Abstract
I shall conclude by way of bringing out important points of similarity between Peirce’s and Lewis’s theories of induction, discussing briefly the significances of Peirce’s and Lewis’s arguments in their theories of induction, suggesting the framework for a comprehensive theory of justifying induction, and finally, exhibiting the relevant bearings of this theory upon the contemporary efforts to justify induction as indicated in the Introduction.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
In a sense, those specific criteria, suggested by Lewis, are also general in character, because more specific criteria could be always formulated upon considerations of the nature of each specific inductive problem and the nature of the purpose which we want to serve in solving a specific inductive problem.
Lewis says, “The validation of empirical belief has two dimensions or directions of its import, its verification and its justification; the determination of it as true and the determination of it as rationally credible. Cognitive evaluation of our assertion, or an assertive state of mind looks to the truth of what is asserted, but also it looks to the warrant or ground of the belief.” An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, 254.
Cf. John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, New York, 1938, 154, 172, 195, 262, 329.
The generality of the skeptical questions can be recaptured in the following formulation: If any valid induction is made, what makes it in general valid or rationally credible ? Why is any empirical generalization true? Whereas the generality of the answers to these questions can be expressed in the statement that induction is a form of inference capable of logical validation and it is contrary to our notions of rational credibility and reality that empirical generalizations are in general rationally untrustworthy for characterizing the real.
We may consider a specific problem of justifying induction not only as that of ascertaining the rational credibility of specific inductive conclusions in a certain field of inquiry, but as one of ascertaining the rational credibility of a system of specific concepts which is proposed as a systematic interpretation of experiences in a certain area. In this latter case, it is obvious that the specific problem of justifying induction involves not only ascertaining the rational credibility of such a system of specific concepts in relation to experience in the given area, but explaining how this system is superior to other alternative systems under considerations of simplicity and comprehensiveness.
Avoiding propositions, this logical schemata can be interpreted as meaning that if φ is true of some statement p, then another statement c can be always formulated such that ψ is true of c and hiprob is true of both p and c. Similar interpretations can be made for the logical schemata (2), (3), and (4).
See W. V. O. Quine, Method of Logic, 160-161. 178
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1969 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cheng, CY. (1969). Conclusion. In: Peirce’s and Lewis’s Theories of Induction. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9367-2_16
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9367-2_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8598-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9367-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive