Motives and Consequences

Abstract

It is not difficult to illustrate the obvious fact that a consideration of motives and consequences does play a very important role in making moral decisions. In all the preceding pages there has been a constant appeal to consequences and occasionally to motives. In judging, for example, whether it was right to expose the abortionist consideration was given to the effect of exposure on the various people involved. In arguing whether or not it is right to lie, extensive appeals were made to consequences. If one tries to decide whether or not a person who said something false was lying, his motives would be carefully examined. Suppose, for example, Mr. A in New York tells Mr. B in Philadelphia, “It is snowing in Boston.” Mr. B, who has just spoken to Mr. C in Boston, replies, “It is not. You are lying.” Mr. A in all probability might be indignant and could say, “Perhaps what I said is false. But I did not lie. I did not intend to deceive you or mislead you by deliberately falsifying what is the case.” Mr. B might argue in this fashion: “Anyone who tells an untruth is lying. Whether or not your motive was to deceive, you did tell an untruth. Therefore, you are lying.”