Abstract
During the third quarter of the nineteenth century it was recognized that patent protection limited by national boundaries was an obstacle to the expansion of international economic relations. In addition, many were of the opinion that justice demanded that an inventor be protected not only within his own country but in all countries. With these considerations in mind, the Paris Union for the International Protection of Industrial Property was to be created. The present chapter will examine the evolution of the rules that govern the exploitation of patents, contained in the text on which the relations among Union members in patent matters are based. It will also briefly mention other multilateral agreements regulating international cooperation in patent matters.
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References
“Foreigners” in connection with patent legislation generally means non-resident foreigners. Consequently the term “nationals” includes all residents.
See S. P. Ladas, The International Protection of Industrial Property (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), p. 73.
Ibid.
“This principle was not again to be accepted by an international conference for 50 years but the anti-patent movement … had created such an awareness of the possible monopolistic and restrictive effects of the patent system.” E. T. Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1951), p. 47.
“L’Obligation d’exploiter les brevets d’invention”, P.I., 40: 66, April, 1924.
The Vienna Congress did not lead to any immediate results, though it set up a committee, in the name of which a program for further action was submitted to the French Government in 1877. Cf. Union Internationale pour la Protection de la Propriété Industrielle; Mémoire publié par le Bureau International pour la Protection de la Propriété Industrielle à l’occasion de cinquantenaire. (Bern: Bureau International de l’Union, 1933) p. 18.
Penrose, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
Ibid., pp. 51-52.
One opponent to compulsory working requirements said that: “En fait c’étaient surtout les pays à industrie encore peu développée qui avaient inscrit dans leur loi l’obligation d’exploiter, croyant servir à son développement, ce’en quoi leur espoir avait été décu.” “L‘Obligation d’exploiter …”, p. 66, continuing: “La législation des Etats Unis l’avait d’abord imposée aux étrangers, et elle l’a ensuite supprimée, sans que l’essor de l’industrie nationale en ait souffert. La législation anglaise ignore l’obligation d’exploiter; son industrie n’en a pas souffert d’avantage.” In the case of the United States it might be recalled that one of the principal aims of instituting a patent system was to acquire foreign inventions, though neither through obtaining licenses nor through compulsory working requirements, but simply through the “importation” of foreign inventions by local manufacturers. It has also been held that for reasons such as the size of the market and still more, because of its tariff-policy (cf. supra, Chapter II, n. 95) compulsory working requirements would have been superfluous. In the case of Great Britain, as long as she was the industrial leader, there was no need to compel foreign patentees to exploit their inventions locally. Since she was by far the most industrialized country, foreign patentees would, in fact, often choose to establish themselves there. When towards the end of the last century some countries began to rival and even overtake Great Britain as industrial powers, a compulsory working clause was introduced. (Patent Act of 1907). For the cases of both the United States and Great Britain, see E. Dame, Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung des Ausführungszwanges im Patentwesen (Berlin: Verlag Chemie, 1929), pp. 16-17; 33-35.
Penrose, op. cit., p. 75; the author quotes a paragraph from the French report that was the basis for the discussions which said in part: “The exclusive right that is granted to a patentee can only be legitimately recognized on condition that he effectively works his invention and that it is thus made to profit the country in which he has obtained his patent.” (p. 76). This clearly exposes the inconsistency that has always marked the relation between the theories on “natural” or “inherent” rights in inventions and the practical application of patent laws.
“Les inventeurs doivent récompenser par leur production l’industrie du pays, qui leur accorde un monopole momentané … La délivrance d’un brevet doit entrainer un avantage correlatif pour l’industrie nationale.” “L’Obligation d’exploiter …”, p. 66.
Whereas the two previous conferences (Vienna, 1873, and Paris, 1878) had been unofficial, the Paris conference of 1880 had only official delegates. The following nineteen States were represented: Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, France, Great Britain, Guatemala, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, El Salvador, Sweden-Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Actes de la Conférence de Paris 1880, pp. 6-7.
Ibid., p. 67.
Ibid., p. 57.
Ibid., p. 67; for the various views expressed, see “L’Obligation d’exploiter …”, p. 67.
Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, France, Great Britain, Guatemala, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, El Salvador, Serbia, Spain, Sweden-Norway, Switzerland, United States, and Uruguay. Actes de la Conférence de Paris 1883, pp. 6-7.
The fourteen original members of the Paris Union were: Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, El Salvador, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunisia. Three States soon left the Union: Ecuador (1886), El Salvador (1887), and Guatemala (1895).
This was the case, for instance, of the Netherlands until 1910 and Switzerland until 1887. Since the Lisbon Conference (1958), however, a country is expected to be able to give effect to the rules of the Convention by national legislation. [Article 17, (2)].
A particular paragraph of Article 4 concerning the rights of third parties led to lengthy discussions and various interpretations at several successive revision conferences. It was finally established at London in 1934 that such rights could only exist prior to the date of the first filing of a patent application when such a date was used to claim priority at a subsequent filing in another country. Such rights are subject to national legislation.
The Convention from the beginning also contained rules on industrial designs, trademarks and trade names, to which utility models, service marks, indications of source as well as rules for the repression of unfair competition were added later. None of these other areas of interest to the Union will be treated.
In 1893, a joint Bureau was established for the Paris Union and the Berne Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, under the name of Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété Industrielle, (B.I.R.P.I.). For the recently decided reorganization of the Paris Union and its Secretariat, and for the creation of a World Intellectual Property Organization, (W.I.P.O.), see pp. 258-65.
In an appendix to the chapter (pp. 106-08) appear the English translations of Article V, and texts related thereto, of the various conventional texts as published by BIRPI in Manual of Industrial Property Conventions, Geneva, 1966.
Considering that the two basic material principles of the Convention, i.e., the principle of national treatment and priority, have remained unchanged, the evolution of the original Article 5 constitutes the most important element of the history of the Union, as far as patents are concerned. In the words of C. Akerman, L’Obligation d’exploiter et la license obligatoire en matière de brevet d’invention (Paris: Sirey, 1936), p. 57: “On pourrait dire que l’historique de l’article 5 ‘est dans un certain sens l’historique de l’Union elle-mëme’.” For a similar view, see Ladas, op. cit., p. 327.
At the beginning of the conference, membership stood at sixteen, the following countries being new members: Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Norway, Sweden and the United States. The following non-member countries participated: Austria-Hungary, Chile, Ecuador, Germany, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, and Turkey, of which Japan became a member during the conference. Actes de la Conférence de Bruxelles (1897–1900), pp. 20, 129, 363-66.
In the following references to the official records of the revision conferences, “Actes” will signify the documents concerning the particular conference being analyzed.
The United States, supporting the proposal and invoking its own liberal patent law, proposed the introduction of reciprocity, which was, however, rejected by all other Member States. Actes, pp. 95, 304-05.
The clause appeared in Article 3 bis of a Final Protocol.
Akerman, op. cit., p. no.
Cf. infra, footnote 33 and pp. 81-82.
For Germany’s position, see Actes, pp. 168-70, 179, 317-18, and for its influence on the conference, see Actes de la Conférence de Washington, p. 284; for Austria’s position, see Actes, p. 321. For more details on this point, see Union Internationale …, pp. 69, 73.
Among other changes concerning patents were the extension of the priority period from six to twelve months (Article 4); the rule that prior exploitation by the patentee does not invalidate the date of first patent application as the basis for claiming priority rights (Article 4); and the establishment of the principle of “independence of patents” granted in different countries, whether members or not (Article 4 bis).
At the conference membership stood at 22. The following five States had joined since the previous conference: Austria, Cuba, Germany, Hungary and Mexico. Actes, p. 25. The following non-members were represented: Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Russia, El Salvador, Siam and Turkey. Actes, pp. 159-70. The large number of Latin American countries represented among the non-members, of which only Haiti has since adhered, was probably due to the fact that most of these countries had created a Pan-American patent convention the previous year. On this matter, see infra, pp. 102-03. No country is bound by the Washington text.
