As shown above, the course of Sino-Tibetan relations since 1951 has passed through a number of distinct stages, differentiated by varying emphasis on alternate goals, changes in the modalities of operational strategy, shifts in the choice of tactics and executory instrumentalities. Nor is this process yet at an end, for one can safely expect further adjustments, improvisations, and mapping of new tactics in Peking’s continuing struggle for undisputed mastery of Tibet. Still, a basic pattern has by now been set and much of what will be tried in the foreseeable future by the Communist Chinese leadership in its drive further to consolidate its hold on the region will be influenced and determined, both positively and negatively, by its experience so far on this score. So as better to gauge the prospects ahead of Tibet in its unwilling political association with the Chinese People’s Republic and try to chart the country’s likely path of proximate evolution under such conditions, a brief recapitulation of the record up to this point seems in order. Since the Communist Chinese profess to believe in historical determinism, one can with profit humor them on this occasion by best attempting tentatively to predict what the next few years hold in store for Tibet through extrapolation from, and projection of the lessons of, the first dozen years of the area’s existence under the present regime.
KeywordsLatent Residue Chinese Authority Resistance Movement Democratic Reform Ancien Regime
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- 1.Prime Minister’s Statement in the Lok Sabha on April 27, 1959, in Chanakya Sen, Tibet Disappears (New York, 1960), p. 190.Google Scholar
- 1.New York Times, February 21, 1955, p. 20.Google Scholar
- 1.SCMP, No. 2250, May 4, 1960, p. 17; No. 2489, May 4, 1961, p. 30; No. 2495, May 12, 1961, p. 26; No. 2533, July 10, 1961, p. 27. Chang Ching-wu, “On Correct Implementation of the Party’s Policies and Measures for Democratic Reform in Tibet,” Jen-min jih-pao, May 25, 1962.Google Scholar
- 1.In the above article by Chang Ching-wu, for instance, he mentions in connection with the land confiscation and distribution program that “in the course of the reform, while the overwhelming majority of cadres were able to appreciate and carry out the Party policies fully and seriously, there had once been a small number of cadres who failed to arrive at an all-round understanding of the Party policy of ‘buying out’. The Party educated them on this policy, and explained to them the necessity and possibility of enforcing the ‘buying out’ policy in the democratic reform in Tibet. As a result, this small number of cadres had since raised their ideological understanding, and promptly corrected their shortcoming in work.”Google Scholar
- 1.Jen-min jih-pao, May 25, 1962. Problems of Peace and Socialism, Vol. 4, No. 9, p. 58 (September, 1961), claimed that “last year … over a thousand in Tibet” joined the Communist Party of China. Exactly the same numbers as those cited by Chang Ching-wu, however, are reported as having been produced by Fan Ming, Secretary of the Chinese Communist party’s Tibet Work Committee as far back as late 1957, F. Moraes, The Revolt in Tibet, p. 75. Either the statistics given by Chang Ching-wu represent new increments to the Party’s ranks and not its total effectives, with the added possibility that of the 1,000 new members mentioned by Problems of Peace and Socialism, only a few were of Tibetan origin and the rest local Chinese settlers, soldiers and cadres; or, if Chang Ching-wu’s figures are a total count and represent fresh membership, then all the Tibetans recruited to the Party prior to 1959 either fled or resigned or were purged from its ranks during the revolt, and the Party had to start all over after the failure of the uprising. Available data does not permit to determine which of these alternatives is the right one.Google Scholar