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Changed Setting: Law and Politics of the New Danube Commission

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Law and Politics of the Danube
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Abstract

The Belgrade Conference opened an entirely new chapter in the history of the Danube. It repudiated the century-old idea of internationalization — that is, freedom of navigation on a basis of equality for riparians and nonriparians alike — and subsituted the Soviet concept of free navigation which meant navigation under the exclusive control of riparians, most of which were themselves ruled by Russia. On a purely formal level, the Conference adopted a Soviet-inspired Convention clearly reflective of the fundamental changes which had occurred in the balance of power and patterns of East European effective control to Russia’s thorough advantage in the wake of the Second World War.

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References

  1. U.S.S.R. Information Bul., VIII, September 8, 1948, p. 525.

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  2. Finally, the note stressed that, in view of the Soviet-dominated joint companies which exercised exclusive control of facilities essential to Danube shipping, the Convention was clearly designed to enable the Soviet Union to maintain a monopoly on Danubian commerce. Hence the United States could not recognize the authority of the Danube Commission over any part of the river. The Soviet Government rejected the Western protests and reiterated its view that the Danube Convention of 1948 eliminated the injustices of the past and established the jurisdiction of the riparian states. Dept. St. Bul., XXI, November 28, 1941, p. 832; Current Developments in U.S. Foreign Policy, III, November 1949, pp. 34-35; ibid., March 1950, p. 37.

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  3. The meager quasi-legislative powers of the new Danube Commission seem essentially limited to the unification of regulations governing river traffic and river inspection. The preponderance in Article 8 of the Belgrade Convention of such terms as “prepare,” “consult,” “make recommendations,” “co-ordinate” and “publish” in connection with the Commission’s statutorily assigned functions appears sufficiently to reveal its advisory character. In contradistinction, Articles 11-17 of the Paris Convention of 1921, establishing the Definitive Statute of the Danube, gave sweeping powers to the International Commission to draw up and supervise a program of works for the improvement of navigation.

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  4. U.N., Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Europe, Summary Record, 4th sess., 13th mtg., May 16, 1949, doc. E-ECE-SR. 4-13, May 30, 1949, pp. 21–22.

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  5. Recent works discussing developments after the Belgrade Conference, include: B. Carantino, “Autour de la 5me session de la Conférence danubienne.” Revue politique et parlementaire, LIV, April–June 1952, pp. 169–176; D. T. Cattell, “The Politics of the Danube Commission Under Soviet Control,” Am. Slavic and East European Rev., XIX, October 1960, pp. 380-394; N. G. Fandikov, Mezhdunarodno-pravovoi rezhim Dunaia, Moscow, 1955; F. Fillitz, “Die Donauschiffahrt vom Einst zum Jetzt,” Donauraum, II, No. 3-4, 1957, pp. 164-175; F. Gschnitzer, “Die Donau, ein ungelöstes europäisches Problem,” Österreichische Monatshefte, VIII, July-August, 1952, pp. 385-396; P. Haeseler, “Die internationale Rechtsregelung des Donauverkehrs,” österreichische Ost-Hefte, II, July 1960, pp. 251-257; V. D. Logunov, Sovremennyi mezhdunarodnopravovoi rezhim Dunaia, Moscow, 1958; H. Miehsler, “Die Donau im Völkerrecht,” Donauraum, II, No. 3-4, 1957, pp. 176-187; H. A. Smith, “The Danube,” Yearbook of World Affairs, IV, 1950, pp. 191-212; S. C. Stolte, “Moscow Regulates Traffic on the Danube,” Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. Bul., VII, May 1960, pp. 21-29; L. Tončič-Sorinj, “Probleme der Internationalisierung der Donau,” Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa, VIII, April-May, 1959, pp. 47-52; K. Wessely, “Probleme des Donauverkehrs unter dem neuen Statut,” Wirtschaftsdienst, XXX, May 1950, pp. 28-36. Further articles on recent developments affecting the Danube may also be found in issues of Donauraum, Internationales Archiv für Verkehrswesen, Review of International Affairs, Revue de la navigation intérieure et rhénane, Schiffahrt und Weltverkehr, Strom und See, Südosteuropa-Jahrbuch, Transport, Verkehr, Volkswirt, and Zeitschrift für Binnenschiffahrt.