The British counter-proposal contained a point of particular interest, in view of what has been said earlier concerning the cases in which the three-year period during which revocation was not allowed, was applicable (Cf. supra, p. 74). It was pointed out that the Bureau proposal had omitted the words “for non-working” thereby giving the impression that by this omission Article 5 should be considered to extend to other causes for revocation. Great Britain suggested (Actes, p. 106) and the Bureau accepted (Actes, p. 228) the insertion of a phrase expressly stating that no patent could be revoked, during the first three years, for the sole reason of non-working or insufficient working. See also, “L’Obligation d’exploiter …”, pp. 73-74. This clearly supports the contention (Cf. supra p. 81-82). that the three-year limitation on the use of revocation, introduced at Brussels, was limited to the case of non-working. Further support for such an interpretation is the wording of the clause according to which revocation is not allowed in cases in which the patentee justifies his inaction.
Actes, p. 48.
See Ch. S. Oppenheim, “The Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property”, J.P.O.S., 32: 903–35, December, 1950, p. 907, who says: “No one would quarrel with advocacy of the protection of the public interest. The difficulty is that the term ‘public interest’ has been used by restrictionists as though it were something apart from and adverse to the private interest.”
Actes, p. 282, continuing: “que la France n’était pas en principe hostile à l’idée de tempérer le régime de l’obligation d’exploiter, mais que des études approfondies n’avaient fait entrevoir aucun moyen de nature à réaliser ce but; que d’après les expériences faites sous le système de la licence obligatoire en Grande Bretagne, en Suède et en Mexique, ce système était mauvais et inadmissible.”
Changes in the wording appeared in Articles 1, 2 and 4; Article 16 bis expressly mentions the right of countries to adhere to, as well as repudiate, the Convention on behalf of their colonies; and the text of Article 3 bis of the Final Protocol was inserted in Article 5 (2).
At the Hague Conference, membership stood at 37 with the adherence of the following countries: Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Luxemburg, Morocco, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia (Serbia had been a member); in addition France had adhered on behalf of Lebanon and Syria. Actes, p. 27; the following non-member States were represented: Argentina, Colombia, Egypt, Guatemala, Hedjaz, Haiti, Liberia, Panama, Peru, El Salvador, San Marino, Siam, South Africa, and Venezuela. Actes, pp. 371 ff. Three countries, Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Poland, remain bound by the Hague text of the Convention as of January 1, 1969.
It is recognized, however, that this may not always be so. Saying that there remains one serious inconvenience in the abolition of compulsory working requirements, the Bureau proposal states (Actes, p. 235): “Certains producteurs nationaux peuvent se rencontrer, qui seraient prëts à exploiter le champ que le breveté étranger laisse en friche.” The question of whether the patentee’s choice of where to produce can be taken as an objective test of what is most advantageous from the point of view of society either in general or in particular for less developed countries, will be treated in Part II, Chapter II.
Ibid, [translation from French]; Ladas, op. cit., p. 323, after stating that inventors cannot be expected to work their inventions in many countries and that the inventor himself is the best judge of where conditions are most favorable for production, i.e., where costs are lowest, resulting in cheaper goods for the consumers, later (p. 333) states that “the compulsory working provisions cause the installation of foreign industries in the country, movements of capital and foreign investments, the effects of all of which may be far-reaching.” This author also uses the following argument plainly contradicting his above-quoted statements, saying (p. 333) that in the case of a foreign industry being established through compulsory working requirements “the country will lose the customs duties it would collect on the importation of the new products from foreign countries, and competition in the national industry will be more severe, as the products manufactured in the country will be free of transportation expenses and customs duties.” The argument that the consumer will pay less for imported goods contradicts the one saying that local production will cause tougher competition because of lower prices. A similar opinion is expressed in the article “L’Obligation d’exploiter …”, p. 120, which says that in the case of local exploitation by foreigners “l’industrie nationale se trouvera en présence de concurrents d’autant plus redoutables que la protection des droits de douane ne jouera plus à leur encontre.” Thus in the same breath as one proposes the abolition of working obligations in the name of efficient resource allocation, one suggests that the obligation to work runs counter to protectionist measures tending to obstruct such efficient allocation; E. Dame, op. cit., pp. 46-52 makes a distinction between industrial and non-industrial countries. Though she recognizes the advantages which the implantation of a foreign industry can have in promoting the local economy, the author is of the opinion that the increased competition would be harmful to the local industry, concluding (p. 52): “Wegen diesen grossen Nachteilen für die Industriestaaten [italics added] ist der Ausführungszwang nicht mehr als ein Mittel zum Einplanzung neuer Industriezweige und zur Schulung von Arbeitern zu verwenden.”
