Abstract
As we noted in our opening chapter, there was considerable disagreement concerning the nature and the content of the class of self-evident, natural law principles. Some of the writers we discussed maintained that natural law consisted of only one such principle, while others argued that it contained several principles of this kind. Nor was the difference limited to the question of the number of principles —there was also a very marked variation in the principles themselves; in only a very few instances did any two writers agree on the precise principles belonging to the class in question. In attempting to reconcile this conflict in natural law teaching, we propose in this chapter to clarify and possibly solve the question as to the nature and number of self-evident principles contained in natural law. We intend to consider the possibility of being able to determine how many such precepts there are, and the manner in which they may be formulated.
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References
This point is discussed at length in Ia IIae, q. 94, a.2; and stated again in Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4. It is also referred to in Ia IIae, q. 100, a.l. As we shall see in our following chapter, this same point is stated but not developed in, Suppl., q. 65, a.l.
S. Thomas uses this term in several slightly different ways, in the following works: In 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3; d. 39, q. 3, a. 1; De Verit., q. 16, aa. 1 and2; Ia Pars, q. 79, a. 12. For a valuable commentary on S. Thomas’s employment of the term synderesis, see M. B. Crowe, “The term synderesis and the Scholastics,” II, I.T.Q., 23 (1956), pp. 228-245.
O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux 12e et 13e siècles, Louvain, 1948, vol. 2, pp. 103–350.
For some recent studies in this field see the following: K. Schmeider, “Die Synderesis und die ethischen Werte,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 47 (1934), pp. 145-153, 297-307; J. Rohmer, Syndérèse, art., Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, t. 14, p. 2, cols. 2292–2296; Y. Simon, Critique de la connaissance morale, Paris, 1934, pp. 54-59. (We note that this writer uses the term “sens moral” instead of synderesis). O. Lottin, Morale Fondamentale, pp. 119-120, suggests the following as also being of interest: O. Renz, “Die Synderesis nach dem heiligen Thomas von Aquin,” in Beiträge zur Geschichte Philosophie des Mittelalters, Band 10, Heft 1-2, Münster i. W; 1911; M. Waldmann, “Synderesis oder Syneidesis? Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Gewissen,” Theologische Quartalschrift, 119 (1938), pp. 332-371.
The Commentary on the Sentences, it is generally agreed, was written between 1253–1255, and can thus be taken as S. Thomas’s first major writing. For further details and references concerning the exact date of composition, see below, p. 58.
In 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2,a.3;In 2 Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 1.
In 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3: “sicut est de motu rerum naturalium, quod omnis motus ab immobili movente procedit.” S. Thomas cites the following sources to which he attributes this view. S. Augustine, Super Genesim, VIII, cap. xxvi, col. 391. Also Aristotle, The Physics, bks. VII and VIII.
In 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3: “cum enim ratio varietatem quamdam habeat, et quodammodo mobilis sit, secundum quod principia in conclusiones deducit, et in conferendo decipi potest… ”
In 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3: “oportet quod omnis ratio ab aliqua cognitione procedat, quae uniformitatem et quietem quamdam habeat.”
In 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3: “quod non fit per discursum investigationis, sed subito in-tellectui offertur.”
In 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3: “ita etiam oportet quod ratio practica ab aliquibus principiis per se notis deducatur ut quod est malum non esse faciendum, praeceptis Dei obediendum fore, et sic de aliis: et horum quidem habitus est synderesis.”
E. D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, London, 1960, p. 35.
In 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3: “ad determinationem cognitionis eorum sensu et memoria indigeamus.” cf. In 2 Post, cap ult. It is interesting to note that in the De Veritate, written shortly after the Commentary on the Sentences, S. Thomas points out the inferiority of human to angelic nature in the matter of intuitive knowledge; even in first principles man cannot know truth nisi a sensu accipiendo. De Ver., q. 16, a. 1. cf. la IIae, q. 51. a. 1; cited by M. B. Crowe, “The term synderesis and the Scholastics,” p. 230, f.n.
In 2 Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 1.
It is generally agreed that the Quaestio Disputata de Veritate, was written shortly after
In 2 Sent., d. 39, q. 3 a. 1.
De Ver., q. 16, a. 1.
De Ver., q. 16, a. 1.: “naturae enim ordinatae ad invicem sic se habent sicut corpora contiguata, quorum inferius in sui supremo tangit superius in sui infimo: unde et inferior natura at-tingit in sui supremo ad aliquid quod est proprium superioris naturae, imperfecte illud participans.”
De Ver., q. 16, a. 1.: “naturae enim ordinatae ad invicem sic se habent sicut corpora contiguata, quorum inferius in sui supremo tangit superius in sui infimo: unde et inferior natura at-tingit in sui supremo ad aliquid quod est proprium superioris naturae, imperfecte illud participans.”