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  6. Manifestations of the communist split in matters of river navigation were already apparent prior to the first session of the Danube Commission. In a note dated October 15, 1949, Yugoslavia charged that, upon orders of the Rumanian Government, the agencies of the Yugoslav State River Shipping Company at Giurgiu and Braila, which had existed in Rumania continuously since 1925, were forced to close and their officials were expelled. The permanent Yugoslav delegates to the Provisional Committee of the Iron Gates Administration were so hampered in their work that they had to move from Rumanian to Yugoslavian territory. As pointed out in the note, the Rumanian methods against Yugoslavian citizens and officials, which included such actions as unlawful seizure, arrest and search, had never before been applied among the riparian states in navigation along the Danube. See Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter F. P. R. Y.), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book, Belgrade, 1951, pp. 341-342.

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  7. The proceedings of the Danube Commission are published in Russian and French, the two official and working languages of the Commission. For the French version, see Procès-Verbaux de la Commission du Danube, published from 1949 to 1953 in Galatz and since 1954 in Budapest. (Hereafter cited as Procès-Verbaux; the occasionally quoted English phrases are my translations.) The full and true nature of the proceedings put out during the Cominform-Yugoslav dispute has been subject to question. According to a Yugoslav source, the minutes were disorderly and failed to record opposing views. See Review of International Affairs, IV, July 1, 1953, p. 13.

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  8. The Yugoslav proposal for a secret ballot was rejected by a vote of 5 to 1. Procès-Verbaux. I, pp. 157, 164, 230.

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  9. Yugoslavia cast its vote against the election of the Rumanian President, but abstained from voting in connection with the elections of the Vice-President and the Secretary. Ibid., I. pp. 157ff.

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  10. The Yugoslav draft of the rules of procedure was rejected as a basis for discussion by a vote of 5 to 1. The negative vote of Yugoslavia came to be a recurrent pattern during the Tito-Cominform rift. For a discussion and text of the Yugoslav draft, see ibid., I, pp. 164. 189ff., 230ff.

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  11. For texts of the Soviet draft of the rules of procedure and rejected Yugoslav amendments, see ibid., I, pp. 225ff., 244ff.

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  12. Under the Rules of Procedure, the President and the Vice-President exercised only certain symbolic functions. Rule 12, for instance, provided that correspondence with governments and international organizations was to be signed by the President or Vice-President and the Secretary, whereas correspondence with other authorities and institutions was to be signed by the Secretary or a person authorized by him. A Yugoslav proposal, by which the President would have directed the work of the Commission with the aid of the Secretary, was rejected. For a discussion and text of the Rules of Procedure, see ibid., I, pp. 214ff., 230ff.

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  13. See Rules 2, 4 and 5 of the Statute. For texts of the Statute, the Soviet draft statute and a Yugoslav amendment which unsuccessfully proposed the creation of a drafting committee composed of representatives of each of the six member states, see ibid., I, pp. 172, 219ff., 239ff., 248ff.

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  14. If the Secretary was temporarily unable to exercise his functions, he was to be replaced by his deputy, that is, another member of his delegation; but if the President and Vice-President were unable to exercise their functions, the Secretary had to take over and not alternates in their delegations. See Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure.

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  15. While the rejected Yugoslav draft allowed each member to demand information regarding the work of the Commission at any time, the adopted Rules of Procedure had no such provision. Similarly, the latter made no provision for standing subcommittees with equal representation, but only for ad hoc working groups to be appointed by the Commission or, in case of urgency, by the President and the Secretary “from among its members.” See Rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure and the discussion of it, ibid., I, pp. 163, 183, 215, 231.

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  16. Ibid., I, pp. 189-191.

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  17. Ibid., I, pp. 195ff.

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  18. Ibid., II, pp. 131, 168, 199.

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  19. Ibid., II, p. 118.