Actes, p. 432.
Actes, p. 433.
“Qui pourrait tenir compte des craintes, sans doute légitimes, qu’a fait naître la proposition chez certains délégations.” Ibid.
M. Plaisant, Traité de droit conventionnel international concernant la propriété industrielle (Paris: Sirey, 1949) pp. 129–30, 137, interprets the results of the Hague Conference as being a complete abolition of the earlier power to revoke patents. In view of the fact that this author was both a delegate at the Conference and a member of the second subcommittee, his interpretation would seem to be authoritative. In support of his interpretation Plaisant alleges that the American delegation had threatened to withdraw from the Union in case their proposal for the abolition of revocation were not accepted. Not only does the text of the new Article 5 contradict Plaisant’s interpretation, but also the American delegation took pains to disperse any doubts about their alleged threat to leave the Union by saying (Actes, p. 414): “La Délégation américaine tient à préciser que sa proposition ne constitue ni un ultimatum ni une menace de la part de son Gouvernement de se rétirer de la Convention d’Union. Elle a tenu à exposer très sincèrement les vues de son Gouvernement sans avoir l’intention de dicter en quoi que ce soit à la Conférence ce qui doit ou ne doit pas ëtre fait.”
Ladas, op. cit., p. 98; See however Ibid., p. 341, where Ladas does not exclude the “less liberal solution.”
Casalonga recognizes this outcome of his interpretation. Cf. A. Casalonga, “Forfeiture of Patents for Non-Working”, J.P.O.S., 33: 720–23, October, 1951.
“Il serait … contraire à la logique juridique de soutenir que, par l’introduction dans l’ordre juridique interne de la Convention de La Haye, dont l’article 5 devait réglementer le passage d’une époque d’intrasigeance absolue à une époque de semi-liberté … on a voulu instaurer, pendant cette période de transition un régime de liberté complète, dépourvu de toute obligation ou sanction.” Akerman, op. cit., pp. 141-42.
… “L’Article 5 de la Convention de La Haye n’a apportée, par lui-mëme, aucun changement au régime existant dans un pays quelconque de l’Union au moment de son entrée en vigeur dans ce pays. Il ne constitue qu’un affirmation de principe et un progrès ‘moral’ en tant que le système des licences obligatoires est officiellement reconnu …” Akerman, op. cit., p. 142. For a similar opinion, cf. M. Plaisant and F. Jacq, Le nouveau régime international de la propriété industrielle (Paris: Sirey, 1927) pp. 70-71, and the Bureau Proposal to the London Conference, Actes de la Conférence de Londres [1934] p. 174. The authors who have interpreted the Hague revision to mean that it completely abolished revocation (Plaisant) or that a compulsory licence would actually have to be proved insufficient before revocation was permitted (Casalonga), have supported their interpretations by pointing out that the Anglo-American proposal was supposed to be a compromise and that the Americans would never agreed to a mere moral obligation to refrain from revoking patents. It will be suggested below, however, that the Americans may have been “compensated” by the new restrictions introduced into the Convention through the concept of “abuse of monopoly power.”
Akerman, op. cit., p. 141.
This was acknowledged by the President of the second sub-committee. Actes, p. 434.
Ibid., p. 519.
Ladas, op. cit., p. 339; Union Internationale …, pp. 112-13.
Akerman, op. cit., pp. 144-146.
Cf. supra, n. 33.
