Abstract
The first Japanese invasion troops landed in the territory of the Dutch East Indies on January 10, 1942, more than a month after the Land of the Rising Sun had begun the great adventure in the Pacific. It was only to facilitate an easy military conquest of the Indies that she did not commence a simultaneous direct offensive against her along with the attacks on Pearl Harbour, Hongkong and Malacca on December 8, 1941. Prime Minister Tojo, in a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council, stated that Japan would not formally declare war against the Netherlands in view of future strategic considerations.1 The Netherlands, however, had declared war against Nippon with other Allies on the same day. In vain Japan made a last attempt to dissuade the determined Dutch from fighting for the East Indies by sending, through Swedish diplomatic channels, an official proposal that “in the name of humanity” bloodshed and any sort of hostile action against the Nipponese forces should be avoided.2 This appeal was obviously motivated by the Japanese desire “to drive a wedge into the united front of the Allies”3 as well as to capture intact the vital resources, particularly the oil fields and installations of the Indies, which was quite evident by their very first landing in the island of Tarakan.4
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References
December 8, 1941. Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1241; Timetable No. 122.
B. H. M. Vlekke, op. cit., p. 400.
ibid., p. 399.
See Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 628; Timetable No. 53.
Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1337; Timetable No. 132.
Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1330-A; Timetable No. 133.
The plan had been decided upon on November 5, 1941; see Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1252; Timetable No. 109.
According to personal information from a Netherlands source.
This was clear already in Tarakan where the Amboinese soldiers could not be induced to attack — De Militaire Spectator, April 1949: “De Strijd op het eiland Tarakan in Januari 1942”, p. 205. Others explained this failure as the lack of sufficient and experienced soldiers in the detachment of the Amboinese, which was completely composed of young soldiers without any fighting experience.
See also Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1338-B; Timetable No. 134: on January 22, 1942, Premier Tojo also stated that the Netherlands East Indies would be destroyed without hesitation, if she continued to resist Japan.
January 20, 1942. Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1329 and 1340; Timetable No. 138.
February 24, 1942. Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1341; Timetable No. 140.
“Het Binnenlands Bestuur in Zuid-Borneo tijdens de Japanse bezetting.” (Uit-gave van de Residentie-voorlichtingsdienst Zuid-Borneo, 1947).
As an example of this characteristic attitude, one may remember how the Controller of Atjeh’s westcoast, G. C. Bruin, was protected by the government police who spontaneously formed a circle around him, so that none of the Atjenese rebels could touch him with their naked arms till the Japanese brought the situation under control (A. J. Piekaar, Atjeh en de Oorlog met Japan, N.V. Uitgeverij W. van Hoeve,’ s-Gravenhage-Bandung 1949, p. 166). Individual cases of help and sympathy towards the Dutch often occurred also in Atjeh which was still considered as dangerous.
Relatively few cases of brute violence occured at the entry of the Japanese. All eyewitnesses praised the strict discipline that was maintained among the invasion troops in spite of the fact that these soldiers had had long experience of cruel warfare in China. Most of them were not Japanese-born but Koreans and Formosans. Plunderers were dealt with by effective Asiatic methods. S. Sjahrir (in his Out of Exile, translated by Charles Wolf, Jr. The John Day Company, New York 1949, p. 237) called the first Japanese troops “barbarians”, but praised (in the same passage) their strict discipline. He presented the case as if it were the Japanese plunderers who were treated so severely; from all others sources, however, it clearly appears that it was the Indonesian “plunderers” against whom strict measures were taken.
Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. Nos. 1342 and 1343-A; Timetable No. 143.
Radio Oranje, March 3 and 6, 1942.
Notes of S. Sjahrir of August 19, 1937 and October 28, 1937 (Out of Exile, pp. 186-188 and pp. 195-196); L. N. Palar, “De Indonesische Beweging en Japan” in Socialisme en Democratie, 1939, pp. 793 ff.