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  20. Among the items discussed were the budget and the importance of improvement of navigation in the Gabcikovo-Gönyü sector. In regard to the latter, the Commission charged its Services to determine the extent of hydrotechnical works which were necessary. The Commission also decided to call upon the Secretary to determine the fate of the property of the International Danube Commission and authorized him to take possession of such property and reclaim it, if necessary. A Yugoslav proposal for an equal distribution of jobs in the organization’s apparatus among the members, taking into consideration the importance of the job, was defeated. See ibid., II, pp. 131-132, 147ff., 184ff., 189, 190.

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  21. Ibid., III, pp. 219-220, 235.

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  22. Ibid., III, pp. 224-226.

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  23. Yugoslavia objected to the establishment, in violation of the express provisions of the Convention and without prior discussion, of a special river administration over the Rajka-Gönyü sector along the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border, which was twice as large as the Gabcikovo-Gönyü sector for which administration was providedin the Convention. Yugoslavia charged that, by setting up this administration, the Commission was exceeding its authority and competence. Ibid., III, pp. 247-248, 253.

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  24. Yugoslavia was not only excluded from the posts of President, Vice-President and Secretary, but also from 13 other directing posts in the Secretariat and Services of the Commission. She was only offered the minor posts of an assistant controller, an engineer, a lawyer and a statistician. Ibid., III, pp. 221-222; VII, pp. 290, 303, 344ff.

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  25. Perhaps the most intimidating were the military maneuvers held by the Soviets in the spring of 1950 in the Austrian sector of the waterway. Yugoslavia strongly objected to these war exercises since they made navigation virtually impossible and as such were in violation of Articles 1 and 2 of the Belgrade Convention which guaranteed free and open navigation on the Danube. Yugoslavia also noted that, although Article 26 of the Convention provided for non-discrimination in customs, health and police procedures, the Russian military authorities were unduly delaying Yugoslav vessels passing through the Soviet sector of the Danube in Austria. The Russian reply to these allegations simply stated that the Soviet commandants had every right to proceed as they did since they acted in their capacity as occupation authorities. For texts of Yugoslavia’s protest notes of June 8 and June 13, 1950, and the Soviet reply of August 22, 1950, as well as subsequent exchanges, see F. P. R. Y., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., supra note 6, pp. 336, 337-338, 358-359.

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  26. The basic regulations were discussed by a working group prior to the fourth session of the Commission. For texts of the working group’s report and the draft of basic regulations governing navigation on the Danube, see Procès-Verbaux, IV, pp. 291ff., 346ff.

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  27. For a text of the adopted Basic Regulations Governing Navigation on the Danube, see ibid., IV, pp. 305ff.

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  28. Ibid., IV, p. 308.

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  29. Ibid., IV, pp. 308ff.

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  30. Ibid., IV, pp. 361ff.

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  31. Review of International Affairs, III, January 2, 1952, p. 10.

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  32. Procès-Verbaux, IV, pp. 218, 262.

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  33. The new regulations were to serve as a guide for the drafting of national laws governing navigation on the Danube. Ibid., IV, pp. 262, 304.

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  34. The Yugoslav note of August 23, 1951, contended that the Basic Regulations were contrary to the Danube Convention of 1948 insofar as they gave the Soviet Union control over the river in violation of the sovereign rights of the riparian countries. Current Developments in U.S. Foreign Policy, V, September 1951, p. 26.

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  35. Carantino, op. cit., pp. 169, 174.

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  36. It came up in connection with the discussion of the draft regulations on river supervision prepared by the Soviet-controlled Secretariat. For texts of the draft and proposed amendments, see Procès-Verbaux, V, pp. 369ff.

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  37. Yugoslavia, for instance, objected to a proposal which would have limited the riparian country’s right to investigate accidents to such cases where “material damage” occurred, pointing out that damage could arise as a result of criminal action without simultaneous material losses being suffered by the country in question. The eventually adopted regulations (Arts. 17 and 18) made no reference to “material damage” but simply to “damage.” Ibid., V, pp. 279ff., 357ff.

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  38. A Yugoslav amendment embodying such clarification was defeated by the usual 5 to 1 vote. Ibid., V, pp. 279, 372.

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  39. The Regulations on River Supervision on the Danube were adopted by a vote of 5 to 1. Ibid., V, pp. 282, 356-357.

