Abstract
Whichcote states that social consciousness and responsibility are as much a part of revealed religion as of the natural. The death and resurrection of Christ must be verified in us and this means that we must die to the world, to selfishness and to sensuality.1 When God calls us to salvation, He calls us from wickedness to holiness. The doctrines of the Gospel must become the “reason of our minds” and the “principles of our life.”2 Christ is a nature, a spirit and life in us, and His “design” is to advance the divine life in men. The fact that Christ condemned sin by His death means that none can be relieved by His death who would justify sin by their lives.3 Dean Inge who quotes Whichcote in defence of his position asserts that “religion and ethics are, for a Christian, inseparable. There are unethical religions, and there are irreligious ethical schools or societies; but these are not Christian.”4 It appears that Inge has captured precisely Whichcote’s position and thus we refer to Whichcote’s views here as Christian morality.
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References
Whichcote, Works, II, 143–144; I, 380. My use of “Christian morals” as the sub-topic of this chapter is deliberate. There is a rather confused distinction today between “Christian ethics,” “Social Ethics” and Christian social ethics.” I understand the first as that field of investigation which treats the biblical, theological, historical and philosophical foundations of ethics; the second deals with the physical, psychological and social aspects of Christian ethics; and the third combines all these approaches into one synoptic investigation. Whichcote’s interest covers the scope of what we refer to as Christian social ethics, but we would be unjustified in attributing to him this technical point of view. Thus “Christian morals” appears to be a more appropriate caption for our discussion.
Ibid., II, 83; Aph. 94.
Aphs. 355, 409, 689, 736.
Inge, Christian Ethics and Modern Problems, (London, 1930), p. 379. It appears significant that Dr. C E. Raven (in a conversation with the present writer) stated that one main influence behind his social concern was an early study of the Cambridge Platonists.
Whichcote, Works, II, 133-134.
Ibid., pp. 134-136.
Ibid., pp. 231-232, 236.
Ibid., pp. 239-240. With this intense emphasis on the “moral part” of Christianity by Whichcote it is little wonder that the statesman-philosopher Shaftesbury, a luke-warm Christian, believing merely in “religion by state established,” should find in Whichcote’s writings the basis of a “benevolent” society without accepting Whichcote’s deep spirituality.
Ibid., pp. 241-242.
Ibid., pp. 34-35; Ibid., III, 66-71.
Ibid., III, 48.
Ibid., p. 79. Here Whichcote’s Johannine position is manifest. The note sounded forth in the Fourth Gospel is that to know God in Christ is eternal life and eternal life conceived as qualitative rather than “temporal” begins when salvation begins. Cf. C. H. Dodd, Gospel and Law, (New York, 1951), pp. 31-32 and Joseph Fletcher, William Temple: Twentieth-Century Christian (New York, 1963), pp. 29, 302-303 (n. 75).
Ibid., p. 82.
Ibid., II, 60-62. This passage might well be Whichcote’s answer to Tuckney’s accusation that this view of Reconciliation consisted of “inherent righteousness” with a little of Christ added. Here Whichcote places Christian morality at the heart of his Christology. Cudworth’s Sermon before the House of Commons, (New York, 1930) is almost a perfect copy of Whichcote’s views on this subject. Cf. Infra, Ch. IX and see, Joseph Beyer’s entire work, Ralph Cudworth als Ethiker Staats-Philosoph und Aesthetiker und Grund der Bedruckten Schriften, inaug. diss. (Bonn, 1935).
Ibid., I, 340-361.
Aph. 564.
Works, I, 257.
Ibid., p. 179, II, 398-399.
Ibid., I, 282.
Ibid., IV, 78-79.
Cf. Matt. 5:8.
See Infra, Ch. X; Cf. Joseph Butler, Sermons, 4th ed. (London, 1749), Sers. i, xi. See also, Baxter, The Reasons of the Christian Religion, (London 1667), pp. 90-92.
The Principles of Christian Ethics, (New York, 1943), p. 178.
Whichcote, Works, IV, 121-131. Cf. Supra, Ch. V.
Supra, Ch. V.
Works, IV, 14-31; Cf. Matt. 18:34, 35.
Ibid., pp. 31-47.
Matt. 5:7.
Works, Ibid., pp. 77-83. Whichcote significantly distinguishes between “relative” and “real” holiness. The former is arbitrary and changeable; the latter is a participation of and resemblance to God. Relative holiness implies the use of things for holy or sacred purposes, but real holiness refers to “deiformity” or God-likeness in hearts and lives. Cf. Ibid., pp. 57-58, 264; Aph. 285.
