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Negation, Conjunction, and Events

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Logic and the Nature of Reality

Abstract

I am now confronted with another problem. If it is granted that “there are events (whatever their ontological status)” is indubitable, I think it will also be conceded that we never find unrelated events. So although the ultimate metaphysical unit is symbolized by the expression ‘fx’, we never do find ‘fx’ alone and we should be tempted to conclude that we never accost a simple event. From the point of view of experience of whatever kind, we must, I believe, admit that we never experience a simple, isolated event but always interrelated or connected ones and hence any language should mirror (or symbolize) this. Something else is beginning to be evident. The metaphysical language seems to be an interpretation of logic; or conversely, logic, as a language, seems so far to be the symbolization of a non-symbolic informal metaphysical language. If what I am doing is correct so far, the discussion over the question “does logic involve ontology in any way?” would seem at long last to give promise of being terminated by demonstrating not only that it does but how it does it. But let us not involve ourselves here in this dispute.

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References

  1. Cf. P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1935 ), pp 79–82.

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  2. Cf. A. J. Ayer, “Negation,” Journal of Philosophy. XLIX, 26, 1952.

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  3. For example by Richard Taylor, “Negative Things,” Journal of Philosophy, XLIX, 13, 433 ff., June 19, 1952.

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  4. G. Frege, “Negation” in Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege ed. P. Geach and M. Black (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952 ), pp. 117 ff.

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© 1956 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Kattsoff, L.O. (1956). Negation, Conjunction, and Events. In: Logic and the Nature of Reality. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9282-8_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9282-8_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8533-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-9282-8

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