Abstract
In the last chapter of The Place of Reason in Ethics Toulmin gives the following summary statement of his conclusions:
“Of course, ‘This practice would involve the least conflict of interests attainable under the circumstances’ does not mean the same as ‘This would be the right practice’; nor does ‘This way of life would be more harmoniously satisfying’ mean the same as This would be better.’ But in each case, the first statement is a good reason for the second: the ‘ethically neutral’ fact is a good reason for the ‘gerundive’ moral judgment. If the adoption of the practice would genuinely reduce conflicts of interest, it is a practice worthy of adoption, and if the way of life would genuinely lead to a deeper and more consistent happiness, it is one worthy of pursuit. And this seems so natural and intelligible, when one bears in mind the function of ethical judgments, that, if anyone asks me why they are ‘good reasons,’ I can only reply by asking in return ‘What better kinds of reason could you want?”1
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References
S. E. Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 224.
C. D. Broad, “Review of Toulmin: An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics,” Mind, N.S.—61 (1952), 94, 93.
S. E. Toulmin, op. cit., p. 137 and sqq.
In his explanation of the logic of scientific reasoning, which he holds to be analogous, in its structure, to ethical reasoning, Toulmin explicitly includes this step in his account, maintaining that the function of scientific theories (reasons or explanations) is to predict our future experiences and that a good theory is one that succeeds in fulfilling this function. Cf. ibid., Chapter 7, esp. pp. 88, 95, and 101. However, this does not provide the logically final reason, either in science or in ethics, for calling a theory or reason good.
Ibid., p. 223. Italics mine. If we assume that Toulmin means by “happy” decisions those that will further the “harmonious satisfaction of desires and interests,” it is clear that the argument of this passage implies the step that I have inserted into his argument above, that a good reason in ethics is one that fulfils successfully the function for which such reasons are given.3 Cf. ibid., pp. 137, 142-143, and 149-150.
Ibid., pp. 160-161. It should be noted that Toulmin’s summary statement here is descriptive throughout and that he explicitly disavows the formulation of an explanatory theory. His statement, in the second paragraph, “This description has led us to see how… good reasoning is (italics mine) distinguished from bad…” is critical to his theory. It implies that for him a good reason in ethics is one that is, in practice, generally accepted as a good reason.
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 124.
S. E. Toulmin, op. cit., p. 165, n. 2.
Ibid., p. 71.
Ibid., p. 144. Italics mine.
Ibid., pp. 194-195.
S. E. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, 1958). Most of the exposition that follows will be based on this book; however I shall not footnote my references to it in any detail.
Cf. ibid., pp. 174-176, 217-223, and 232-235.
R. M. Hare, “Review of An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics” The Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1951), 374.
P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Oxford, 1957), pp. 7–8.
Cf. ibid., pp. 32-33, 200, and 225.
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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Johnson, O.A. (1966). Duty and Ordinary Language. In: Moral Knowledge. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9317-7_5
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