Quoted in B.H.M. Vlekke, op. cit., p. 391.
ibid., pp. 396-397. This is probably the article to which S. Sjahrir refers in his book, Out of Exile, p. 232. See also New York Herald Tribune, July 30, 1944.
Out of Exile, pp. 220 ff.
A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 183.
Out of Exile, p. 219. According to Prof. Berg the element of temporary rule by a yellow race was first consciously introduced in the legend after Japan’s rise.
L. N. Palar, op. cit., p. 804.
Both L. N. Palar and S. Sjahrir (in the already-mentioned writings) agree almost literally in their presentation of facts.
A. J. Piekaar amply describes the “F” (Fujiwara-Kikan) organisations, called after Major Fujiwara, and their role in the revolt in his earlier-mentioned book.
W. Brandt, De Gele Terreur (Uitgeverij W. van Hoeve,’ s-Gravenhage 1946), pp. 23 ff. This book describes (in journalistic style) the fate of the Europeans in Sumatra’s East Coast.
D. H. Meyer, “Over het Bendewezen op Java”, in Indonesië, 3e jrg., No. 2, pp. 182 ff.; ibid., Japan wint den Oorlog! Documenten over Java (N.V. Leiter-Nypels, Maastricht 1946). The writer quotes an article of Dr. Slamet Sudibio: “Perampokan” in Asia Raya of May-June, 1942. See also the writing of Prof. Dr. van Wulfften Palthe, Het Bendewezen op Java (Amsterdam 1949) which treats psychologically the continued activity of these bands down to the time of the Republic.
According to a statement of Dr. Hans Meyer (a Swiss employee of the Kon. Petr. Maatschappij in Sumatra) in his lecture at Zurich on May 31, 1949.
See the description of the events of war in De Militaire Spectator, March 1948 ff.
W. H. J. Elias, Indië onder Japanschen Hiel (W. van Hoeve, Deventer 1946), 2 pp. 55 ff.
J. H. Voigt, “Aanteekeningen betreffende de Thee-ondernemingen op Java gedurende de Japansche bezetting” (Econ. Weekblad voor Ned. Indie, Aug. 24, 1946) and G. Rodenburg, “De Suiker-industrie op Java tijdens de Japansche bezetting” (ibid., April 13 and 20, 1946).
For examples see A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 159.
J. Verkuyl, De Achtergrond van het Indonesische Vraagstuk (D. A. Daamen’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., ’s-Gravenhage 1946), p. 29.
The attitude of the people in the British territories of South East Asia (viz. Burma) was, on the contrary, certainly very unfavourable for the Western Powers.
W. H. J. Elias, op. cit., p. 62.
J. Verkuyl, op. cit., p. 28.
Out of Exile, pp. 238 ff.
Zyawa Nenkan (Java Year Book, published on July 25, 1944), Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (Amsterdam), 016162-016168.
ibid.
A. A. Zorab, De Japanse Bezetting van Indonesië en haar Volkenrechtelijke Zijde (Thesis, Leiden; Universitaire Pers, Leiden 1954), p. 31.
Mangku Negaran, Susuhunanan of Solo, Paku Alaman and Sultanate of Djokjakarta.
Zyawa Nenkan, Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 016162-016168.
Statement of K. A. de Weerd, The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies (Inter. Prosecution Section, Neth. Division, Nov. 1946), Document No. 2750 (Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1351), pp. 26-27.
For administrative departments see Decree No. 27, August 5, 1942 of the Japanese Commander.
Verslag van de Commissie tot Bestudeering van Staatsrechtelijke Hervormingen (further cited as Report Vismari), DI. II, pp. 32, 247ff. (page numbers according to the reprint in New York in 1944.)
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 35.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 27.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 36.
i.e. Rehabilitation of “criminals” who have served their penance and are helped to get work and to start anew.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 34.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 28. See also the articles (already quoted) in Economisch Week-blad voor Ned.-Indië, April 13, April 20, August 24, 1946.