For the opposite point of view, see F. Ostertag, “Exposé introductif de questions à l’ordre du jour du Congrès de l’AIPPI, Rome, 1928”, P.I., 44: 178–83, August, 1928, p. 179, who says: “Le texte actuel [Hague text] permet aux pays contractants, contrairement au texte primitif de la Convention, d’introduire des restrictions au droit exclusif du breveté non seulement en cas de non-exploitation, mais encore dans d’autres cas … oú il y a abus de monopole …”
The authors who have interpreted the new text of Article 5 as far as sanctions are concerned as more than a statement of principle and moral obligation (Cf. n. 44 and n. 48 supra) supported such arguments by observing that the text was supposed to be a compro-mise between the countries proposing far-reaching changes and those opposed to modification. With the interpretation suggested above (p. 81), the former countries would be left with the sole advance of the incorporation of a “moral” obligation into the Convention. When the American delegation, during a session of the Conference, sitting as a committee of the whole, commented on the amendments to Article 5 saying in part (Actes, p. 576) that “lesdits amendements à La Convention sont appréciés à leur juste valeur par la Délégation des Etats-Unis qui les considère comme des concessions réelles”, it appears unlikely that it had in mind the mere “moral” value of the recognition of compulsory licenses. Instead, it can be held that the curtailment of sanctions for abuses other than non-exploitation—which, it has been suggested, was the real significance of the introduction of the “abuse of monopoly power” concept into the Convention—belonged to the real concessions of which the American delegation spoke. Some authors, seeing the introduction of this concept as a concession to the interests of society (as against those of the patentee), have directly linked its inclusion in Article 5 to the “compromise” solution proposed by the United States and Great Britain. (For instance, Akerman, op. cit., 146 et passim, and Union Internationale, pp. 112-13). The logic for such a conclusion seems dubious. It is hardly possible that out of a compromise between those who wanted less interference in the freedom of patentees and those who wanted to retain status quo would come new, more extensive powers for society to control the activities of patentees.
Akerman, op. cit., p. 80. It is sometimes said that patentees in countries that have pre-examination systems do not start exploiting their inventions before they are granted a patent. Therefore, their effective protection would be only the three-year period. This contention would seem contradicted, however, by the arguments presented at the Lisbon Conference (1958) that supported a longer period of protection for patentees in non-examination countries to equalize conditions for patentees under the two systems. See the Bureau Proposal at Lisbon and comments by one delegation at that Conference. Actes de la Conférence de Lisbonne [1958], pp. 392, 395.
The position of patentees was further improved to the extent that the individual countries interpreted the text to include all possible action against patentees. At the Lisbon Conference (1958), several delegations stated that their laws were based on such an interpretation.
That is, if one does not use “interest of society” to mean the interests of the foreign patentee’s own country. A member of the American delegation expressed this opinion. See Actes, p. 575. Though from the beginning, the principal goal of the Union was to secure the rights and interests of patentees, never was it claimed that “interest of society” referred to the country of the foreign patentee!
How little impact the requirements of national interests have made, especially as argued by several less industrialized countries, is apparent in the following comment on the Hague Conference. Observing that non-exploitation may only be sanctioned if it is considered an abuse and that revocation was only a subsidiary sanction, it is said that: “Néanmoins, le danger subsiste que les pays pauvres en industrie utilisent l’obligation d’exploiter, non seulement pour introduire chez eux des objets brevetés, dans la mesure oú ils en ont besoin, mais encore pour attirer sur leur territoire de nouvelles industries sans tenir compte de la question de savoir si ces dernières seront viables.” Union Internationale …, p. 113.
At the London Conference membership stood at forty, the following two States having adhered since the Hague Conference: Lichtenstein and New Zealand. Actes, pp. 9-10. The following non-members were represented: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Ecuador, Guatemala, Iraq, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Peru, Siam, and Venezuela. Actes, p. 311 ff. The following twenty-four States are still bound by the London text of the Convention (as of January 1, 1969): Australia, Austria, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Finland, Greece, the Holy See, Iceland, Indonesia, Lebanon, Lichstenstein, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunesia, Turkey, U.A.R. and Vietnam.
[translated from French] Actes, p. 261.
“… à satisfaire à tout les besoins du marché indigène.” Actes, p. 174.
It is obvious that this point is not taken into consideration in the following comment by the Bureau: “Lorsque ni le breveté étranger ni l’industriel indigène n’osent entreprendre l’exploitation dans le pays … on ne saurait reprocher au breveté un abus de son droit exclusif, puisque l’inefficacité de son offre d’accorder des licenses aux industriels du pays constitue précisément la justification de son inaction.” Actes, p. 175.
Ibid., p. 262.
Supra, pp. 79-80.
Actes, pp. 262-63. Czechoslovakia, Spain and Yugoslavia took the same position. Ibid.
[translated from French] Ibid., p. 245.
