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Arms, Technology, and the Masses

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Abstract

In 1905, Lenin wrote an article entitled “The Fall of Port Arthur.” He was commenting on the loss by the Russian Imperial troops of the fortress of Port Arthur to the Japanese forces.

Keywords

Soviet Republic Militarization Program Soviet Economy International Situation Civil Organ 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    V. I. Lenin o voine, armii i voennoi nauke (Moscow: Voennoe izdateFstvo, 1957), I, p. 49.Google Scholar
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    A description of the trend to mass participation is found in Hoffman Nickerson, The Armed Horde, 1793–1939: A Study of the Rise, Survival and Decline of the Mass Army (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940).Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    There was, for instance, the German mass army of 1870–1871 and the French mass army of post-1871. Thomas Taylor Meadows, The Chinese and their Rebellions (Stanford, Calif.: Academic Reprints, n. d.), describes the Taiping Rebellion in which, it is estimated, 22,000,000 persons were killed.Google Scholar
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  10. 10.
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  11. 11.
    Frunze’s prevision of limited war has been followed almost to the letter by the theorists of modern Soviet Russia. The concept of limited war has been explicitly rejected by Soviet doctrine. For instance, Marshal Rodion Ia. Malinovskii, former Minister of Defense of the USSR, said in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960 (and reported in Pravda January 15, 1960, p. 7), that the theory of small wars was developed by the “imperialists” out of fear of Soviet retaliation and in order to deceive the “peoples.” Frunze was unable to admit the concept of limited wars because he was unable to imagine the “bourgeois” world engaging in wars with the proletarian state system for other than total objectives. He predicated his limited war thesis on the theory that the “bourgeoisie” could not trust its own proletariat. It is more a comment on how far the wheel of history has turned than on Frunze’s prescience that he was able to forsee the development of “capitalistic” theories of limited war. In Frunze’s time, the West was presumed to know that war with the party which had embarked on the conquest of the world was, and would be, in earnest.Google Scholar
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    Frunze, op. cit., II, pp. 347-348.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., p. 348.Google Scholar
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    See Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 1879–1921 (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 487-503, for a description of Trotsky’s project.Google Scholar
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    On the Soviet economic situation in 1924, see Alexander Baykov, The Development of the Soviet Economic System (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947); Edward Hallett Carr, The Interregnum, 1923–1924 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954); and Harry Schwartz, Russia’s Soviet Economy (2d ed.: New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954).Google Scholar
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    Colonel Iosif Stepanovich Korotkov, “Krasnaia aviatsiia v boiakh protiv Vrangelia,” Voennaia mysl’, No. 11, 1938, pp. 77-94. In the campaign against Wrangel, the few aircraft available to Frunze were used chiefly in an observation role.Google Scholar
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    Frunze, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 1957, op. cit., II, p. 134. The editors of this collection considered it necessary to footnote this observation by Frunze with the comment, at p. 480, “The question of the use of infectious microbes for military purposes was openly discussed in the pamphlet of the French military doctor, Georges Louis, L’armee bacteriologique, which was published in Paris in 1922. This pamphlet attracted the attention of M. V. Frunze and he was compelled to draw the attention of the military community to the possibility of the use of infectious microbes as a means of warfare. Scanty information about the new method of warfare made it impossible to prophesy with great accuracy its role in future wars, but it can not be denied that the belligerent sides must seriously consider bacteriological weapons.”Google Scholar
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    Frunze, Sobranie sochinenii, op. cit., II, p. 134.Google Scholar
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    Frunze, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 1957, op. cit., II, pp. 282-283. In the latter years of his rule, Khrushchev became so concerned with the failure of the chemical industry properly to develop in the Soviet economy that he suggested the allocation of about $ 42,000,000,000 for the purpose.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., p. 246.Google Scholar
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    Frunze, Sobranie sochinenii, op. cit., III, p. 112.Google Scholar
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    Frunze, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 1957, op. cit., II, pp. 133-143. A translation of this article is included in the appendix.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., p. 137.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., pp. 138-139.Google Scholar
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    History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), pp. 333-343; and Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1959), pp. 319-375.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1969

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MarylandUSA

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