The archives of this office, the work of many years of diligent and patiënt research with invaluable political and economic data about the East Asiatic countries, which would have been useful to the Allies, were burnt before the Japanese landing.
See Decree No. 27, August 5, 1942, supplemented by Osamu Seirei No. 3, February 10, 1945; Decree No. 28 August 7, 1942; Osamu Seirei Nos. 12 and 13, April 29, 1943; Osamu Seirei No. 7, February 16, 1944.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 32.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 32.
Of all the Residents in Java and Madura there was only one Indonesian, while the burgomasters of the town municipalities were all Indonesians except those of Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya.
“Ce sont tout d’abord les Japonais qui, chassés par la guerre d’Occident, ont reflué d’Europe ou d’Amérique, prudemment revenus avant Pearl Harbour ou rapatriés plus tard par les bateaux d’échange: diplomates, hommes d’affaires, représentants des grands trusts comme Mitsui et Mitsubishi, banquiers, agents des grandes compagnies du navigation, exportateurs, journalistes, etc Tous ces gens continueront à former l’état-major politique d’outre-mer, mais des régions qui leur sont tout à fait inconnues: de chefs de bureaux à Londres, San Francisco ou Buenos Aires, ils deviendront, sans préparation, administrateurs ou conseillers civils à Kotah-Baru, Balik-Papan ou dans Mindanao. On leur adjoint comme subordonnés tout ce qu’on peut retrouver comme trafiquants ayant autrefois vendu la pacotille japonaise entre Singapour et Rangoun, comme négociants ayant rôdé entre Bornéo, Timor et l’Australie, et quiconque a sous un masque divers — journalisme, affaires, entreprises de pécheries, bureaux de tourisme, etc.…… — mené naguère le sournois travail de pénétration et d’espionnage dans le Sud.” — R. Guillain, Le Peuple Japonais et la Guerre 1939–1946 (René Julliard, Paris 1947), pp. 106–107.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 33.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 29.
F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 374.
W. H. Elsbree, Japan’s Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements 1940–1945 (Harvard Univ. Press for the Institute of Pacific Relations, Cambridge, Mass. 1953), p. 167.
A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 191.
ibid., p. 253.
Former Fort de Kock.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 34.
ibid., p. 35.
With regard to the financial arrangement agreement was apparently reached before, since it was identical in all occupation zones. See H. J. Manschot, “Het Geld-, Bank-en Credietwezen in Nederlandsch-Indië in de Bezettingsjaren 1942–1945” in Economisch-Statistische Berichten, March 27, 1946.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 35.
Zyawa Nenkan, Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 016167.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 30.
ibid.
See Osamu Seirei No. 9/1942 and Osamu Seirei No. 13, April 29, 1943.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 10.
J. S. Sinninghe Damsté, Overzicht van de Japanse Oorlogsmisdrijven gepleegd tegen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en zijn Onderdanen, p. 40.
Osamu Gunrei No. 1 of March 2, 1942 contained some regulations of penal law, and by Osamu Gunrei No. 2 of the same date a Court Martial was instituted.
Art. 3 of Decree No. 1 of the Commander of the Japanese Army. In force from the day of promulgation — art. 6.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 36.
Dept. van Justitie, Voorlopig overzicht van de rechtspraaktijdens de Japansebezetting (Batavia, Juni 1946), p. 12.
ibid, p. 24.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 36.
Dept. van Justitie, op. cit., p. 27.
J. S. Sinninghe Damsté, op. cit., p. 36.
ibid, p. 41.
ibid.
Doc. No. 2750, pp. 27-28, 37.
The Kempeitai was somewhat similar to the German Gestapo.
Doc. No. 2750, pp. 37-38.