Ibid., pp. 245-46.
Ibid., p. 263.
Eighteen in favor, seven opposed (Brazil, Syria-Lebanon, France, Italy, Japan, Morocco, Tunisia) with five abstentions (Belgium, Cuba, Danzig, Mexico, Poland). Ibid., p. 379.
Ibid., p. 459.
Ibid., p. 515.
Among other changes concerning patents, the reservation of the rights of third parties was finally eliminated. Plaisant, op. cit., pp. 99, 101, commenting on this point, said: “La réserve du droit des tiers apparaît comme un élément étranger introduit dans le corps organique de la Convention d’Union. Le devoir des juristes est justement de construire un monument des lois et des traités qui offre aux inventeurs … leur plein expansion. C’est pourquoi le droit de priorité ne peut ëtre qu’absolu: la réserve des tiers apparaît comme hérésie, une lacune dans un édifice logique.”
At the Lisbon Conference membership stood at forty-seven, a net increase of five since the London Conference. The new members were: Ceylon, Haiti, Indonesia, Israel,Federation of Rhodesia-Nyasaland (Rhodesia and Malawi have since become separate members), Monaco, South Africa, U.A.R., and Vietnam while the following “left” the Union: Palestine, Danzig, Estonia, Latvia. The following non-members were represented: Argentina, Ecuador, Iraq, Iran, Liberia, Panama, El Salvador, Saudi Arabia, U.S.S.R., the Vatican, Venezuela. Out of seventy-nine Member States (as of January 1, 1969) fifty-two are bound by the Lisbon text.
Brazil seems to have had the same intention when it proposed that compulsory licenses be granted “pour l’exploitation de brevets si leur concessionnaire ou concessionnaires ne l’ont pas fait dans le délai établi par le Code de la propriété industrielle”, a period which in the case of Brazil was, and still is, two years. Actes., p. 918.
Actes., p. 404.
Ibid., continuing: “Les Etats industrialisés, sans ëtre exposés à des sérieuses difficultés, ont bénéficié grandement de la possibilité de monopole que leurs brevets pourraient créer. Donc, les Etats moins industrialisés que les autres, n’auront-ils jamais le droit de bénéficier de ces avantages?”
Actes, p. 404.
Ibid., pp. 411; 413.
[translated from French] Ibid., p. 412.
In a vote on the proposal to abolish revocation for non-working nineteen delegations supported the proposal, five delegations opposed it (Brazil, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and Yugoslavia) and four abstained (Australia, Austria, Canada and Hungary.) Actes, p. 417.
Actes, pp. 419-20.
When the Conference sitting as a committee of the whole adopted the text of the Report, it was stated that “l’alinéa 3 a pour objet de disposer que la déchéance du brevet n’est jamais une sanction directe, qu’elle ne peut intervenir que si une licence obligatoire déjà accordée s’est révélée insuffisante, et après un certain délai après l’octroi de cette première licence obligatoire.” Committee of the Whole, Report by the Second Committee, stenographic records, p. 89. The fact that there is a printing error is further borne out by the fact that the quotation made above from the report of the drafting committee appears under a subheading of the Report, entitled: “Sur la licence obligatoire pour abus du droit exclusif” (Part II of the Report), while provisions specifically concerning non-working appear under the heading: “Licence obligatoire pour défaut d’exploitation” (Part III of Report).
Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland.
Actes, p. 424-25; for the English text of the drafting committee report, see Doc. 171A (unpublished working document for the Lisbon Conference obtained from BIRPI); Though at the second plenary session, when the text of Article 5A was adopted, the English text is referred to as Doc. 287 (Actes., p. 100, reading: “Revocation of the patent shall not be provided for in cases where the granting of compulsory licenses was not sufficient …”) said document appears to base its translation on an earlier text. The Manual of Convention Texts, using the expression “would not have been sufficient” is the only translation published and must be considered the official version. [At the Lisbon Conference, French was still the only official language and the English translations were merely working documents.]
Thirty-two votes in favor and seven abstentions (Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Spain). Actes., pp. 424-25.
Ibid., pp. 100-01.
