Abstract
It is now time to consider Brentano’s final position concerning the problem of truth. Several of his writings contain relevant passages.1 I shall firstly consider his ultimate criticisms of the correspondence theory of truth, and pass on to his positive suggestions later on. In order to do this I shall take a number of papers together and pick passages and arguments in the order which suits me. In discussing any argument I may refer to relevant passages in any of Brentano’s writings. The five papers mentioned in the footnote on this page will, however, form the main text to which I shall refer. Towards the end of the discussion the problem of evidence will have to be considered as well. My purpose, as in the previous sections, is not merely to interpret Brentano, but to learn from his arguments as much as possible about the problem of truth and its difficulties. I also hope to find some help by paying attention to Brentano’s insight into the problem, as evidenced in those arguments. What I think to be the most important insight or the most illuminating passage might not always be what Brentano himself would have regarded as such. It is however what I shall pay closest attention to. One could therefore maintain that the resultant picture is not always a really good picture of what Brentano would regard as the correct and balanced view concerning truth, but more a picture of what I regard as Brentano’s important and interesting contribution to the subject. On the other hand, paying due regard to the character of Brentano’s philosophy, it could be maintained that the approach which I have adopted is the only one that suits the subject really well. I am inclined to think that this is correct and that my representation of Brentano is fair. If, however, we wish to say that scholarship consists in tracing out what the man actually said and what precisely he meant when saying these words, then this is not what I am aiming at. By this I mean that such is neither the primary nor the sole aim of the book. Perhaps it is safer to say that this account should not be primarily thought of as a scholarly investigation.
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References
Five papers are particularly important here. Three of these were published in W&E, pp. 121-39. They are: (i) “Zur Frage der Existenz der Inhalte und von der adequation rei et intellectus.” (Nov. 20. 1914) (ii) “Über den Sinn des Satzes: “veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus”.” (May 11, 1915.) (iii) “Über den Satz: “veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus”. ” (EL. 45) Two were not published as far as I know. They are: (iv) “Über den Sinn und die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung des Satzes: “veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus”.” (May 12, 1915) Translated in Appendix ‘ C”. (EL. 28) (v) “Kurzer Abriss einer allgemeinen Erkenntnistheorie”1, (no date.) Chapter 4 translated in Appendix “D”. (EL. 96).
In seinem Geiste.
Brentano holds that a true judgement is either immediately evident, or else it agrees with an evident judgement or a set of evident judgements. (The double judgement analysisof the terms a, e, i, o ties in with this view.)
See W&E (OK. 168). I list words which one might, at times, be tempted to use to translate ‘res’.
The German word used is ‘Gleichheitsverhältnis’.
‘Mind’ and ‘understanding’ are used by me for ‘intellectus’.
If two different judgements correspond with the same state of affairs, how are either of them to be verified? (See the Gorgias difficulty.) If meaning is determined by verification they become identical and 1/1 correlation obtains, but is this really plausible?
Even though it implies some further facts, e.g. that someone or some people created a ‘centaur’, but this is, of course, quite a different matter.
Cf. Strawson, ASP Symposium.
See Chapter IV, Section 2 above — the expedient is directed at negative judgements only.
Discussed in the preceeding paragraphs.
The German text reads: “Temporal modalisierten Urteile”. (See OK. 169).
This is in direct contrast to the paper discussed in Chapter II, Section 1.
Cf. W&E, p. 133. This suggestion is not as preposterous as it might seem when offered as an explanation and not as a criterion of truth.
Compare here Austin’s ingenuous interpretation in ASP Symposium.
Compare here the correspondence of statement with facts, states of affairs, what is the case, etc.
Representation — mere idea, is different from judgement in that it has a different in-tentional relation to its object — the idea cannot be the object of a judgement unless of course the judgement is about an idea. The concrete thing can be the object of an idea and of a judgment.
Cf. Strawson: ASP Symposium and Anal. IX.
Despite this, I am of the opinion that this position is plausible. If it is adjusted in the light of the above it becomes very nearly satisfactory. Vide: — my article “It is True” in “Mind” 1965/6.
Again I list these words that one is at times tempted to use in translation of ‘intellectus’
The ‘act seen in abstracto’ comes very close to what I would wish to call assertion.
Quite clearly, the said correspondence, is not the mental act.
This is the minimum requirement.
Consideration of this involves some reference to all relevant points.
See Appendix “D”, para. 2.
This was not discussed by Brentano; a further difficulty would arise out of an attempt to distinguish the required correspondence from the intentional relation which characterises judgement. Cf. above para. 7.
Vorstellung.
See W&E, p. 3 ff. The reply below does not answer this criticism. 10 Cf. here also Most p. 23 ff.
Cf. Strawson, ASP Symposium and Anal. IX.
Cf. the Gorgias difficulty.
This may lead to something like the view of J. L. Austin; See ASP Symposium.
This is not parallel to the view of Strawson for obvious reasons.
See Sprechen und Denken.
This is what Brentano would say.
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© 1965 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Srzednicki, J. (1965). Late Position (Critical Part). In: Franz Brentano’s Analysis of Truth. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9094-7_5
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