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Wars of the Future

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Abstract

One of the favorite jibes of the professional civilian against the military used to be, “The generals always prepare for the last war.” The charge, if true, means that the generals are failures. Their chief excuse for existence is to prepare for the next war and, having prepared for it, successfully to wage it (if need be).

Keywords

Class Character Class Nature Soviet Republic Soviet State Night Action 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    Vos’moi s’ezd RKP (b), Mart 1919 goda: Protokoly (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1959), p. 17.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., p. 45. Frunze also suggested, ibid., pp. 50-51, the employment of night actions and partisan warfare to help overcome the enemy’s advantages in technology. He said, “Partisan actions must be organized and prepared on the broadest scale and separate troops must be trained, systematically and according to plan, in the spirit of the preparation of these activities.… Night actions have always been considered an important form of combat action; with new accomplishments in technology, their role will be even larger. Night actions will permit us to lessen the importance of our technological backwardness.”Google Scholar
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    Ibid., p. 19.Google Scholar
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    Trotsky, op. cit., III, Book II, p. 250.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1969

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MarylandUSA

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