Judicial decrees: Oendang-Oendang No. 14, Batavia, dd. April 24, 1942; id. Nos.
and 32, dd. September 5, 1942; id. No. 34, dd. September 26, 1942; id. No. 35, dd. October 1, 1942.Osamu Seirei No. 18, dd. December 15, 1942; id. No. 21, dd. July 1, 1943; Gunseikan regulations for execution concerning evidence in criminal cases; dd. July 12, 1943; Osamu Seirei No. 2, dd. January 14, 1944; id. Nos. 25 and 26, dd. May 10, 1944 and Osamu Gunritu Nos. 1 and 2, dd. March 2, 1942. For Sumatra an ordinance was announced by the Commander there on January 1, 1944 while in the area governed by the Navy simultaneous changes were made by an ordinance Minseiburei, No. 26, dd. Nov. 1, 1943.
Dept. van Justitie, op. cit., p. 5.
There were twelve camps in this part of Indonesia: four in Borneo (Balikpapan, Tarakan, Samarinda, Bandjermasin), four in Celebes (Macassar, Menado, Aiermadidir, Kampili), three in or near Amboina (Ambon, Haruku, Amahei in Ceram) and one (Maoemere) in Flores. The Kuching (Sarawak) camp also contained Dutch internees. See Verslag Werkzaamheden van 1939 tot en met 1947 van het Informatiebureau van het Nederlandse Rode Kruis (Den Haag 1948). pp. 221-222.
R.O. Kartodirdjo, “De Rechtspraak op Java en Madoera tijdens de Japansche Bezetting 1942–1945”, in Tijdschrift van het Recht (Indonesië), Jaargang 1947, p. 10.
A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., pp. 124ff., 160, 164.
In Sumatra and neighbouring islands there were at least twenty-one camps: Medan, Belawan, Brastagi, Rantau-Prapat, Aik-Pamienke, Soengei-Sengkol, Padang, Pakan Baroe, Bangkinang, Tapanoeli, Pajacombo, Fort van de Capelle, Kendah, Lawè Si Galè-Galè, Langsa, Koetaradja, Palembang, Belalau, Soengei-Gerong, Muntok (Banka), and Koebang (Riouw) — Verslag Rode Kruis, op. cit., p. 221.
W. H. J. Elias, op. cit., p. 44.
Decree No. 7, April 11, 1942.
150 guilders for Europeans, 75 guilders for Chinese and other non-Indonesian Asiatics.
According to semi-official estimates, between 65 and 75 per cent of the total 242,000 (the figure of 1942) inhabitants of the Netherlands Indies who were classified as Europeans before the war, belonged to the Indo-European group. Competent judges, however, considered this estimate as too low and wanted to put it at 85 per cent. About 5 per cent of the Indo-Europeans held posts commanding a high salary, some 25 to 30 per cent were in medium grade jobs. See Charles Fisher, “The Eurasian Question in Indonesia”, in International Affairs, October 1947, pp. 522, 524. The difference in estimates may be due to a different basis: of 242,000 Europeans about 14,000 belonged to a non-white race (7000 Japanese and 9000 legally assimilated Indonesians). See Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies (1944), pp. 7 ff. This writer nevertheless estimates the percentage of the Indo-Europeans at 80. So also De Enc. N.I., dl. VII, under “Indo-Europese Beweging”. 4 per cent of the Europeans below the age of 19 years were illiterate (Report Visman, dl. I., p. 66) and, therefore, would have been entirely assimilated in the way of living of the Indonesians.
This gives S. Sjahrir an occasion for strong comment (Out of Exile, p. 237). He, however, seems to have ignored the factor of “not bowing one’s will” of the Europeans against the Japanese.
R.V.O. (referring to Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Amsterdam), 011231.
R.V.O., 0l 1232. See also F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 373.
