Toward a General Theory of Morality

Abstract

What I should like to do in this last chapter is to give a brief, and quite cursory sketch of a general theory of morality, based on the conclusions that I reached in Chapter VII. In addition, I should like to discuss further a few scattered points that I raised at various times earlier in the book, but did not then treat fully. The argument of the chapter, consequently, will be diffuse rather than precise and general rather than detailed. My object will be served, however, if I am able to indicate the main lines that I believe a satisfactory theory of the moral life must follow. To develop such a theory from the conclusions I reached in the last chapter. I shall attempt to do the following: (1) Derive a positive theory of moral obligation from the negative one I have already elaborated and (2) justify certain practical qualifications in the extreme position on moral obligation that my theory seems to imply. I shall take up these two tasks first.