Abstract
“The Press,” writes Lord Denning, “plays a vital part in the administration of justice. It is the watchdog to see that every trial is conducted fairly, openly and above board. Any misconduct in a trial is sure to receive notice in the press and subsequent condemnation by public opinion. The press is itself liable to make mistakes. The watchdog may sometimes break loose and have to be punished for misbehaviour.”1 This is the reason for the law of contempt of court as applied to the press.
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idem at p. 40. The Hyderabad High Court adopted Lord Hardwicke’s classification in Read v. Huggonson, (1772) 26 E.R. 683, when it said in H.E.H. Nizam v. B. G. Keskar (A.LR. 1955 Hyderabad 264) that “there are three classes of contempt; one is committed by scandalising the Court, another by abusing parties who are concerned in the case and the third by prejudicing mankind against persons before the case is heard.”
R. v. Almon, Wilmot’s Notes, p. 294. The judgement was written in 1765, but was not published until 1802.
Aswini Kurnar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, 1953 S.C.J. 38 at pp. 38–39
Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago, (1936) A.C. 322
Hira Lal Dixit v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 S.C.J.846 at 850
a In Bridges v. California (314 U.S. 252) the argument based on the ground of undermining administration of justice was rejected by the Court, Black, J., observing, “We must therefore turn to the particular utterances here in question and the circumstances of their publication to determine to what extent the substantive evil of unfair administration of justice was a likely consequence, and whether the degree of likelihood was sufficient to justify summary punishment.” As to disrespect for the judiciary alleged in the case, the learned Judge said: “It is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.” (at p. 271) Again, in Craig y. Harney (331 U.S. 367) the Supreme Court observed: “… the vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it enkindles must constitute an imminent, not merely likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote, or even probable; it must immediately imperil.” (at p. 376)
The Indian judges would follow the decision in R. v. Evening Standard and others (1924) 40 T.L.R. 833, in which Lord Hewart described the amateur detectives employed by the newspapers concerned as men “who bring to an ignorance of the law of evidence a complete disregard of the interests alike of the prosecution and the defence.” Since the decision in this case there has been nothing in the nature of trial by newspaper in England. But there is still some danger of prejudicing a fair trial in the lawful publication of proceedings before Magistrates prior to the committal of the accused for trial, especially because the accused usually reserves his defence and therefore what is reported is only the case for the prosecution. The reports of coroner’s inquests in cases involving murder or manslaughter may constitute a real and substantial danger, in as much as the trial jury may, from such reports before hearing the case form a preconceived opinion adverse to the accused; and these reports are of proceedings which are not restricted by the rules of evidence in force in a criminal court.
Surendranath Banes jea v. Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of Bengal, (1883) 10 Indian Appeals 171.
A Court of Record is a Court whose acts and proceedings are enrolled for permanent memorial and testimony. These records are regarded to he of such high authority that their truth cannot be questioned in any Court, though the Court of Record itself may amend clerical slips and errors. A Court of Record has the power to fine and imprison for contempt of its authority, so that, according to Stephen, any Court possessing this power may be called a Court of Record. (Stephen, Commentaries, Vol. I, pp. 58–59 )
Legal Remembrancer y. B. B. Das Gupta, A.I.R. 1954 Patna 204
Talhara Cotton Ginning Compan2’ v. Kashinath Gangadhar Namjoshi, I.L.R. (1940) Nagpur 69.
In re Motilal Ghose and others, (1918) I.L.R. 45 Calcutta 169 at p. 233
a State v. Editors and Publishers of Eastern Times and Prajatantra, A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 318.
a. Legal Remembrancer v. B. B. Das Gupta, A.I.R. 1954 Patna 204
Courtney Turrell, C. J., observed in Jnanendra Prasad Bose v. Go pal Prasad Sen (I.L.R. 1932 Patna 172 at 177): “Courts of record have inherent power to punish con-tempts of their authority, whether committed in the face of the Court or whether committed vicariously upon the persons of their officers. It was, however, not thought fit to give power of that character to subordinate Courts. The express provisions of section 228 (of the Indian Penal Code) set forth the contempt of inferior courts which are punishable under the Code and it was subsequently held that contempts, which would be certainly contempts of a Court of record, if they do not come within the provisions of section 228 or any other section, cannot be punished as offences of the character of contempt of Court. And it was further held that the High Courts of record cannot punish contempts of the inferior Courts. Subsequently the Contempt of Court Act (of 1926) was passed, which enabled the superior Courts to punish contempts of the inferior courts, notwithstanding that such contempt as is complained of is not an offence (as contempt) against any of the sections of the Indian Penal Code and the object is that as to contempts considered as contempts of the Court which are punishable by the Indian Penal Code they shall not be taken cognizance of by the High Court.”
Surendranath Banerjea v. The Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court of Bengal, (1883) 10 Indian Appeals 171
Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1953 S.C.J. 3e Weston v. Editor, Printer and Publisher of “the Bengalee”, (1911) 15 C.W.N. 771; N. N. Choudhuri v. Bela Bala Devi, A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 702.
N. N. Choudhuri v. Bela Bala Devi, A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 702
Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court, 1954 S.C.J. 67
Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court, 1954 S.C.J. 67
Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor, (1945) 72 Indian Appeals 189
M. S. M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sharma, 1959 S.C. J. 925 at 944
G. K. Reddy v. Nafisul Hasan, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 636
M. S. M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, 1959 S.C.J. 925 at 944
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Minattur, J. (1961). Contempt of Court and of Legislature. In: Freedom of the Press in India. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9103-6_6
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