According to the data furnished by the Dutch Red Cross, the following prisoners of war were made by the Japanese: 65,000 men belonging to a subdivision of the Dutch Indies or Dutch Royal Army, and 25,000 Allied troops. Of 65,000 Dutch troops about 12,500 died in prison. According to different data found in Java at the time of the capitulation: about 25,000 soldiers of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, 40,000 “city guards”, about 5,000 British soldiers, 4,500-6,000 R.A.F. personnel that could not escape after the loss of the British air craft, about 3,000 Australians and one battery of field artillery with Americans (it is said 500) — (From the data of the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie).
Doc. No. 2750, p. 8. The total number of civilian internees for the whole of the Archipelago is estimated at about 80,000, of which there were about 20,000 men, 35,000 women and 25,000 children (died about 8,000, 4,500 and 2,300 respectively) — according to the information of the Dutch Red Cross.
D. H. Meyer, Japan Wint den Oorlog, Documenten over Java (Maastricht 1946), p. 33.
See G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, (Cornell University-Press, New York, Ithaca 1952), p. 102.
Examples of these trials, of which the Kempeitai itself did not believe in the Tightness of the charges and the confessions, are: the railway trial, the Magelang-guerrilla trial, the planters’ trial of Djember, the “brain-trust” trial of Semarang. R.V.O., 011232-011233.
See David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London 1948), p. 4.
R.V.O., 011233.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 69. Osamu Kanpo (J) No. 2, p. 8 and Osamu Kanpo (M)2No. 27, pp. 12-13.
W. H. J. Elias, op. cit., p. 107. A remarkable word, seen in the light of later events.
W. H. J. Elias, op. cit., p. 107.
ibid., p. 108.
These measures had also economic-political significance as we shall see later.
W. H. J. Elias, op. cit., pp. 46-54.
Kan Po, November 6, 1942.
B. H. M. Vlekke, Geschiedenis van den Indischen Archipel (J. J. Romen & Zonen, Roermond-Maaseik 1947), pp. 130–131.
According to a Dutch view, it was necessary “because the presence of everything Dutch reminded the Indonesian in many respects of the happy old order” (G.W. Overdijkink, Het Indonesische Probleem, De Feiten, Martinus Nijhoff, ’s-Gravenhage 1946, p. 23.
Decree No. 15, April 29, 1942. See also A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 74.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 74.
Decree No. 6, March 27, 1942; Doc. No. 2750, p. 16; A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 74.
At a later stage the display of the Indonesian flag was allowed.
Decree No. 11, April 29, 1942; Decree No. 8, April 11, 1942.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 74; Doc. No. 2750, p. 17.
W. H. Elsbree, op. cit., p. 121.
V. Thompson, “Japan’s Blueprint for Indonesia”, The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol V., 1945–1946, p. 201.
M. Lubis, “The Press in Indonesia”, Far Eastern Survey, June 4, 1952, p. 92.
R. Abdulgani, “The National Press and its Social function”, Indonesian Affairs, Vol. II, No. 4, August-September 1952, p. 26.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 15, A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 100.
W. H. Elsbree, op. cit., p. 102.
From an article by T. Fujimori of the Propaganda Department in the Shonan Shimbun, September 5, 1942. Quoted in W. H. Elsbree, op. cit., p. 103.
See the Plan of the Total War Research Institute of February 18, 1942: Hoover Doc. No. 1621C; Summary in Timetable No. 128, referring to Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1335.
R.O. Kartodirdjo, “De Rechtspraak op Java en Madoera tijdens de Japansche Bezetting 1942–1945,” op. cit., p. 17.
In the beginning of 1943 twenty students were sent to Japan (D.H. Meyer, op. cit., p. 43). Numbers of Atjenese got the same chance (A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., pp. 211, 226, 272). Other parts of the Archipelago also were undoubtedly given the same chance. Students of Sumatra for medical science were not sent to Batavia, but to Singapore, on the basis of the new political division. According to Foreign Students in Japan, 1896–1947 (United States Government publication. Special report prepared by Education Research Branch, Research Unit, 1948, Dept. of State), p. 22, Table 4, the number of Indonesian students who came to Japan during the war was as follows: Java: 44; Sumatra: 16; Celebes: 11; Borneo: 9; Ceram: 3. See W. H. Elsbree, op. cit., p. 106.
