Abstract
The two foregoing chapters have prepared the way for our positive contention that there are many irreducible principles of obligation which are not principles of absolute obligation. So far, only the negative aspect of the case for postulating prima facie duties has been considered. These considerations lend support to a theory of prima facie duties in two ways. They dispose of rival theories, and in so doing, they suggest that a theory of the kind outlined by Richard Price in A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, and, in this century, by W. D. Ross in The Right and the Good and Foundations of Ethics might satisfactorily explain why we have the duties we have. That is to say, negative arguments against the theories of Aquinas, Kant and the utilitarians create a strong positive presumption in favour of such a theory. An examination of the morals facts at our disposal gives us all the positive support that is needed.
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References
The use, and apparently effective use (if the number of times it is used is any guide) of the radio commercial ‘Why deny yourself?’ to advertise luxuries in Australia, is possibly indicative of a substantial change in belief in this area.
For example, for reasons such as I have indicated in “God and Evil”, Philosophical Quarterly, 10, 1960, pp. 97-114, and “The Problem of Evil” Journal of Bible and Religion, XXX, 1962, pp. 187-197.
In “Self and Others: A Defence of Altruism” (Philosophical Quarterly, 4, 1954, pp. 109-127) W. G. Maclagan offers a number of important considerations against the contention that there can be a duty to promote one’s own happiness. Any attempt to set out a detailed reply would take us far afield into a discussion of rights. However, as above, I should suggest that the case for claiming the duty to promote one’s own happiness is that it is part of the general duty to promote good. Where the good which can be promoted is one’s own rationality, rational belief, knowledge, or self-perfection, there is no paradox in asserting a duty to promote the good; and where one’s possession or enjoyment of such goods clashes with others’ possession or enjoyment of them, strict impartiality between one’s self and others in weighing the claims of our and their enjoyment is judged to be the morally proper course.
See W. G. Maclagan: “Respect for Persons as a Moral Principle”, Philosophy, XXXV, 1960, pp. 193–217, 289-305.
Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959, p. 109.
See my discussion of this issue in “Ross and the Concept of a Prima Facie Duty”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41, 1963, pp. 336–345.
The four accounts are: (i) Prima facie duties, by contrast with absolute duties, may be indicated by universal principles which admit of no exception, and which may be directly apprehended by intuitive insight. (Foundations of Ethics, pp. 85, 86, 134, 144-5, 315; The Right and the Good, p. 30). (ii) Prima facie ought implies can, hence prima facie duties cannot be intuited. (Foundations of Ethics, pp. 109, 161). (iii) Prima facie duties are all those duties which we weigh up in conflict of duty situations. (Foundations of Ethics, p. 136). (iv) Vaguely suggested in places is the view that prima facie ought implies can and can know. The latter two are lapses rather than considered views, although (iii) which in effect includes derivative duties as prima facie duties represents a widespread usage among those who speak of prima facie duties.
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© 1969 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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McCloskey, H.J. (1969). A Positive Approach: Prima Facie Duties. In: Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9299-6_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9299-6_9
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