If it was a concession to certain countries, it should anyhow be remembered that it is so only in the sense of maintaining the status quo. If the more restrictive interpretation of paragraph 3 were maintained, i.e., the intention of the drafting committee that a compulsory license would have to be proved insufficient, what would be the solution for the case in which no licensee could be found? A possible interpretation of paragraph 3 would be that its first and second parts combined would, in the cases in which a compulsory license “would not have been sufficient” permit revocation two years after the first possible date of granting such a license.
R. Plaisant, commenting specifically on paragraph 3 of the Lisbon text says: “L’alinéa 3 indique, en effet, que la déchéance ne peut ëtre prononcée qu’après la concession effective d’une licence obligatoire et la constatation de l’insuffisance de celle-ci. Il semble que telle était bien l’intention des négociateurs; mais il faut constater que le texte n’est pas encore d’une parfaite clarté.” R. Plaisant, “L’Evolution des Conventions de Propriété Intellectuelle”, Les Unions Internationales 1883–1963 (Geneva: BIRPI, 1962) p. 104.
Cf. Bureau proposal, Actes., p. 392, and an interpretation in this sense by a delegation, Ibid., p. 395.
The large majority of the new members since 1958 had belonged to the Union as colonies though in that capacity they merely constituted Union territory with no active part in the work of the Union.
S. P. Ladas, “The Fundamental Bases of the International Protection of Industrial Property”, P.I., 70: annex, April, 1954 [original text of “Les bases fondamentales de la protection internationale de la propriété industrielle”, P.I., 70: 93-97, April, 1954] p. 1, replying to the view that the Convention “… was an instrument adopted by the large colonial powers possessing the privilege of an advanced industrialization …” (S. Pretnar, “The International Protection of Industrial Property and the Different Stages of Economic Development of the States”,) observes that among the eleven original members were Brazil, Guatemala, Portugal, El Salvador, Serbia and Spain. Of these, however, Guatemala and El Salvador soon left the Union (supra n. 17) and Serbia had no national patent law7 until 1918.
The German Democratic Republic considers itself a member, but the question remains unsettled.
P. Roubier, “The Law of the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property”, Journal du Droit International, 78: 1049, No. 4, 1951.
Ladas, “The Lisbon Conference …”, p. 1294.
“Chacun de ces systèmes a une conception diamétralement opposée à celle de l’autre en ce qui concerne la violation du droit exclusif sur une invention protégée, surtout s’il s’agit d’une violation en raison de la non-exploitation. Tandis que, dans les pays à ordre social économique privé, la non-exploitation est considérée un abus, dans les Etats socialistes une exploitation de l’invention à titre privé est une action directement contraire à l’ordre publique.” S. Pretnar, “La notion d’intérët public et la Convention d’Union”, [Offprint from] Mélanges Marcel Plaisant (Paris: Sirey, 1960) pp. 9-10. Mélanges Marcel Plaisant (Paris: Sirey, 1960) pp. 9-10.
Article 17(2) “It is understood that at the time an instrument of ratification or accession is deposited on behalf of a country, such country will be in a position under its domestic law to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.” For the intention behind the revised article 17, see Ladas, “The Lisbon Conference …”, pp. 1312-1313.
Though all these countries, in their national laws for the protection of inventions, provide for a choice between “inventors’ certificates” and patents, for obvious reasons, the traditional type of patent protection in these countries must have a very different significance from such protection in private enterprise economies. For more on this question, infra, pp. 242-44.
See, at the Hague: Spain, supra, p. 79; London: Poland, supra, pp. 85-86, and Czechoslovakia, supra., p. 86; at Lisbon: Turkey, supra., p. 88, and Brazil, Iraq and Yugoslavia, supra., p. 89; see also the cases in which extensions of the liberty of patentees have been opposed from the point of view of “smallness” rather than the “underdeveloped” character of the economy: at London: Czechoslovakia, supra., p. 86 and at Lisbon: Austria and Italy, supra., p. 89.
S. P. Ladas, “The Revision of the Paris Convention”, I.C.C. Brochure, No. 206, Paris, 1959, pp. 17–18, recognizes the existence of such interests, saying that “there have developed at the present time far sharper differences of view between strongly industrialized countries and economically underdeveloped countries, so that compromise solutions on proposed amendments of the convention were much more difficult to reach.”