A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 270. In other areas certainly the same system was followed.
About the school in Batavia see G. W. Overdijkink, op. cit., p. 25 and D. H. Meyer, op. cit., p. 43. Meyer mentions the names of Indonesian teachers in that school: S. Mangunwirono, M. Mochadi, H. P. L. Tobing, Dr. Raden Mochtar, Dr. Abu Hanifah, Dr. R. M. Slamet Sudibyo, R. Samsusin, R. Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, Ir. Kastan and Moh. Tohir.
See A. A. Zorab. op. cit., pp. 101-103.
Decree No. 12, April 29, 1942.
F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 372.
A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 271.
A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 271.
The Japanese objections against H. Djajadiningrat were raised even from the time before the occupation owing to his well-known anti-Japanese feelings and close connections with the Dutch. His brother, Lockman Djajadiningrat had been with Dr. van Mook in Australia and America. Sumatra had no Dept. of Education of her own but was placed under that of Singapore (A. J. Piekaar, op. cit., p. 252).
T. Alisjahbana, “The Indonesian Language: By-product of Nationalism”, Pacific Affairs, December 1949, pp. 388–389.
F. C. Jones, op. cit., p. 373. See also T. Alisjahbana, op. cit., pp. 389-390.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 75; W. H. Elsbree, op. cit., pp. 122-123. Kan Po No. 9, December 1942.
W. H. Elsbree, op. cit., p. 130.
See ibid., p. 131.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., pp. 98, 103.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 50.
See the Plan of February 18, 1942 as well as the article of Hashimoto in Taiyo Dai Nippon, January 5, 1942 already quoted.
M. de Niet Gz., Zending, Indonesië en Nederland (Uitgave van het Nederlands Jongelings Verbond, Singel 58, Amsterdam-Centrum 1946), pp. 16–19. The writer, however, mentions also that Japanese pastors had defended the Indonesian church in Minahassa.
That after one year of occupation the performance of the Christian Service was no longer permitted (W. H. J. Elias, op. cit., p. 113) is absolutely wrong.
See Chapter VI (Part I): Hoover Doc. No. 1492: “Outline of the Economic Counter-Plans for the Southern Area”, December 12, 1941; Summary in Timetable No. 124, referring to Far East Mil. Trib., Exh. No. 1332.
Therefore, economically, according to this view, a chaotic situation would have followed on a Japanese defeat, apart from the intentions of the Japanese in 1944–1945.
T. A. Bisson, in Japan’s War Economy mentions (p. 79) the National Financial Control Association, which was supposed to have been instituted at the desire of the Zaibatsu. He further speaks of “a bitter struggle” in the Parliament and of strong opposition to Tojo’s dictatorship (p. 97). This resistance could not have taken place under the then Japanese relations without powerful support by the Zaibatsu.
T. A. Bisson, op. cit., pp. 77-102. See also F. C. Jones, op. cit., pp. 334-337.
See J. B. Cohen, op. cit., p. 267.
See Hoover Doc. No. 1492, op. cit.
It is interesting to note that the rapid restoration of some of the oil fields was made possible by the fact that Japan, according to the Board of Economic Warfare (U.S.), imported substantial amounts of oil-field equipment from the United States in the three years prior to Pearl Harbour–New York Herald Tribune, Agust 9, 1942; Japan had “floating refineries ready for immediate exploitation of the oil fields they planned to seize”–The Chicago Daily News, July 13, 1942.
See Hoover Doc. No. 1492, op. cit.
H. J. Manschot, “Het Geld-, Bank-en Credietwezen in Nederlandsch-Indië in de Bezettingsjaren 1942–1945” in Economisch-Statistische Berichten, March 27, 1946.
Virginia Thompson, “Japan’s Blueprint for Indonesia” in The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 5, 1945–1946, p. 204.
ibid., p. 202.
