Abstract
The belief of modern empiricism in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic or grounded in meaning independently of matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic or grounded in fact, was foreshadowed in Hume’s distinction drawn in the Treatise between relations which are invariable, depending solely upon ideas, and relations which may be changed without any change in ideas ; and a simpler distinction made in the Enquiries between Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact. Thus, Hume, by offering criteria for analytic truths as well as for meaning, made himself a true precursor of modern empiricism.
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References
D. G. G. MacNabb, David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge and Morality, p. 46.
Hume, An Abstract, p. 32.
Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, p. 182.
John Laird, Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature, p. 53.
The same Principle is used by Hume to show both that all complex ideas which are distinct are separable into parts, and also to prove that we cannot separate ideas of inseparable impressions except by distinction of reason which could be drawn only concerning simple perceptions. Hume employs his principle against Platonism in arguing that “’tis utterly impossible to conceive any quantity or quality, without forming a precise notion of its degree,” and “precise length of a line is not different nor distinguishable from the line itself; nor the precise degree of any quantity from the quality.” But, as it is pointed out by commentators, this line of argument breaks down since by distinctions of reason we can separate what is inseparable in reality. Thus Kemp Smith writes: “Now quite evidently he is allowing, under a new title, what he has seemed to deny in the earlier parts of the section. By the direction of attention, the mind distinguishes what is not actually separable.” N. Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume. London, 1941, p. 266.
As we pointed out in Chapter Two, the above maxim is only applicable to complex ideas. Of course each component should be caused by its corresponding impression.
T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (eds.). The Philosophical Works of David Hume, Vol. I, p. 174.
Thomas H. Huxley, Hume, with Helps to the Study of Berkeley, New York, 1896, pp. 81–82.
W. Morris, “Foundation of the Theory of Sign,” International Encyclopedia of Unified Soience, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 13.
Hume indeed populated the mind with entities which for him could not be discovered among his outward sentiments. As MacNabb puts it, “… beauty is in the mind of the beholder as virtue in the mind of an approver and necessity in the mind of the inferer.” Yet Hume need not do this. From the fact that some terms do not denote an impression of sensation, it does not follow that they denote an impression of reflection. But why should every term denote objects?
David Hume, Hume’s Dialogues, N. K. Smith, ed., p. 233.
The analysis of the relation of equality will be given in the next chapter in explaining Hume’s view on Geometry.
In Hume’s analysis of existence lies the germ of Kant’s distinction between formal and material concepts, and even Russell’s theory of description. Kant following Hume, observes clearly that judgment of the form: “something exists” contains only the single concept of that thing (whatever it may be), not two concepts of a Thing and Existence. This analysis makes us see that existence is a purely formal concept and it should not be treated as if it were a material concept. Russell provides a method for the analysis of descriptive phrases which have no descripta, such as “the most perfect being,” or “The golden mountain.” Though such phrases may contribute to the meaning of a sentence, neither existence nor subsistance of anything is implied by them.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, paragraph 251.
Chapter One, p.
C. W. Morris, op. cit., pp. 13 and 30.
An Abstract, op. cit., p. 8.
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© 1960 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Zabeeh, F. (1960). The Principle of Analyticity. In: Hume Precursor of Modern Empiricism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9194-4_5
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