 1961–62, p. 199. cf. M. J. Laversin, “Droit naturel et droit positif d’après saint Thomas,” Revue Thomiste, 36 (1933), pp. 178-179.
W. Farrell, The Natural Moral Law of S. Thomas and Suarez, Ditchling, 1930, p. 112.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 6; see also, Suppl., q. 65, a. 1, ad. 9: “natural inclinations in the appetitive faculty, follow the natural concept in the cognitive faculty.” cf. also, P. Delhaye, op. cit., pp. 144-146.
M. B. Crowe, op. cit., p. 199, suggests that the link whereby it might be shown that the two approaches complement each other, could be found in an examination of the concept naturalis cognitio, as referred to in the Summa Contra., I, c. 10; but after an examination of this concept in this and other contexts, we see no evidence to indicate that it could provide any such required solution.
A. D. Sertillanges, La philosophie morale de S. Thomas d’Aquin, Paris, 1961, p. 105.
S. Bertke, The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance of the Natural Law, Washington, 1941, p. 33.
Bertke, op. cit., pp. 34-45.
We will reserve comment on the philosophical validity of the distinction involved when the criterion of “conclusions following from general principles” is employed. We will withhold comment until our analysis of the Summa Contra., and the Summa Theologica, is completed.
W. Ryan, The Indissolubility of Marriage in Natural Law, (unpublished thesis), Maynooth, 1962, p. 42. cf. also Suppl., q. 65, a. 5; Ia IIae., q. 94, a. 6.
O. Lottin, op. cit., p. 180.
P. M. Van Overbeke, op. cit., p. 470.
Written 1259–64, according to Grabmann, op. cit., p. 19; while Mandonnet-Destrez, op. cit., Introd., p. xvi, suggest 1258–60.
Summa Contra., III, 129, p. 4.
This concept is well summed up in the following description: “From their very nature, all beings have certain desires, affinities and forms of activity. The term natural appetite (naturalis inclinatio) includes all these. It means the inclination of a thing to that which is in accord with its nature, without any knowledge of the reason why such a thing is appetible.” Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 1, p. 636, in article, Appetite, by C. A. Dubray.
Summa Contra., III, 129, p. 5.
Summa Contra., III, 129, p. 5.
cf. J. Fuchs, Lex Naturae, Düsseldorf, 1954, pp. 46–47, suggests that private property is not a concept in conformity with pure nature, but rather is seen as natural because man is in a state of a fallen nature, cf. D. MacLaren, Private Property and the Natural Law, Aquinas Paper No. 8, Oxford, 1948.
Summa Contra III, c. 129, p. 6.
Summa Contra., III, 129, p. 6: “There is a definite measure according to which the use of the aforesaid things (the lower things) is proper to human life, and if this measure is set aside the result is harmful to man. e.g. the immoderate eating of food.”
Suppl, q. 65, a. 1.
Summa Contra., III, 129, p. 7.
Summa Contra., III, 129, p. 7.
Summa Contra., III, 129, p. 7; cf. J. Fuchs, Die Sexualethik des heiligen Thomas von Aquin, Köln, 1949.
Summa Contra., III, 129, p. 8.
Van Overbeke, op. cit., p. 462.
Suppl., q. 65, a. 1.
Summa Contra., III, 129, p. 6.
See above pp. 60-63.
Summa Contra., III, 124, p. 6.
Summa Contra., III, 124, p. 1.
Although there is no mention of discarding the concept of primary and secondary ends in the case of marriage. See Summa Contra., III, 124, pp. 1, 2.
We cannot fail to note the abruptness with which S. Thomas discards what for him was a central doctrine in the Commentary on the Sentences. The comparative ease with which S. Thomas dispenses with this relationship between the ends of actions and natural law precepts suggests the likelihood of there being no ontological basis for the division at all. Indeed, Dr Cunnane may well have an important point when he suggested that the distinction in question is of only “ad hoc” value, as it was merely framed to provide a solution to the apparent textual difficulties of the Bible, cf. J. Cunnane, The Natural Moral Law, (unpublished thesis), Maynooth, 1941, p. 119.
This will hereafter be referred to as the Commentary on the Ethics.
Although there is some disagreement concerning the exact date, it would appear that 1266 is the year most likely, cf. M. Grabmann, op. cit., suggests 1261–64; while Mandonnet-
P. M. Van Overbeke, op. cit., p. 470.
In V Ethic, lect. 12.
O. Lotton, “Saint Thomas et la loi naturelle,” Mélanges Joseph Maréchal, Bruxelles, 1950, p. 359.
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Armstrong, R.A. (1966). The Thomistic Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Natural Law Precepts, as Found in the Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Contra Gentiles, and the Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle. In: Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9388-7_3
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