The Transition and Background

Abstract

The theory of mentality was an important part of Brentano’s overall philosophical position, and it is often enough regarded as its mainspring. We could term it more precisely the theory of mental acts. Brentano’s psychology was, of course, of independent importance. His distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology, his theory of intentional relations, his criticism of faculty psychology and of the attempts to base it entirely on physiology, were extremely influential, so that Brentano was always regarded as one of the important figures in the development of psychology, even when philosophers tended to overlook his work. Brentano himself regarded psychology as the basic discipline in the field of humanities. But, as I have argued in Chapter II, this was a mistaken view, amounting to taking the term ‘humanities’ literally and drawing spurious conclusions from this unwarranted assumption. The whole view rested on the confusion between logical, methodological and psychological investigations. In Brentano’s writings there is ample evidence of it. Consequently it is a mistake to take his word for it and regard psychology as central for his wrhole philosophical position. It is also a mistake to regard developments in this field as operative changes for all other areas of discourse. In fact, the core of his position was formed by logical analysis, particularly analysis of linguistic function. Further, it consisted of methodological analysis — the two, often enough, closely bound together. It is his insistence that both psychology and philosophy are sciences and his views concerning proper philosophical methods as well as proper methods in descriptive and genetic psychology that determine the character of Brentano’s position. In philosophy he regarded careful investigation, with proper regard to particular points, as of paramount importance. Audacious theorising was definitely suspect, as it amounted to a “mad dance with ideas”; the proper approach was to be based on “careful psychological analysis”, i.e., on careful logical investigation.¹ His analysis of linguistic function, his discovery of systematically misleading features of language, were the most important features of this investigation. Psychology was to be approached empirically but with due regard being paid to the important regularities — Brentano was well aware of the dangers of thoughtless amassing of unrelated empirical data. Here the logico-philosophical analysis again came into its own; it determined the character and direction of psychological investigations. Thus Brentano was a philosopher first and foremost. His philosophy enabled him to make important advances in the field of psychology but, characteristically, they were philosophers’ advances. The character of the science, its method and its basic concepts were investigated, analysed and conceived anew in an illuminating and fruitful way. I am inclined to regard psychology as one of the most important fields in which Brentano applied his logico-philosophical discoveries. Generally, however, the unity of this and other fields of Brentano’s research activity is taken at his own valuation and consequently overstressed on the one hand and on the other hand, regarded in the wrong way. In saying this, I do not wish to deny that there is some connection between these investigations, or that it is illuminating or important to consider all the aspects of Brentano’s position. Consequently I shall devote this section to the discussion of his theory of psychical phenomena.