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  40. Ibid., V, pp. 273, 276.

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  41. New York Times, June 15, 1952, p. 5. Certain economic restrictions governing the Danube, however, continued to remain in effect. See Gazette of the Allied Commission for Austria, April 1953, pp. 10, 19.

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  42. Procès-Verbaux, VI, pp. 389ff., 407.

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  43. Ibid., VI, p. 382.

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  44. In the face of this opposition, the Yugoslav delegate bitterly remarked that the Danube Commission during its short-lived existence had not been an organization of all Danubian countries, but one which served the purposes of a single member of the Commission. He felt that the majority preferred to postpone discussion of the Yugoslav draft for an indefinite period since it was difficult openly to oppose the democratic principles and, especially, the principle of peaceful collaboration among the Danubian countries, upon which the proposal was based. Ibid., VII, pp. 276, 278.

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  45. In connection with the Secretariat’s report on the Commission’s accomplishments, the Yugoslav representative pointed out that the Secretariat had no right to comment on or defend the rules of procedure as it did in the report since it knew that not all the members of the Commission agreed with the statement that the Rules of Procedure had “by and large proved themselves just.” Ibid., VII, pp. 288, 465ff.

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  46. In 1950 Yugoslavia paid only an advance sum of 176, 700 rubles out of its allotted budgetary share of 540, 000 rubles. With the additional assessments of 100, 000 and 150, 000 rubles for 1951 and 1952 respectively, which Yugoslavia refused to pay, the total Yugoslav debt at the time of the seventh session (end of 1952) amounted to 613, 300 rubles. Yugoslavia regarded these financial obligations as too excessive and, as in the course of the fifth session, she sought again to justify her nonpayment on the ground that her rights and obligations were inseparable. She was willing to settle the matter of finances as soon as the other members of the Commission changed their attitude toward her justified demand for equal participation in the management of the Commission. The position of the Soviet bloc toward Yugoslavia’s nonpayment was summed up by the Hungarian delegate who stated that the Yugoslav representative was haunted by the phantom of discrimination against his country. Subsequently the Commission found Belgrade’s explanation unsatisfactory and declared that the nonpayment of her dues constituted a violation of the Convention of 1948. Ibid., VII, pp. 290, 293, 327, 329, 482, 498.

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  47. Yugoslavia accused the Soviet bloc of open discrimination against her since she was offered only four minor posts. The accusation, however, did not prevent the Commission from once more ignoring Yugoslavia and electing a Soviet Secretary, a Rumanian President and a Hungarian Vice-President. Ibid., VII, pp. 290, 303, 344ff.

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  48. The Commission considered a controversial motion by Rumania to censure Yugoslavia for the “unilateral” measures it took in the Iron Gates sector. On October 5, 1945, Rumania and Yugoslavia had set up a Provisional Committee for the joint administration of the Iron Gates sector of the river which forms a boundary between the two countries. The Committee had agreed to pay Yugoslavia 70,000 Swiss francs a year in return for the use of locomotive traction installations much the same way as when the old International Commission was in charge. In October 1952, however, Yugoslavia took over the traction facilities as a retaliation against Rumania’s failure to pay the agreed annual rent and declared that when a party to a contract failed to meet its obligations, it relinquished its right to demand fulfillment of the contract from the other party. Despite these Yugoslav representations, the Commission condemned the “unilateral” and “illegal” actions of Yugoslav authorities and demanded that Belgrade refrain from interfering with normal navigation on the river and respect the provisions of the Danube Convention. Ibid., VII, pp. 356ff., 367ff., 388ff., 416, 503; F.P.R.Y., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 341.

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  49. The Commission took no action on the Yugoslav charge that Rumania was obstructing navigation on the Danube. Procès-Verbaux, VII, pp. 423ff.

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  50. Ibid., VII, p. 303.

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  51. Under the agreement, a permanent administrative body, composed equally of Yugoslavs and Rumanians, was set up for the narrow gorge between the two countries through which the Danube shipping must be towed by land locomotive or barge. The administration has its own budget and establishes its own rules of procedure. New York Times, May 15, 1953, p. l;June 1, 1953, p. 5.

