Phenomenology and the Natural Attitude

Abstract

At first glance it would appear that Husserlian phenomenology and ordinary language analysis have little in common. At second glance, however, it seems that these positions are so violently opposed to each other that their representatives do not even share a universe of discourse. In a recent and provocative article entitled “Is There a World of Ordinary Language ?,”¹ John Wild has taken a third glance at these rivals and has come forth with the suggestion that there are some fundamental points of contact between them, that, in fact, they have a good deal in common. I wish to take some of his remarks as a point of departure for considering the relationship between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The focus for discussion will be Husserl’s conception of the “natural attitude,” the fundamental belief in the existence and validity of our common sense experience. The point is to clarify what I take to be the differences that set apart the philosophical enterprises being carried on by analysts and phenomenologists. Such a clarification is the necessary condition for meaningful contact between what is happening now in Anglo-American philosophy and what is happening on the Continent.