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Japanese Blueprint (1937–1941)

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Japan’s Colonialism and Indonesia

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Abstract

The year 1937, “in which fascism and nazism became bolder in their verbal and diplomatic attacks upon democracy, communism, the territorial status quo, and the system of collective security as represented by the League of Nations”,1 seemed to offer a determined effort to inaugurate the establishment of Japanese hegemony in Eastern Asia. The incident at the Marco Polo Bridge on the outskirts of Peiping on July 7, 1937 provided the Land of the Rising Sun with the pretext to set off against China a full-scale war, which was regarded as “a natural consequence of fixed national policy calling for establishment of a solid footing on the continent.”2 Japan decided to strike before the Kuomintang-Communist Alliance, following the Sian kidnapping episode of December 1936, could be developed into an effective united front against her.

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  83. Thus the maintenance of the production of these materials for trade with areas outside the Co-Prosperity Sphere was in principle rejected.

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Authors
  1. M. A. Aziz M. A., M. A., Ph. D.
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© 1955 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Holland

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Aziz, M.A. (1955). Japanese Blueprint (1937–1941). In: Japan’s Colonialism and Indonesia. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9233-0_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9233-0_6

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  • Print ISBN: 978-94-011-8500-4

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