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  52. The Austro-Hungarian agreement was signed in Budapest on May 15, 1953. Keesing, Contemporary Archives, August 15-22, 1953, p. 13086.

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  53. Ibid.

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  54. The Special Committee met in Bucharest from June 8-24, 1953. For a text of the Special Committee’s recommendations, see Procès-Verbaux, VIII, pp. 365ff.

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  55. For a text of the Yugoslav draft, see ibid., VI, p. 389. A brief appraisal of the draft may be found in the Review of International Affairs, IV, July 1, 1953, pp. 13ff.

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  56. Procès-Verbaux, VIII, pp. 259, 267, 271. The revised rules provided for the election of the Commission’s President, Vice-President and Secretary by secret ballot and simple majority vote and stipulated that, in proposing candidates for these three posts, the Commission be led by the consideration that a representative of each state have the opportunity to occupy one of these posts at least once during “three periods of three years” (Rules 6 and 7). Under the new rules, the Secretary, jointly with the President, was empowered to exercise general direction over the affairs of the Commission, oversee and regulate the work of the Secretariat and the Services and sign the proceedings in the name of the Commission (Rules 8 and 10). The Secretariat and the Services were to be headed by a Director who was personally responsible for his work to the Commission (Rule 38). All personnel of the Commission was to be recruited, insofar as possible on the basis of equality considering the number and importance of the positions, from among the citizens of the member states which the latter placed at the disposal of the Commission (Rule 40). Ibid., VIII, pp. 377ff., 381ff.

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  57. Ibid., VIII, p. 364.

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  58. Ibid., IX, pp. 205, 207, 257.

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  59. At the same time, a Hungarian President and a Bulgarian Vice-President were also elected. Ibid., IX, p. 211.

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  60. Under the new rules relating to the organization of the Secretariat and Services of the Danube Commission, the number of administrative sections in these organs was reduced from eleven to six. The Director, the two assistant-directors and the chiefs of sections of the Secretariat and Services were to be appointed by the Commission. Vacant posts were to be filled by the President and Secretary of the Commission in consultation with the Director, bearing in mind the requirement, already incorporated in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure by the eighth session, to affect a fair distribution of appointments among all member countries from the viewpoint of number and importance of the posts. Ibid., IX, pp. 193, 252ff.

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  61. While earlier Yugoslav proposals had been voted down, at the ninth session, upon motion of the Hungarian representative, the Commission unanimously decided to move the headquarters from Galatz to the more centrally located Budapest. Ibid., IX, pp. 199, 204, 256.

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  62. Apart from the Austro-Hungarian agreement already mentioned, other agreements were concluded with Austria by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania in 1953, 1954 and 1955. They were essentially similar, providing for the reciprocal use of the river and harbor facilities and the mutual establishment of shipping and import agencies in the territories of the contracting parties. Austria also concluded a Treaty of Trade and Navigation on October 17, 1955, with the U.S.S.R. and the whole series was culminated on June 14, 1957, when agreement was reached between the Soviet Union and Austria concerning the settlement of technical and commercial questions relating to navigation on the Danube. The latter agreement provided for most-favored-nation treatment in all matters relating to merchant shipping on the Danube. West Germany also entered into agreements with the communist states (e.g., with Russia on April 25, 1958), however, in her case, they were mostly concluded as part of general trade agreements. See U.M. Treaty Series, CCXL, 1956, p. 289; CCLXXXV, 1958, p. 169; CCCLXII, 1959, p. 119; CCCXLVI, 1959, p. 71; The Times (London), November 12, 1954, p. 6; May 16, 1955, p. 6; July 4, 1955, p. 8. Various bilateral accords were also signed between the satellite states themselves. The most important was the Agreement of December 5, 1953, between the Soviet Union and Rumania which, in conformity with Article 20 of the Danube Convention, provided for the establishment of a Special Fluvial Administration to affectuate hydrotechnical works and regulate navigation on the Lower Danube from the mouth of the Sulina Channel to Braila. The Administration began to function in July 1954 and was, by the subsequent Agreement of July 18, 1957, turned over by Russia to Rumania. See Procès-Verbaux, XI, pp. 175-176; XIII, p. 331; Logunov, op. cit., p. 104. For another agreement on Danubian navigation, concluded between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on April 19, 1957, see U.M. Treaty Series, CCCXLIX, 1960, p. 3.

