Concluding Remarks

Abstract

This, then, is Brentano’s analysis of truth. It is illuminating and thorough but it is neither complete nor final. I tried to present it as such, and I am sure Brentano himself would agree. But to say this is not to deny that he regarded some of his results as conclusive nor yet to deny that they were conclusive. One of his more important a-chievements lies in demonstrating that the concept of truth is not a concept of a property, quality or feature of either the universe or of our judgements. To say that a judgement is true is tantamount to saying that he who passed this judgement did not err. This sensible view removes the temptation to regard the analysis of truth as a cure-all or, at the very least, as the starting-point of any proper investigation. It leaves entirely open the problem of determining whether we have or have not erred. It could be argued that the concept of evidence fills this space, but the real import of saying that I have passed an evident judgement is that I am sure of my judgement. Why I am sure could be, and unless more is said, must be, regarded as an open question. It was suggested that the certainty derives from the scrutiny or the awareness of the nature of concepts used in the case of judgements ‘a priori’. In the case of judgements ‘a posteriori’, only introspective judgements are evident, this largely because they simply cannot be questioned.¹ It will be clear that both these points are elements of philosophical theory, independent of the claim that to pass an evident judgement is to be really sure of the judgement that we are making. It is, however, self-contradictory to assert that I have in this sense judged with evidence, but perhaps I am mistaken. Some doubt may be cast on this opinion because Brentano oscillates between saying that evident judgements are those of which I am really sure, i.e., those that seem evidently true to me while I am passing them, and talking as if evident judgements were always self-evident in the sense of logically certifiable. However, I think that the above opinion is in the main correct since the view that I can pass an evident judgement and yet be mistaken seems to be held quite firmly.