Whichcote appears not to be bound by what Reinhold Niebuhr describes as the source of “perfectionist illusions,” viz., the “Hellenic spirit,” see The Nature and Destiny of Man, (London, 1941–43), II, 134-135. R. N. Flew, The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology, (London, 1934) pp. 92-117, 151-157, 206, 244-257.
Ibid., pp. 174-176.
Cf. J. C. Bennett, Christian Ethics and Social Policy, (New York, 1956) pp. 4–9.
Ibid., p. 274.
Ibid., p. 322; Cf. Ibid., pp. 275, 325-326.
Ibid., pp. 269-270. For an assessment of the impact of Stoicism upon Christian ethics, see W. L. Bradley, The Meaning of Christian Values Today, (Philadelphia, 1964), p. 82. Which-cote’s advice, however, is difficult for a man without economic means. One needs a reasonable amount of wealth for self-respect and meaningful existence and service. The ancient Indian classic on Statescraft, Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra while elevating wealth (artha) above enjoyment (kama) and duty (dharma) has considered an important matter. Without a reasonable amount of artha, conscience is seared and the moral imperative is paralyzed. For the Christian, however, earthly possessions may never be more than means — never the chief end of life, see my, “Majoring in Minors,” Link, vol. 20, no. 9 (September, 1962), pp. 5-8.
Ibid., II, 149-150.
Ibid., pp. 151-153. When Shaftesbury speaks of a wholesome type of religion which supports and heightens man’s natural benevolence, he might well have had in mind the religion envisioned by Whichcote, Cf. Infra, Ch. X. See also, V. G. Stanley “Shaftesbury’s Philosophy of Religion and Morals.” A study in Enthusiasm,” unpub. diss. Columbia University, 1961; Alfred Sternbeck, “Shaftesbury Über Natur, Gott und Religion, inaug. diss. (Berlin, 1904).
Aph. 625. Cf. Works, III, 57; II, 142.
Ibid., 920.
Ibid., 337.
The Westminster Confession, Ch. i, 5, cited by John Baillie, Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (London, 1956), p. 117.
Baillie, Ibid.
Whichcote, Works, II, 82–84. Cf. Baillie, Ibid., p. iii. Baxter obviously has in mind the Quakers with other similar groups. See, G. F. Nuttall, Studies in Christian Enthusiasm, (Wallingford, Pa., 1948), pp. 23-24 and Hugh Barbour, The Quakers in Puritan England, (New Haven, 1964), pp. 94-99.
Cf. Henry More, “Grand Mystery of Godliness,” Theological Works, ed. by Joseph Downing (London, 1708) bl. X, Ch. xiii, p. 533. According to Richard Baxter, the Quakers made the “inner light” a sufficient rule. They made much of the “dwelling” and working of the Spirit in us, but little of justification and pardon of sin and our reconciliation with God through Jesus Christ. They pretended to depend on the Spirit’s conduct, against set times of prayer and against sacraments, and against due esteem of Scripture and the ministry and would not have the Scripture called the Word of God. See Autobiography, ed. by J. M. L. Thomas (London, 1931), pp. 72-74. Against this background we can understand Whichcote’s treatment of the Spirit in defence of “sober piety and rational religion.” Baxter obviously has in mind the Quakers with other similar groups. See, G. F. Muttall, Studies in Christian Enthusiasm, (Wallingford, Pa., 1948), pp. 23-24 and Hugh Barbour, The Quakers in Puritan England, (New Haven, 1964), pp. 94-99.
Whichcote, Ibid., III, 55-56.
Ibid., I, 51-52.
Ibid., pp. 53-54.
Ibid., pp. 54-55. Cf. Aph. 1068, 1094.
Ibid., pp. 49-50.
Ibid., p. 51.
Ibid., pp. 262-270. Theologically Whichcote’s view is rooted in the Fourth Gospel. Philosophically we are reminded of Bergson’s concept of time as “duration” rather than “space-time” or time conceived as spiritualistic and qualitative rather than materialistic and quantitative. Cf. Maritain, Redeeming the Time, (London, 1946), pp. 48-50 and my article “Bergson as a Metaphysical, Epistemological and Religious Thinker,” J. R. T., Vol. XX, No. 2 (1963–1964), p. 108.
Ibid., p. 279.
Ibid., pp. 280-282.
Ibid., pp. 324-326. Cf. Ibid., pp. 35-36. Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy, p. 418. See also Bishop Joseph Butler, “Analogy,” Works, ed. by J. H. Bernard, new ed. (London, 1900), vol. II. pt. I, chs. IV, V, pp. 68-99.
