Late Position (Positive Part)

Abstract

The solution of the problem posed at the end of the last chapter is attempted by Brentano in his ultimate positive account of truth. This account is very cautious; it refers to evidently true judgements and ultimately comes to saying that a properly established judgement is what we call a true judgement. But does this really amount to a full and satisfactory analysis of the concept of truth? In a way, yes. Many misconceptions have been removed and many important features of the problem brought to light. The main source of error — linguistic naïveté — was pointed out and analysed. We now have a much firmer and more sophisticated conception of truth. Lastly but not least, we are provided with an explanation that accounts for the use and usage of the phrase “X is true”. This explanation is not circular since it explains ‘true judgement’ by reference to ‘evident judgement’. In another way we are not satisfied. We feel that the metaphysical puzzle has not been resolved satisfactorily; it tends to reappear if we scrutinise the phrase ‘evident judgement’. Furthermore, we might find that the actual ‘reduction’¹ is not quite satisfactory. Perhaps it was not sufficiently demonstrated that the account offered is an account of the meaning of ‘true’. Perhaps no answer was really provided to the question: “What do we mean by the words ‘X is true’? ”.