De Ver., q. 16, a. 1.: “naturae enim ordinatae ad invicem sic se habent sicut corpora contiguata, quorum inferius in sui supremo tangit superius in sui infimo: unde et inferior natura at-tingit in sui supremo ad aliquid quod est proprium superioris naturae, imperfecte illud participans.”
De Ver., q. 16, a. 1.
De Ver., q. 16, a. 1. “Unde et in natura humana, in quantum attingit angelicam, oportet esse Cognitionem veritatis sine inquisitione et in speculativis et in practicis … Unde et hanc Cognitionem oportet homini naturaliter inesse, cum hoc quidem cognoscat quasi quoddam seminarium totius cognitionis sequentis …”
De Ver., q. 16, a. 1. “Unde et in natura humana, in quantum attingit angelicam, oportet esse Cognitionem veritatis sine inquisitione et in speculativis et in practicis … Unde et hanc Cognitionem oportet homini naturaliter inesse, cum hoc quidem cognoscat quasi quoddam seminarium totius cognitionis sequentis …”
De Ver., q. 16, a. 1. “Unde et in natura humana, in quantum attingit angelicam, oportet esse Cognitionem veritatis sine inquisitione et in speculativis et in practicis … Unde et hanc Cognitionem oportet homini naturaliter inesse, cum hoc quidem cognoscat quasi quoddam seminarium totius cognitionis sequentis …”
De Ver., q. 16, a. 1. “Unde et in natura humana, in quantum attingit angelicam, oportet esse Cognitionem veritatis sine inquisitione et in speculativis et in practicis … Unde et hanc Cognitionem oportet homini naturaliter inesse, cum hoc quidem cognoscat quasi quoddam seminarium totius cognitionis sequentis …” This is an identical point to that made in his earlier work. In 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3.
De Ver., q. 16, a. 1: “qua sunt naturalia principia iuris naturalis, qui quidem habitus ad synderesim pertinet.”
De Ver., q. 16, a. 2.
De Ver., q. 16, a. 2.
De Ver., q. 16, a. 3.
De Ver., q. 16, a. 3.
For details concerning the dates of writing of the several parts of this work see below, pp. 86-87.
Ia Pars, q. 79, a. 12.
M. B. Crowe, op. cit., pp. 244-245.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2. We note that there he reaffirms his teaching from the Commentary on the Sentences and the De Veritate. This is the distinction between propositiones per se notae quoad se et quoad nos and, propositiones per se notae quoad se.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2. We note that there he reaffirms his teaching from the Commentary on the Sentences and the De Veritate. This is the distinction between propositiones per se notae quoad se et quoad nos and, propositiones per se notae quoad se.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
It is clear from these comments that the term “analytic” has a rather relative use. It would be incorrect to regard analytic propositions as comprising a certain finite class, what is analytic for one person or group of people may not be so for another. Furthermore while in the first instance we might not see a proposition as analytic, as we come to learn more about the terms involved so we see that it is analytic.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.
E. D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, London, 1960, pp. 52–53.
F. G. Copleston, Aquinas, London, 1955, p. 223.
From our understanding of this principle it would seem more accurate to describe it as “ontological” rather than “logical”. To describe it as “logical” could lead to the mistaken belief that it is analytic, but as we indicated earlier, this is not an adequate description, because it overlooks its intimate connexion with the nature of man.
J. Maritain, Man and the State, London, 1954, p. 81.
J. Maritain, The Range of Reason, London, 1953, pp. 26–29.
In 2 Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3.
In 2 Sent., d. 29, q. 3, a. 2.
De Ver., q. 16, a. 1, ad 9.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3, ad 1.
Ia IIae, q. 100, a. 3, ad 1.
The literature on this subject is considerable, and we only attempt to draw our reader’s attention to some representative works in this field. For a contemporary outline of s. Thomas’s teaching on teleology see the following: W. Fulton, Teleology, art. Hastings En-cyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. 12, pp. 215-232; J. Buckley, Man’s Last End, S. Louis Mo., 1950; E. A. Pace, “The Teleology of S. Thomas,” The New Scholasticism, 1 (1927) pp. 213-231; and by the same author, “The Concept of Order in the Philosophy of s. Thomas,” The New Scholasticism, 2 (1928), pp. 51-72; P. Janet, Les Causes Finales, 4th ed Paris, 1901. On the doctrine of naturalis inclinatio see: G.J. Gustafson, The Theory of Natural
C. A. Dubray, Appetite, art., Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 1, p. 636.
Ia IIae, q. 8, a. 1: “Appetitus nihil aliud est, quam quaedam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid.”
In I Physic, lect. 15: “Appetitus autem omnis est propter indigentiam quia est non habiti.”
Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 1, ad 3; see also, Ia IIae, q. 40, a. 2: “Motus enim ad res pertinet proprie ad appetitum.”
