Social Remarks

Abstract

Epictetus’ individual ethics, at any rate once the apparent excesses have been trimmed, is essentially an ethics of freedom from psychological slavery. And this need not be incompatible with interest in people and things. Nor is Epictetus unaware of this. Thus, as we already had occasion to notice (in section 24), training for life embraces for him developing social tendencies. Or, as he puts it in a different connection, the “ideal” for man (his aretē) includes being “fair,” as well as such self-regarding habits as “restraint” and “self-control” (III.1.7-9; and below). Also, the individual can enjoy the “sight” and “company” of others (IV.4.26-8), and can be a family man (III.21.5, 2.4, etc.) and clean; for cleanliness is both a private and a social desideratum, so that a dirty man might as well go live in the “wilderness” (IV.rr.13-8). The individual needn’t be a recluse (cp. ƒ 1), and can even risk death for his family and country (M32.3).