Especially Djarak. See P. M. Prillwitz, “De Ondernemingslandbouw tijdens de Japansche Bezetting” in Economisch Weekblad voor Nederlandsch-Indië, March 2, 1946.
See Hoover Doc. Nos. 1492 and 1621C., op. cit.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 71.
Saibai Kigyo Kanri Kodan. Text of this Decree is given in Economisch Weekblad voor N ederlandsch-Indie, July 6, 1946.
P. M. Prillwitz, “De Ondernemingslandbouw tijdens de Japansche Bezetting”, op. cit.
Such war-booty was then shipped by the Japanese for the supplies of the mother country and the Army, or for sale elsewhere, by which huge quantities were lost or administratively “got lost”. After the invasion, among others, 15,000 packages of tobacco were removed from Deli to Singapore, a part of which was spoiled by rains in Singapore and the rest found scattered over the whole of East Asia after the capitulation (“De tabakscultuur in Deli gedurende de bezettingsjaren 1942–1945” in Economische Voorlichting, August 27, 1948, according to Economisch Weekblad voor Indonesië).
Chapter II of Decree No. 22, July 5, 1942.
Chapter IV of Decree No. 22, July 5, 1942.
See “De tabakscultuur in Deli gedurende de bezettingsjaren 1942–1945” in Economische Voorlichting, August 27, 1948.
See the earlier-mentioned article of P. M. Prillwitz, and also J. H. Voigt, “Aanteekeningen betreffende de Thee-ondernemingen op Java gedurende de Japansche Bezetting”, in Economisch Weekblad voor Ned.-Indië, August 24, 1946.
G. Rodenburg, “De Suikerindustrie op Java tijdens de Japansche bezetting (I), (II)”, in. Economisch Weekblad voor Ned.-Indië, April 13 and 20, 1946.
According to Japanese estimates, the surplus production of sugar in peacetime in Greater East Asia amounted to about 2,010,000 tons (production 4,410,000 tons, consumption 2,400,000 tons). In order to obtain a balance the production of Java should have been curtailed by 1,000,000 tons and that of the Philippines should have been wholly eliminated. The Japanese production would have been maintained at 1,300,000 tons (G. Rodenburg, op. cit.).
P. M. Prillwitz, op. cit. The new enterprises were immediately organised in a federation (Saibai Kigyo Rengokai = S.K.R.).
See Decree No. 36, dated October 1, 1942.
H. J. Manschot, op. cit.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 19.
In Java there were four Dutch banks (de Javasche Bank, de Ned. Handelmaat-schappij, de Ned.-Indische Handelsbank and de Ned.-Indische Escompto Maat-schappij), two English (the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking corporation), and some Chinese banks (the Oversea Chinese Banking Corporation and the Bank of China). See the article of H. J. Manschot, op. cit.
Decree No. 44, October 20, 1942.
The Mitsui Bank reopened its office in Surabaya, but seems to have obtained no big share in the booty, yet it was in this bank that the Imperial House had great financial interests.
A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 90. Decree No. 39, October 3, 1942. M: “Bank Rajat”.
The growing inflation made the repayment of money by Chinese and Indonesian dealers rather easy (H. J. Manschot, op. cit.). In Borneo and the Great East the Taiwan Bank acted as the agent of the Nanpo.
H. J. Manschot (op. cit.) points to the remarkable fact that the Japanese showed no interest for securities, which were found in the safe-deposit of the Javasche Bank in Bandung after the war.
See A. A. Zorab, op. cit., p. 80.
W. van Warmelo, “De Indische Industrie gedurende de Japansche bezetting”, in Economisch-Statistische Berichten, March 27, 1946.
Doc. No. 2750, p. 49.
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© 1955 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Holland
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Aziz, M.A. (1955). Conquest and Occupation Policy. In: Japan’s Colonialism and Indonesia. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9233-0_9
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