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  63. For example, the ships of both West Germany and France were given permission to travel over the Soviet-occupied section of the Danube prior to the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. Other concessions included the liquidation of the joint navigation companies by the Soviet Union which turned over its shares to the national shipping companies. See New York Times, April 29, 1955, p. 1; infra, Chapter V, fn. 72.

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  64. Article 31 of the Austrian State Treaty made navigation on the Danube free and open to all nations. For references, consult infra, Chapter V, fn. 51.

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  65. At the tenth (June 8-15, 1954), eleventh (December 8-15, 1954) and twelfth (June 8-13, 1955) sessions, the Hungarian President praised the full and good collaboration among all members of the Commission and referred to the improved international climate which created an atmosphere favorable to the improvement of navigation conditions. Despite the announced cooperation, it was reported that in 1956 another permanent Danube Commission was set up by the Soviet-controlled Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to draft measures for the increased utilization of the Danube for power, irrigation and navigation. Belgrade viewed this Commission as a rival to the official Danube Commission. Procès-Verbaux, X, p. 223; XI, p. 166; XII, p. 119; New York Times, September 2, 1956, p. 26.

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  66. Procès-Verbaux, VII, p. 482; XII, p. 150.

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  67. For instance, the tenth session unanimously approved the new rules for the functioning of the various sections of the Secretariat and Services of the Commission, whereas the eleventh session adopted rules relating to the rights and obligations of the functionaries of these organs. Ibid., X, pp. 219, 315ff.; XI, pp. 193, 256ff.

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  68. While the Commission’s time was not taken up with internal political debates, the Hungarian representative took time out to state that the European and International Commissions had never served the interests of the riparian states but had used the Danube as an instrument of oppression and exploitation of the Danubian peoples. Ibid., XI, p. 165.

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  69. The budgets for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956 were set at 1,194, 000, 1, 233, 000 and 1, 226, 600 rubles respectively. In 1957 it was set at 3, 852, 000 forints and in 1961 at 4, 703, 614 forints (about $400, 000), indicating increase over previous figures. Ibid., XI, p. 209; XII, p. 164; XIV, p. 249; XV, p. 287; XX, p. 481.

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  70. Among the technical matters discussed must be mentioned the establishment of a uniform system of marking navigable routes on the Danube, progress of hydro-technical works, preparation of nautical maps, geophysical descriptions of the Danube and its nautical conditions, establishment of uniform rules of veterinary and phytosanitary surveillance, coordination of hydro-meteorological services and observations, and collection of data concerning cargo movements through the Sulina Channel. The Commission also began consideration of the preparation of an integrated, long-term development project — a “Grand Plan” — for the improvement of Danubian navigation. Ibid., X, pp. 205ff., 238ff.; XI, pp. 165, 171ff.; XII, pp. 132, 193; XIV, pp. 235ff. Cf. note 88 below.

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  71. Procès-Verbaux, XIII, p. 197.

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  72. Ibid., XIII, p. 209.

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  73. During the same year, they also participated in a conference at Basel under the auspices of the Association Internationale Permanente-des-Congrès de Navigation and in a special reunion at Geneva of the Committee on Inland Transportation of the Economic Commission for Europe. Ibid., XIV, p. 188.

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  74. The observer emphasized that the Economic Commission for Europe was always ready to help in the solution of legal and technical problems arising in the field of Danubian navigation. Ibid., XIV, p. 189.

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  75. Ibid., XIV, p. 209.

