Utilitarianism and ‘Techne’

Abstract

Although the “ordinary” utilitarianism of the early dialogues is not quite cast in the form so well presented by Glaucon and Adeimantus with justice or morality shown as undesirable in itself and valuable only for its beneficial consequences, “ordinary” utilitarianism is a plausible predecessor of the view presented by the two brothers. A concern for securing happiness and for the possession of advantageous and beneficial things by acceptable means may easily lead to preoccupation with their attainment by any possible means. The position which was widely held at the time, and was advanced by Glaucon and Adeimantus that justice is valuable only for its consequences and in fact may be inherently undesirable, has as its corollary that since it is a more effective means for winning happiness and good things, injustice done with impunity is preferable to justice. That this current and popular view of the relative merits of justice and injustice so disturbing to Socrates and his youthful companions springs from the “ordinary” utilitarianism of the early dialogues is obvious from its linkage of arete with happiness and good consequences. Should emphasis rest on the consequences of arete rather than on arete or justice itself, as is natural, then the means become relatively unimportant. The prime consideration is to secure the desired ends. If unjust actions are more effective agents than just actions for attaining such beneficial and desirable consequences, and are accompanied by impunity, then they should be adopted. Justice is worthwhile only because of the esteem and reputation its possession wins from the gods and men. The culmination of this inordinate enthusiasm for beneficial consequences is the egoistic voluntarism of Thrasymachus and Callicles.