The Bureau proposal to the London Conference recognized the existence of differences of interests between countries at different stages of economic development, but it is clear from the text that the Bureau was mainly interested in the problems created by this situation for the industrialized countries. The proposal says in part: “L’Union englobe des pays dont le développement industriel diffère profondément et qui ont des notions et des besoins très différents en ce qui concerne la protection de la propriété industrielle. On comprend dès lors que les pays fortement industrialisés envisagent comme absolument contraire à tout progrès le fait que les pays beaucoup moins développés peuvent empëcher toute amélioration de la Convention.” Actes de la Convention de Londres 1934, p. 165.
Akerman, op. cit., p. 152.
Ibid., pp. 334-35.
Roubier, op. cit., p. 1049.
[translated from French] Actes de la Conférence de Lisbonne, 1958, pp. 89-90.
Actes de la Conférence de Londres, p. 165. A number of majority vote systems have been suggested. The most interesting is that suggested by Ladas, The International Protection …, p. 814. According to Ladas, industrialized and underdeveloped countries should from separate groups and a three-fourths majority would be required of each for any amendment. Though written in 1930, it is strikingly similar to the system used by the Trade and Development Board of UNCTAD.
Akerman, op. cit., pp. 152-53 et passim. See, however, supra, p. 82.
Supra, pp. 91-92.
The definite interpretation of the question of the relationship between paragraphs 2 and 3 and paragraph 4 meant a further concession to the extent that some countries had interpreted it as regulating the granting of compulsory licenses also for actions on other grounds then abuse of the patent monopoly. Cf. “Die Lissabonner Konferenz zur Revision der Pariser Verbandsübereinkunft”, 61: 57-113, February, 1959. p. 71.
Supra, p. 75-76.
Supra, pp. 77.
Supra, p. 69.
Ladas, “The Fundamental Bases …” p. 2.
One example mentioned is the question of abolishing “the right of third parties” which was, however, resisted by some less developed countries on economic grounds.
B. Godenhielm, Utländsk och intemationell patenträtt (Stockholm: Institutet for ut-ländsk rätt, 1953) p. 29. [translated from Swedish].
Such agreements are expressly allowed by the Paris Convention. Cf. supra, p. 72.
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. This Convention remains in force only between Argentina and Peru, the other States having adhered to later conventions. Ladas, The International Protection … p. 762.
Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador. Though A. Troller, Die mehrseitigen völkerrechtlichen Verträge im internationalen gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht (Basel, Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1965), p. 28, states that those countries are still bound by this Convention; according to Ladas, The International Protection …, p. 762, the convention has been superseded by later agreements. The latter opinion is supported by the fact that all countries later adhered to other conventions.
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salvador.
Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, United States, and Uruguay.
The thirteen original States plus Bolivia. The following States are also members of the Paris Union: Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, United States, Uruguay.
Cf. P. G. de Medina y Sobrado, Naturaleza juridica de la propiedad industrial y pro-tección a los inventores en el derecho internacional y en el interno [Havana (chez l’auteur), 1949] pp. 181–89.
Ladas, The International Protection …, p. 765; Or, the author continues, “is it the lack of long preparations and continuity of study of the questions involved in the protection of industrial property?”, or again, “is it … the failure to interest those countries sufficiently in the advantages of a common international regulation of the subject of industrial property?” Though many Latin American countries today are far from mere “raw material producers” [this was written in 1930] the wide differences of stages of economic development still seem to provide the most plausible explanation.
Two alternatives have been suggested: either full membership with unconditional acceptance of all rules including the jurisdiction of the planned European patent court, or associate membership.
The article in the draft concerning this problem (Article 5) gives two alternatives: one admitting any person unconditionally and the other with a more restricted application. The latter alternative would seem to be in conflict with Article 15 of the Paris Union.
European Convention Relating to the Formalities Required for Patent Applications 1953); 2. European Convention on the International Classification of Patents for Inventions, (i954); 3. European Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Inventions (1963).
Members are: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Chad, Dahomey Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, and Mauritania. Togo joined the group in 1967.
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© 1971 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Anderfelt, U. (1971). The Development of an International Patent System. In: International Patent-Legislation and Developing Countries. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9218-7_3
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