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  76. In 1951, at the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council, the Danube Commission was tentatively included in a list of intergovernmental organizations that the Secretary-General had been authorized to draw up with a view toward establishing possible relationships between these organizations and the United Nations and toward possible absorption or integration of any of them into the United Nations’ framework. The Soviet delegate immediately objected to such an inclusion on the grounds that the Danube Commission had been founded as a result of action by the victorious nations after the Second World War and that, under Article 107 of the United Nations’ Charter, those powers alone, and not the United Nations, were entitled to bear responsibility for it. The Western Powers, in turn, pointed to the untenability of the Soviet interpretation under which the United Nations would be unable to come to the aid of any state or recognized territory created after World War II. Finally, at the fifteenth session of the Council, the Secretary-General noted that the Danube Commission had not complied with his request for information and the Council, over Soviet objection, voted to include the Commission on the list as of 1953. Following the reversal of Soviet policy, the permanent representative of Hungary, in a note to the United Nations dated August 27, 1959, was more communicative and characterized the Danube Commission as an intergovernmental, international organization with headquarters in Hungary. See U.N., Economic and Social Council, Summary Record, 13th sess., 73d mtg., August 2 and 7, 1951; 15th sess., 676th mtg., April 2, 1953, pp. 21, 22; Docs. E-AC.24-SR. 73-76; Doc. E-2366, Annex II; U.N. Leg. Ser., Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations, II, New York, 1961, p. 34, doc. ST-LEG-SER.B-11.

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  77. Procès-Verbaux, XV, p. 182.

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  78. Ibid., XVI, p. 194; International Organization, XII, Spring 1958, p. 256; see also infra, Chapter I, fn. 13.

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  79. The project has particular significance if viewed in the light of an all-water route between the Danube and the Volga which Russia reportedly has been planning. See Pravda, October 12, 1961, p. 2. Consult also A. Lebed, “Die Bedeutung der Wasserstrasse zwischen Ostsee und Schwarzem Meer,” Sowiet Studien, August 1962, pp. 96–109.

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  80. Procès-Verbaux, XVIII, p. 265.

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  81. Haeseler, op. cit., pp. 254-255.

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  82. Under the terms of the Agreement of July 24, 1958, by which the U.S.S.R. agreed to the reduction of Austria’s reparations payments, Austria undertook to adhere to the Danube Convention of 1948. K. Katzarov, “Das Völkerrechtliche Statut der Donau,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, December 12, 1959, p. 5; Economist, CLXXXVIII, August 2, 1958, pp. 360-361.

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  83. New York Times, January 24, 1960, p. 17.

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  84. The total volume of Austrian freight traffic in 1960 was 6, 202, 000 tons composed of 1, 189, 000 tons of domestic and 5, 013, 000 tons of international cargoes, the latter including 1, 304, 000 tons of exports, 2, 975, 000 tons of imports and 734, 000 tons of transit cargoes. This compares to a total of 3, 112, 000 tons in 1955 which was composed of 284, 000 tons of domestic and 2, 828, 000 tons of international cargoes. U.N., Economic Commission for Europe, Annual Bulletin of Transport Statistics for Europe 1961, New York, 1962, p. 27.

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  85. While no reliable statistics are available, it was estimated that Danubian traffic in the years 1945-1947 had hardly reached one-tenth of its prewar volume. U.N., Dept. of Economic Affairs, A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe, Geneva, 1948, p. 13.

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  86. Bulletin Statistique de la Commission du Danube, Budapest, 1961, p. 40.

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  87. Ibid., p. 5.

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  88. After a few years of delay, the Danube Commission, on the basis of data received from the Danubian states and the Fluvial Administration of the Lower Danube, prepared its “Grand Plan” for the first stage (1961–65) of long-term Danube development and works which received unanimous support just like many other technical, juridical and other reports in recent years. Procès-Verbaux, XX, pp. 347, 352, 353, 365. For a text of the plan, according to national sectors of the waterway, see ibid,. XX, pp. 586ff. Cf. supra note 70.

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  89. At the twentieth session (January 24-February 7, 1962) of the Commission, the Hungarian representative reiterated the importance of continued extension of the international relations of the Commission. At this meeting, in addition to observers from the Federal Republic of Germany and the Economic Commission for Europe, other unofficial delegates were present from the World Meteorological Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Union des Chambres de Commerce Rhénane, a nongovernmental organization. Procès-Verbaux, XX, pp. 337, 348.

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© 1964 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Gorove, S. (1964). Changed Setting: Law and Politics of the New Danube Commission. In: Law and Politics of the Danube. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9259-0_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9259-0_6

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