Ibid., p. 55. To use Ferré’s convenient treatment of time appears valuable here. He understands the problems of “time” in terms of the kronos, or mere succession; logos, or meaning; and kairos, or concrete or filled time. For Whichcote time is conceived as kronos, but mainly as logos and kairos, as meaning and content. Cf. Ferré, The Christian Understanding of God, (London, 1952), pp. 79-81. See also, Cullman, Christ and Time, tr. by F. V. Filson (London, 1952), pp. 39-41. There appears to be no suggestion by Whichcote concerning Christ as the centre of time as presented by Cullmann. However, Whichcote’s view is firmly rooted in the New Testament in spite of his Platonic leanings. He appears to anticipate, though faintly, something of the “realised” “eschatology” of C. H. Dodd, Ibid. For Tillich chronos is “formal time,” while kairos is “the right time,” the moment rich in content and significance, see The Protestant Era, tr. by J. L. Adams, (Chicago, 1951), p. 33.
Ibid., II, 154-155.
Ibid., p. 155, Cf. Aph. 818.
Ibid., pp. 160-161.
Ibid., p. 165.
Ibid., p. 167; Cf. Milton, De Doctrina Christiana, tr. by C. Summer, pp. 398-399. (Cambridge, England, 1825).
Ibid., pp. 156-157. Cf. Aph. 216 — “It is impossible for a man to be made Happy, by putting him in a Happy ‘place’; unless he be in a Happy’ state’.”
Cor. 15:35-58. Cf. Krister Stendahl, ed. Immortality and Resurrection, (New York, 1965). Stendahl introduces the biblical approach of Oscar Cullman and Henry J. Cadbury in contradistinction to the Greek outlook of Harry A. Wolfson and Werner Jaeger on the future life. See also, Michael Fixier, Milton and the Kingdoms of God, (London, 1964), p. 219.
Whichcote, Ibid., pp. 173-185.
Ibid., pp. 194-195. Cf. Aphs. 368, 818.
Ibid., pp. 196-198. Cf. Aph. 290 — “We must now ‘Naturalise’ ourselves to the Employment of Eternity.”
Ibid., p. 196; Cf. W. H. Rigg, The Fourth Gospel and Its Message Today, (London, 1952), Ch. III.
We should bear in mind that Whichcote is most probably following the suggestion of the Fourth Gospel. Thus he has the advantage of having his view of eternal life grounded in the New Testament. A similar view is held by Westcott and Maurice, see W. R. Inge, Platonic Tradition, in English Religious Thought pp. 103-104. Cf. H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, (London, 1952), pp. 197-199, 218-219, Westcott, The Gospel According to St. John, p. 87.
Cf. Brunner, Eternal Hope, tr. H. Knight (London, 1954), pp. 90–92. “The Message of the Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches, Evanston, 1954,” C.C., vol. lxxl, no. 38 (September 22, 1954), p. 1123. Evanston, 1954, C. C., vol. LXXI, No. 38, (September 22, 1954), p. 1123.
Cullman, Ibid., p. 59.
Ibid., p. 45-46.
Cf. Supra, Ch. III. Georges Florovsky, “Saint Gregory Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers,” G.O.E.R. Vol. V, No. 2 (Winter, 1959–1960). There Florovsky presents the conviction of the Greek Fathers concerning the ultimate aim of human existence. Man remains a creature but he is promised and granted in Christ an intimate sharing in what is divine — life everlasting and incorruptible. The main characteristic of theosis is “immortality” or “incorruption” (pp. 126-127).
Whichcote, Works, II, 201, 220-221.
Ibid., pp. 189-191.
Ibid., I, 78-80; C. Aph. 1003.
Butler, Ibid., Chs. II, IV, V, pp. 34-36. Whichcote, unlike Butler, has little sense of the “toughness” and perversity of the material world or of the difficulty of the moral struggle. It would be unfair to accuse him of otherworldliness or complacency; but his sense of sin and the experience of suffering seem defective. However, when one considers his good nature (without effort) and his wealth, his moral insights are commendable. Cf. D. E. Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion, (New York, 1957), pp. 235-256.
Whichcote, Ibid., pp. 83-85.
Ibid., pp. 85-86. Cf. Ibid., III, 84.
Ibid., pp. 110-111. Cf. Supra, Ch. VI.
Ibid., pp. 201, 323.
Ibid., IV, 165-166. Cf. Aphs. 761, 1029.
Cf. Supra, Ch. X; Origen, De Princ. ii. 10.
Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (London, 1953), p. 104.
Whichcote, Works, III, 139–140. Cf. Aphs. 100, 824; Cudworth, Ibid., p. 51.
Ibid., II, 140-141. Western societies like Eastern societies are rapidly moving from a “guilt” complex to a “shame” complex. Freudianism, nihilism, atheistic Existentialism and a host of other influences have converged to develop an ethic based upon expediency. But the “hell” that Whichcote speaks of is still with us in another form. Even Sartre speaks of “hell as other people.” Cf. O. H. Mowrer, The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion, (Princeton, 1961), pp. 81-102, 103-129.
Ibid., IV, 423-424; Cf. Butler, Ibid., Ch. II. pp. 34-36.
Ibid., pp. 399-400. Cf. Aph. 129, 311. Whichcote’s confidence in reason and conscience (both are for him the “voice of God”), anticipates Butler’s trust in the accuracy of conscience. The weakness in the views of both men appears to be in the failure to make sufficient allowance for the degeneration of these facilities, i.e. in the case of Whichcote, the perversion of reason and the searing of conscience. Kant upon observing that so many evil men appear to go unpunished in the present life infers necessarily the existence of God as well as the immortality of the soul in support of the moral order. Paul L. Lehmann in Ethics in a Christian Context, (London, 1963), presents a worthy safeguard. For the Christian, according to Lehmann, the church as Koinonia — “the fellowship creating reality of Christ’s presence in the world” is the context of ethical reflection. A contextual ethic is indicative rather than imperative and acquires meaning and authority not from demands, but from specific ethical relationships. The latter constitute the context out of which demands emerge and are shaped. (pp. 45-49, 150).
Aph. 1108.
Ibid., 317; Cf. Ibid., 760.
Ibid., 380).
Ibid., 1077.
Works, IV, 48-50.
Ibid., I, 330.
Ibid., I, 331-332. Cf. Butler, Ibid.
Ibid., II, 110-112. Whichcote’s views on life as well as on death are an example to us. Tillotson’s account of Whichcote’s death is remarkably similar to Plato’s account of Socrates’ death in the Apology. However, just as his teaching concerning death takes us beyond the most admirable philosophical view of death, even so his acceptance of the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper as a declaration of his communion with the “Church of Christ all the world over” is an invaluable Christian example. Cf. John Tillotson, Funeral Sermon of … Whichcote, (London, 1673), pp. 28-29.
Cf. John Smith, “Of the Immortality of the Soul,” Select Discourses, ed. by H. G. Williams, 4th ed., (London, 1859), pp. 62–63. I am not sure that Whichcote appreciated the fundamental difference between the Greek and biblical views of the body. To Plato, the body is a tomb or prison; to St. Paul, it is a temple. Therefore, he could not give a worthy statement to the affirmation in the Creed, “I believe in the resurrection of the body.” Recent historical study of the Bible enables us to appreciate the essentially unique conception of the after life of the Christian faith while taking into consideration the manner in which Greek philosophy has aided us in the statement of this belief.
Ibid., pp. 105-112.
Ibid., pp. 117-118.
Ibid., pp. 125-126. This passage reveals Whichcote’s Puritan background perhaps as much as any passage to be found in his writings.
Ibid., pp. 119-120.
Ibid., pp. 124-125.
Ibid., I, 292.
Aph. 986; Cf. Rev. 1:18.
The Body, (London, 1955), p. 40. In this work, (pp. 11-13) and in Cullmann, Ibid., pp. 61-63., the tendency appears to be to make a radical distinction between the Greek views of the relation of soul and body and time and eternity and the New Testament ideas on the same subjects. In Cullmann this is carried over in his reflections upon the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body. Cullmann finds complete contrast between the death of Socrates and the death of Christ. Whichcote appears to be on safer ground. He can see a similarity between New Testament and Greek thought on these subjects, but always points out where Christianity takes us beyond the wisdom of the Greeks. I am reminded of John Baillie’s helpful suggestion that the Christian doctrine of last things is essentially a doctrine of resurrection not of flesh, but spiritual body though it includes insights from the Greek conception of immortality of the soul as well as the notion of survival after death in primitive religions. The same view is advocated by H. H. Farmer.
Whichcote, Select Aphorisms,The Christian Tract Society, No. XXVIII, Vol. III, cited from the title page.
Ibid., Preface.
Matt. 7:20.
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Roberts, J.D. (1968). Religion of after-Revelation (II). In: From Puritanism to Platonism in Seventeenth Century England. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9110-4_7
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