G.J. Gustafson, The Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy of S. Thomas, Washington 1944, p. 69; cf. De Ver., q. 25, a. 1: “Appetitus autem potentia passiva est quia movetur ab appetibili quod est movens non motum.”
Ia Pars, q. 87, a. 4: “inclinatio autem cujuslibet rei est in ipsa per modum ejus”; cf. Ia Pars, q. 80, a. 1.
Ia Pars, q. 59, a. 1: “Omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum sed diversi-mode.”
De Ver., q. 25, a. 1.
De Ver., q. 25, a. 1. “Quia vero res naturalis in suo esse naturali determinata est; et una est ejus inclinatio ad aliquam rem determinatam…”
De Ver., q. 25, a. 1. “unde non exigitur aliqua apprehensio per quam secundum rationem appetibili-tatis distinguatur res appetibilis a non appetibili.”
Ia Pars, q. 19, a. 1, q. 59, a. 1, q. 78, a. 1, ad 3; Ia IIae, q. 26, a. 1, q. 35, a. 1; De Ver., q. 25, a. 1.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2: “Homo habet naturalem inclinationem … ad hoc quod in societate vivat … quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet conversari…”
For a discussion on S. Thomas’s distinction between the three levels of being (natural, animal or sensitive, and rational) see, Ia Pars, q. 59, a. 1. This is a distinction we will be employing again towards the end of this chapter.
G. J. Gustafson, op. cit., p. 72.
Ia Pars, q. 59, a. 1.
Ia Pars, q. 59, a. 1.
Ia Pars, q. 59, a. 1.
Ia Pars, q. 59, a. 1.
G. J. Gustafson, op. cit., p. 73. We note that here he is expounding S. Thomas’s doctrine of De Ver., q. 25, a. 1.
De Ver., q. 25, a. 1.
De Ver., q. 25, a. 1.
De Ver., q. 25, a. 1.
Summa Contra., IV, c. 19.
De Ver., q. 21, a. 1.
De Ver., q. 22, a. 2.
J. Maritain, The Range of Reason, London, 1953, p. 27.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2. cf. Ia IIae, q. 91, a.2.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2: “Inest primo homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam qua communicat cum omnibus substantiis, prout scilicet quaelibet substantia appétit conser-vationem sui esse secundum suam naturam; et secundum hanc inclinationem pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur.”
Ed. Janssens, Cours de morale générale, t. 1, Louvain, 1926, p. 222.
J. Maritain, On the Philosophy of History, London, 1959, p. 85.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2: “Secundo inest homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia, in qua communicat cum caeteris animalibus; et secundum hoc dicuntur esse de lege naturali quae natura omni animali docuit, ut est coniunctio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum et similia.”
J. Maritain, On the Philosophy of History, p. 85.
J. Maritain, On the Philosophy of History, p. 85.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 2: “Inest homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam rationis, quae est sibi propria; sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat.”
J. Maritain, On the Philosophy of History, p. 85. We note that a similar principle is suggested by other writers. V. Cathrein, Recht, Naturrecht und Positives Recht, Freiburg, 1909, p. 133; J. Dabin, Théorie générale du droit, Bruxelles, 1944, p. 421. However, we note that M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, I., Dublin, 1909, p. 609, takes a position similar to ours, for, when listing the natural inclinations possessed by man, he omits any mention of one concerned with man’s desire to know the truth about God.
J. Maritain, op. cit., p. 85.
C. Martyniak, Le fondement objectif du droit d’après saint Thomas d’Aquin, Paris, 1931, p. 97
P. Delhaye, Permanence du droit naturel, Louvain, 1960, p. 82.
H. Capitant, Introduction à l’ étude de droit civil, Paris, 1923, p. 35.
H. Rommen, The Natural Law, London, 1947, p. 220; cf. J. Dabin, La philosophie de l’ ordre juridique positif spécialement dans les rapports de droit privé, Paris, 1929, p. 289. Insofar as both writers state the same principles as being self-evident, Rommen may have used Dabin as his source.
L. Le Fur, Les grands problèmes du droit, Paris, 1937, p. 181.
V. Cathrein, Recht, Naturrecht und Positives Recht, Freiburg, 1909, p. 132.
J. Maritain, Man and the State, London, 1954, p. 81; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, Glasgow, 1958, p. 27; The Range of Reason, London, 1953, p. 27; On the Philosophy of History, London, 1959, pp. 84-85. See also, M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, I, Dublin, 1909, p. 609.
J. Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 27.
J. Maritain, The Range of Reason, p. 27.
De Veritate, q. 16, a. 3.
In V Ethic, lect. 12.
Ia IIae, q. 94, a. 4.
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Armstrong, R.A. (1966). An Examination of the Concept of “Self-Evidence” in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching. In: Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9388-7_2
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