Abstract
It is a persistent thought of Solomon Maimon, repeated several times by him in various connections, that while perception is a process occurring in time and subject to the mode of time, pure thought emerges instantly, at one stroke as it were, and is not a temporal process at all. In view of the prominence that Maimon gives to this distinction between perception and pure thought, two questions demanding elucidation necessarily arise. First, what is the source and origin of this idea? And second, what is the importance of this idea and its systematic place in Maimon’s thinking as a whole? In answering these questions we may even gain clarification of Maimon’s conception of a priori thought as distinct from sense perception.
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References
Cf. H. Bergmann, Ha-philosophia shel Shlomo Maimon (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1932, p. 130, note 1, who refers to Judah Halevi, Kuzari 5, 12, as a possible source for Maimon’s thought.
See Guide, II, 12.
The italics are Maimon’s. Cf. 5. Maimons Lebensgeschichte, II, 83 f. Maimonides’ last sentence is rendered by Maimon thus: “Die Ursache dieser Formen an sich aber kann nichts anderes als selbst eine Form sein. Und da diese Formen einfache Wesen sind, so können sie nicht entstehen und vergehen mit der Zeit und nach und nach, sondern plötzlich und auf einmal.”
Maimonides’ statement can be understood to imply merely that the divine intelligence does not affect “at a certain time” but flows continously, as is evident from the context and the whole tenor of Maimonides’ argument. Maimon, however, interprets it to mean that the effect of the divine intelligence is not a spatio-temporal process and therefore not subject to the conditions of space and time. Maimon is correct in his conception of this idea, even though it is not an exact rendering of, but rather involves a step beyond, Maimonides; for the two aspects of this idea are closely interrelated, the one following from the other. The effect of the divine Intellect does not occur “at a certain time” because it is not a temporal process at all. Munk correspondingly renders the sentence thus: “… dans un temps plutot que dans un autre temps,” op. cit., II, 101, which is in keeping with the original Arabic text.Cf. Bacon, p. 217.
Logik, pp. 120 ff.
Ibid., p. 121.
In addition to the references in Maimon’s writings quoted in the text, see his commentary on Maimonides’ Guide, Chaps. 32 and 68, and Philos. Wört., p. 63. In Com., Chap. 32, Maimon discusses the idea that intellectual concepts are dependent on the perception of material objects and expounds it in the following manner. Rational concepts are dependent on the perception of objects, which is a process occurring in time, but they (the rational concepts) are not to be derived from the perception of objects. Since the origin of rational concepts lies in the mind, they arise spontaneously and instantly and are not conditioned by time. (Italics mine.) This distinction between being “dependent on” and “derived from” is reminiscent of Kant’s differentiation between “beginning with” and “arising out of” with reference to the relation between cognition and experience. Cf. Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason: “But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience” (Englsih translation by N. K. Smith, p. 41). In the distinction between “beginning with” and “arising out of,” properly understood in all its implications, is contained the very essence of the Critique. Cf. Hermann Cohen, Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 8 f.
See Tr., pp. 33 f.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 228.
Cf. Bacon, p. 213.
See Krit. Unt., pp. 244 f., 248 f.
Cf. Ibid., p. 233.
See Str., pp. 260 ff.
Guide, III, 20.
Ibid., Chap. 21. Maimon renders Maimonides’ last sentence thus: “God imagines the knowledge of His own self as the ground of all things. The imagination of all things is thus for God inseparable from the imagination of His own self.” Cf. Maimon’s Lebensgeschichte, II, 124. In its main features this is, of course, an Aristotelian idea. But Maimon knows it from Maimonides in the connotation Maimonides imputes to it and in his formulation. Furthermore, according to Aristotle, God, as the source of all forms, knows only the general forms of all reality, and knows the particulars only to the extent that they are presentations of the general forms, while for Maimonides His knowledge extends over the particulars as such.
Cf. Tr., p. 168.
Cf. ibid., pp. 169 f.
Cf. Str., p. 193.
Cf. above, Chap. V. 21See Tr., pp. 65 f., where Maimon attempts to reduce the synthetic proposition that a straight line is the shortest line between two points to an analytic proposition on the basis of Wolff’s definition of a straight line as a single line, i.e., the parts of which are in the same direction as the whole. Maimon’s intention is thus to prove that the proposition, a straight line is the shortest line between two points, is not an axiom but is derived analytically from the definition of a straight line as a single line (Wolff). Maimon then adds in a note (ibid.) that even assuming that Wolff’s definition can be shown to be rooted in a synthetic proposition, it should still be possible to resolve that synthetic proposition into analytic thought. Furthermore, Maimon admits that he is not quite satisfied with the Wolffian definition, but nevertheless maintains the possibility in principle of such a reduction. It seems that Maimon added his note after having read Kant’s letter to Markus Herz, containing a criticism of Maimon’s doctrine by way of a refutation of Wolff’s definition of a straight line. Kant writes: “As to the definition of a straight line, it cannot be defined as the identity of the direction of all its parts, since the concept of direction itself presupposes the concept of line.” Briefe von und an Kant, ed. Cassirer, I, p. 420. Kant read Maimon’s manuscript, Versuch über die Transcendentalphilosophie, which Herz sent him, and understood Maimon to imply a definite proof of a particular reduction of the synthetic proposition into an analytic one. On reading Kant’s criticism Maimon felt constrained to add his note modifying his doctrine, namely, that his intention was not to propose a definite reduction based on a particular definition of a straight line, but merely to offer an illustration of a possible reduction, i.e., such a reduction must, in principle, be possible of attainment on the assumption that the synthetic proposition is grounded in analytic thought.
See above, p. 135, where the entire passage from Maimon is quoted.
See Logik, Introduction, p. xxvi.
Tr., p. 173.
P. 50.
Cf. B. Katz, “Zur Philosophie Salomon Maimons,” in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, XXVIII (1915), 55 f., who pointed out this contradiction in Maimon.
See Tr., pp. 65 f., and above, note 21.
See above, note 26.
Cf. Tr., pp. 31 f., and at the end of Maimon’s Introduction to his Com. on the Guide.
Str., p. 20.
Cf. Com. on the Guide, Chap. 1, p. 10b.
Str., p. 20.
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© 1964 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. Netherlands
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Atlas, S. (1964). Levels of Cognition. In: From Critical to Speculative Idealism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9106-7_7
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