Abstract
There have been persistent attempts during the history of ethics to explain all valuation and all obligation in terms of one basic source. Many such theories are basically meta-ethical theories which suggest that all concepts can be explained in terms of and reduced to one concept, and that to a natural phenomenon. It has been argued in Part A that such meta-theories are mistaken. However, monistic theories can be advanced purely as normative theories. It is impossible here to consider all the actual and logically possible monistic normative theories, and I shall, accordingly, confine my attention to the most important of them, namely, the utilitarian theories. Here I shall be concerned to argue that whilst utilitarianism can be and has been stated as a simple, straightforward monistic theory, in fact it has come to be modified and restated in ways which make it a pluralistic theory, and this in order to avoid difficulties encountered by the simple monistic version.
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References
“Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism”, Philosophical Quarterly, 6, 1956, p. 346.
“Interpretations of Mill’s ‘Utilitarianism’”, Philosophical Quarterly, 6, 1956, pp. 118–9.
Principia Ethica: Cambridge, C.U.P., 1903: pp. 162-4. (Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press).
“An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism”, The Philosophical Review, LXVI, 1957, pp. 466–485.
See my “A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment”, Inquiry, 8, 1965, pp. 249–263. A very carefully and thoughtfully argued utilitarian reply to such examples has been set out by T. L. S. Sprigge in “A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey”, (Inquiry, 8, 1965, pp. 264-291). My reply to Sprigge’s arguments is set out in “Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment”, Journal of Philosophy, LXIV, 1967, pp. 91-110. Sprigge argues that it is less often the case that the utilitarian is committed to unjust punishment than my discussion and my examples suggest, but he acknowledges that utilitarianism may dictate the infliction of unjust punishment. He suggests that when this is so, the punishment is morally justified, even though we may regret its necessity. In reply I have argued that if we consider possible and actual examples of useful, unjust punishment, e.g. of a person wrongly believed to be a responsible, free moral agent, it is evident that it is not the case that such punishment is usually morally justified. On the contrary, much such punishment is morally abhorrent to us, and where it is practised, we regard it as a social and political evil which should be eradicated. It is at least in part because we are concerned with justice in punishment, that so many of us are concerned to inculcate into the community at large an understanding of what constitutes free conduct for which the person can properly be held to be answerable. The widespread campaign to have alcoholism treated as a form of sickness and not as a crime, is part of this endeavour. It is hoped that by so educating the general public, the demand for punishment which is unjust (although often useful) will weaken or even cease.
“The Complexity of the Concepts of Punishment”, Philosophy, XXXVII, 1962, pp. 307–325.
See my note: “ ‘Suppose Everyone Did The Same?’ — A Note”, Mind, LXXV, 1966, pp. 432–3.
Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 1.
“Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism”, Philosophical Quarterly, 6, 1965, p. 353. See also Smart’s An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1961.
The Methods of Ethics, Bk. IV, ch. iv, 7th Edition, p. 467.
The rich variety of utilitarian, and in particular, of rule utilitarian theories which could be devised by ingenious and imaginative utilitarians is suggested by Brandt in his “Towards a Credible Form of Utilitarianism” (Chapter 4 of Morality and the Language of Conduct, edited Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1963). Brandt’s final version runs: “An act is right if and only if it conforms with that learnable set of rules the recognition of which as morally binding — roughly at the time of the act — by everyone in the society of the agent, except for the retention by individuals of already formed and decided moral convictions, would maximize intrinsic value.” (p. 139) Such a theory would have to be placed as a synthesis of the moral principles and rule-in-practice versions of rule utilitarianism distinguished above.
pp. 130-6.
Ethics, pp. 230 ff.
The Place of Reason in Ethics, Cambridge, C.U.P. Press, 1950, pp. 150-1.
See J. J. C. Smart: “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism”: Philosophical Quarterly 6, 1956, pp. 344–354.
“Interpretations of Mill’s ‘Utilitarianism’”, Philosophical Quarterly, 6, 1956, p. 119.
See J. Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules”, Philosophical Review, LXIV, 1955, pp. 3–32.
See “The Complexity of the Concepts of Punishment”, Philosophy, XXXVII, 1962, pp. 307–325, “A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment”, Inquiry, 8, 1965, and “Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment”, Journal of Philosophy, LXVI, 1967, pp. 91-110.
For a discussion of further difficulties of this theory see my article “An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism”, Philosophical Review, LXVI, 1957, pp. 466–485.
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© 1969 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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McCloskey, H.J. (1969). Monistic Theories of Absolute Obligation: Utilitarianism. In: Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9299-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9299-6_7
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