Abstract
There are two main parts to Grote’s thesis in Exploratio Philosophica. The preceding chapter dealt with one and stressed it particularly, though mention was also made of the other. It would be impossible to deal with one to the utter exclusion of the other. These two are entitled phenomenalism and ‘philosophy‘ Let us recall the distinction which Grote makes between these two terms:
I shall call by the name ‘phenomenalism’ that notion of the various objects of knowledge which go to make up the universe which belong to the point of view of physical science.1
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References
Grote, EP, I, 2.
Op. cit., 17-33.
Op. cit., 17.
Loc. cit.
Kant, CPR, 104.
“The phenomenalist view rests on a supposition, one way of putting which is that we are thus passive in knowledge…” Grote, EP, I, 35.
Cf. ‘ii. Consciousness is also active,’ below.
Bowne, MET, 74.
Kant, CPR, 103.
Grote, EP, I, 47.
Kant, CPR, 93.
Grote, EP, I, 36.
Loc. cit.
In chapters IX and X.
Grote, EP, I, 34-52.
Op. cit., 35.
Grote, EP, I, 36.
Loc. cit.
Grote, EP, I, 19.
Op. cit., 38.
Loc. cit.
Op. cit., 19.
Grote, EP, I, 19.
Op. cit., 19, 20.
Grote, EP, I, 38.
Kant, CPR, 181.
This view of Grote regarding unity as an essential characteristic of the ‘extra-phenomenal’ will be referred to again, below. Cf. pp. 36-37.
Grote, EP, I, 39, 40.
Grote, EP, I, 40.
Brightman, ITP, 389.
Grote, EP, I, 42.
Grote, op. cit., 44.
Loc. cit.
Grote, EP, I, 44, 45.
Immediately above.
Grote, op. cit., 45, 46.
Grote, EP, I, 46.
“I said that the notion of unity… is not phenomenal.” Grote, op. cit., 49.
Kant, CPR, 136, 137.
“Though particulars of the universe… have not life they have that unity, or individuality, or reason why they should be distinguished and separately thought of, which in fact is only suggested to us by our consciousness of our own life and consequent felt self-belonging or independence… is a sort of relic or reminiscence of the life which the infant intellect supposed in things.” Grote, EP, I, 48, 49.
“I said that in strictness, unity was phenomenally exceptional rather than un-phenomenal..” Grote, op. cit., 49.
Supra.
By “consciousness or the sensing of one’s existence” is meant simply awareness. This awareness is of phenomenal reality (including one’s own physical being).
Consciousness for Grote is wholly knowing. “Consciousness, excluded from phenomenalism, I now assume as the one thing which we do know or are certain of.” Grote, EP, I, 18. “The ‘we’ or ‘I’ of consciousness is something quite different from the ‘we’ or ‘I,’ ‘man’ of phenomenalism, which, as I said, is a portion of matter organized and variously endowed, with phenomenal sensation… for one of its properties.” Grote, EP, I, 19.
Grote, op. cit., 1 8.
Kant, CPR, 93.
Descartes, DOM, 26, 27.
Grote, EP, II, 145-228.
Grote, op. cit., 145.
“The world is made up of two ultimately different kinds of reality. Descartes… had an uneasy feeling about this situation, for it rendered interaction between mind and matter unintelligible to him.” Brightman, ITP, 222.
Italics mine.
Grote, EP, II, 37.
Or, as Berkeley would likely say, rather: ‘In virtue of their being ideas.’
Grote, op. cit., 39.
Grote, EP, II, 39, 40.
Grote, op. cit., 41.
Brightman, ITP, 389.
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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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MacDonald, L.D. (1966). Grote’s Interpretation of the Relation of Phenomenalism to Philosophy. In: John Grote. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9239-2_3
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