Abstract
Let us now turn our attention to Brentano’s conception of some general philosophical difficulties. I feel that on this background we will be in a better position to understand his later analysis of truth.1 The main point made in Sprechen und Denken is that the grammatical and syntactical structure of language is misleading if taken uncritically as a guide to the logical character and function of our statements. One has to find out what is the actual use of a given phrase before one is in a position to decide what we really mean to say when we express ourselves in this or that way. The presentation of the paper is sometimes misleading and might, though it need not, lead to misunderstandings. In places, Brentano seems to misconstrue the apparent philosophical errors implied by linguistic usages, by regarding them as errors committed either by people who use the language unthinkingly, or by the people who evolved the language in the first place. He tends to treat the language as if it represented a philosophical view, and he appears to be saying that one who does not share such philosophical errors can still use the language provided he means something different, i.e., if he is at least aware of the proper reduction of what he says:
“Therefore he will … use the common modes of speech, but … (he) conjoins them with a completely different sense.”
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References
My reference in this chapter is an unpublished manuscript under the title: Sprechen und Denken, dating from 1905. Parts of it were published in LRU. It bears the code number EL. 66 and appears as appendix A at the end of this book. All quotations in this chapter are from this MS.
Philosophical Investigations, (Blackwell), 1951.
And surely also about the character and function of concepts or words (cf. here the psychological fallacy).
Italics mine.
See Appendix “A”.
We could say that the forms of thought — the types of linguistic usage, are more varied than the grammatical forms could ever be.
The people who use language.
At another point he denies it himself, but this mode of speech is, to say the least, grossly misleading — see Appendix “A”.
It is an example of a Ptolemaic view embodied in language, and ‘That there is enough space’ can be substituted for our purpose.
Insofar as it goes, and with certain reservations. See L. Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations and The Brown and The Blue Book.
See Appendix “A”.
See Chapter I.
Compare here Strawson’s discussion of fact, also Herbst and Mackie in AJP.
Note the psychological fallacy.
Brentano’s own parentheses.
I have added the word ‘may’ in brackets — it is clear from Brentano’s writings that he could not intend to imply that this’ something’ cannot exist, i.e., he believes that an existing thing can be an object of perception.
Having changed his mind, Brentano might have thought of it as re-interpretation or elucidation of the old statement, hence his protest that he never accepted entia rationis.
The original sentence is very unclear. I took the liberty of rendering its sense rather than its form. (Compare also O.K. 103.)
See Chapter II, section 1.
See Chapter IV, section 3.
‘Appear’ and ‘disappear’ are used to mean coming into and going out of existence; these terms can apply to objects, qualities and feeling, i.e., to reality.
In this place Brentano used a bracket. I put the sentence in footnote for the sake of clarity of style. It reads: (to add this, in order to guard oneself against the propensity to take other dealings with supposed entia rationis).
i.e., the disappearance of A.
i.e., it is the case that the disappearance of A alone would give sufficient and complete grounds for asserting “There is no A”.
Brentano means to say that unless this equivalence is admitted, in the required sense, one could not use entia rationis as an explanation of the difference between correct and incorrect judgement. (O.K. 119 argues the point fully.)
It is not thereby claimed that the expression ‘to imagine the impossibility of b’ is erroneous when used unphilosophically, but merely that it is philosophically misleading and that it is erroneous to suppose that its form indicates its logical character. (cf. Carnap’s discussion of semantics; semantics would seem to be an attempt to remedy such failings of language.)
The original reads ‘Urteil’. Usually I translate this word by ‘judgement’; here it would be misleading.
The original reads ‘Vorstellens’.
e.g. ‘future’, ‘past’, ‘the past’, etc.
Objects’ are not meant to indicate material objects as entities, e.g., qualities are acceptable.
i.e., whatever Marty would call ens rationis.
It is impossible to render the meaning of the german text in anything like the original form. The words in brackets put in explicit form what is implied but not stated in the original. Elsewhere this very point was stated explicitly by Brentano himself.
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© 1965 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Srzednicki, J. (1965). The Transition. In: Franz Brentano’s Analysis of Truth. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9094-7_3
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